PART V. FREEWILL PROVED TO BE A LIE.

PART V. FREEWILL PROVED TO BE A LIE.

SECTION 1. How Luther proposes to conduct the fight.

WE have now arrived at the last part of this treatise, in which, according to promise, I ought to lead out my own forces against Freewill. But I will not produce them all; for who could do this in a small work, when the whole Scripture is on my side, every point and letter of it. Nor is there any need to do so, since Freewill has already been vanquished and laid prostrate by a twofold victory: vanquished by my having proved that all is against her, which she thought was for her; vanquished again, by my having shown that all those proofs which she had a mind to confute, remain invincible. Besides, even if she were not already vanquished, it would be enough to prostrate her by one or two lances. For what need is there, when an enemy has been slain by some single weapon, to pierce him through and through with many more as he lies dead. I will therefore be short now, if the subject allows me; and out of the vast variety of armies which I might lead forth into the field, I will summon only two general officers, with a select portion of their legions. These are Paul and SECT. 2. Rom 1.18 pronounces sentence upon Freewill.

Paul, writing to the Romans, thus enters his argument in behalf of the grace of God against Freewill. "The wrath of God," he says, "is revealed from heaven upon all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness." In these words, you hear a general sentence pronounced upon all men, that they are under the wrath of God.

What else is this, if not that they are worthy of wrath and punishment?

He assigns as the cause of this anger, that they do nothing but what is worthy of wrath and punishment; that all, truly, are ungodly and unjust, and hold the truth in unrighteousness. Where now is that power of Freewill which endeavours after something good? Paul represents it to be deserving of the wrath of God, and passes sentence upon it as ungodly and unjust. Now, that which is ungodly and deserves wrath, endeavours and has power, not for grace, but against it.

Luther will be laughed at here for his carelessness in not having examined Paul's text sufficiently; and some will say that in this passage, Paul does not speak of all men, nor of all their endeavours, but only of those who are ungodly and unjust — those, as his words express it, who detain the truth in unrighteousness. And so it does not follow that all are of this character. I remark upon this, that for Paul, it is the same thing to say,

'upon all ungodliness of men,' as to say, 'upon the ungodliness of all men;' for Paul hebraizes almost everywhere. So that his meaning is, 'all men are ungodly and unjust, and detain the truth in unrighteousness; therefore all men are worthy of wrath.'

Besides, it is not the relative that is used in the Greek text — of those who — but the article, thus: 'The wrath of God is revealed upon the ungodliness and injustice of men, detaining as they do the truth in unrighteousness.' — So that this is a sort of epithet applied to all men:

'That they detain the truth in unrighteousness;' just as it is an epithet when it is said, 'Our Father who is in heaven;' it might otherwise be expressed this way, 'Our heavenly Father,' or 'Our Father in the heavens,'

For the expression is used to distinguish them from those who believe and are godly.

But let these suggestions be frivolous and vain, if the very thread of Paul's argument does not constrain and prove them. He had said just before this, "The Gospel is the power of God unto salvation, to everyone who believes; to the Jew first and also to the Greek."

The words used here are not obscure or ambiguous: 'To the Jews and to the Greeks — that is, to all men — the Gospel of the power of God is necessary in order that believers may be saved from the wrath which is revealed.' He declares the Jews — who excelled other nations in righteousness, in the law of God, and in the power of Freewill — to be without any difference, both destitute of the power of God, and also in need of it, that they may be saved from the revealed wrath. When he makes that power necessary to them, does he not reckon them to be under wrath, I ask? What men would you assume not to be liable to the wrath of God, when you are compelled to believe that the greatest men in the world — the Jews and the Greeks for instance — are not so? Again; whom will you except amidst those Jews and Greeks, when Paul embraces them all under one name, without any distinction; and subjects them all to the same sentence? Is it to be supposed that there were no individuals in these two most eminent nations, who strove after honesty? Were there none who endeavoured to the uttermost of Freewill? Yet, Paul does not heed this at all. He puts them all under wrath; he pronounces them all ungodly and unjust. Must we not suppose that the rest of the Apostles, by a like sentence, also cast all the other nations, and each individual of them in his lot, as one mass of condemnation, under the curse and dominion of this wrath?

SECT. 3. A published Gospel proves lack of knowledge in the natural man, as well as lack of power.

This passage of Paul's (Rom 1.18) therefore stands boldly, and insists that Freewill, or the most excellent thing in men — even in those who are most eminent, even in those who are endowed with the law, justice, wisdom and all virtues — is ungodly and unjust, and deserves the wrath of God.

Otherwise, Paul's argument falls to the ground. But if it stands, then his division by which he distributes salvation to those who believe the Gospel, and wrath to all the rest, leaves no man midway between them.

He represents believers as righteous; and unbelievers as ungodly, unrighteous, and subject to wrath. For all he means to say is this: 'the righteousness of God is revealed in the Gospel, that it is by faith.'

Therefore, all men are ungodly and unrighteous, seeing that it would be foolish in God to reveal righteousness to men, which they either knew, or possessed its seeds already. But seeing that God is no fool, and yet He reveals a righteousness of salvation, it is manifest that Freewill, even in the greatest of men, not only has nothing and can do nothing, but it does not even know what is just in the sight of God. Not unless you choose to say that the righteousness of God is not revealed to those best of men, but only to the baser sort. That would be in opposition to Paul's boast that he is a debtor to the Jew and to the Greek, to the wise and to the unwise, to the barbarian and to the Greek. So then, comprehending that all men without exception are in one mass here, Paul concludes that all of them are ungodly, unjust, and ignorant of righteousness and faith. This is how far they are from being able to will or to do any good thing.

This is a firm conclusion from the premise that God reveals a righteousness of salvation to them, as they are ignorant and sitting in darkness — why then, of themselves, they are ignorant. Now, those who do not know a righteousness of salvation, are assuredly under wrath and damnation. They cannot extricate themselves from it because of their ignorance; nor can they even endeavour to be extricated. For what endeavour can you make if you do not know what, where from, where to, or how far you are to endeavour.

SECT. 4. Experience confirms Paul's argument. Freewill neither conceives the truth, nor can endure it.

Fact and experience agree with this conclusion. Show me a single individual out of the whole race of mortals — even if he is the holiest and most righteous of all men — who ever conceived that this is the way to righteousness and salvation: truly to believe in Him who is at the same time God and man; who has died for the sins of men, and who has risen again, and is seated at the right hand of the Father? Or, who ever dreamed of this wrath of God, which Paul declares here to be revealed from heaven? Look at the Jews, continually taught, as they have been, by so many miracles, and by so many Prophets. What, do they think of this way? Not only have they declined accepting it, but they even hate it to such a degree that there is not a nation under heaven which has persecuted Christ more atrociously to this very day. And yet, who would dare to say that there has not been a single individual in such a multitude of people, who has cultivated his free will, and endeavoured to effect something by its power? How is it, then, that all men try after something different from this? How is it that the most excellent of men have not only neglected to cultivate this method of righteousness, and indeed been ignorant of it, but now that it has been published and revealed, they have repelled it with the most consummate hatred, and have been eager to destroy it?

So that, in 1Cor 1.23, Paul declares that this way of salvation is a stumbling-block to the Jews, and foolishness to the Gentiles.

Now, since he mentions Gentiles and Jews indiscriminately, and since it is certain that the Jews and the Gentiles are the chief people under heaven; it is at the same time certain that Freewill is nothing but the greatest enemy of righteousness and of man's salvation. This is because it cannot be, but that some among these Jews and Gentiles have acted and endeavoured with the uttermost power of Freewill. And yet, with this very

Freewill they have done nothing but wage war against grace. Go now, and say that Freewill endeavours after good, when goodness and righteousness itself is a stumbling-block and foolishness to her! Nor can you say that this verse pertains to some, but not to all. Paul speaks indiscriminately of all when he says, "to the Gentiles foolishness, and to the Jews a stumbling-block." He excepts none but those that believe. "To us," he says — that is, to the called and sanctified — "he is the power and wisdom of God." He does not say, 'to some Gentiles,' or 'to some Jews;' but simply 'to the Gentiles and to the Jews who are not of us.' Thus he makes a division which is very plain, between the believing and the unbelieving, leaving not a single individual midway between the two.

Now, we are talking about Gentiles who do not have the grace of God.

Paul says that the righteousness of God is foolishness to them, and they abhor it! So much for this amiable endeavour of Freewill after good.

SECT. 5. Paul expressly names the greatest of the Greeks, and afterwards condemns the Jews indiscriminately.

Again; see whether he does not himself adduce the very greatest of the Greeks as examples of his assertion, when he says that the wiser of them were made foolish, and their heart was darkened. Rom 1.20-21 Also, that that they were made vain by their reasonings; that is, by their wily

What, does he not here lay his hands upon what is highest and most excellent among the Greeks, when he lays hold of their reasonings? These are their highest and best thoughts and opinions, which they considered solid wisdom. But this wisdom, which elsewhere he calls foolish in them, here he calls vain. And he says that, with much endeavouring, it went from bad to worse: so that at length their heart was darkened, and they worshipped idols, and performed the monstrous acts which he records in the following verses.

If the best endeavours and performance, then, in the best of the Gentiles, is evil and wicked, what do you think of the remaining multitude — being, as they were, even a worse sort of heathens? For again. neither does he differentiate here between the better sort; without any respect of persons, he condemns their search after wisdom. Now, when the very act or endeavour is condemned, the endeavourers, whoever they are, are condemned also, even though they may have done what they did with the uttermost might of Freewill. Their very best effort, I say, is declared to be faulty — how much more, then, are the persons employed in it!

Presently, in like manner, he also rejects the Jews without any distinction, as being Jews in the letter and not in the spirit. Rom 2.27:

"You, by the letter and circumcision, dishonour God," he says. And again; "For he is not a Jew who is a Jew openly, but who is a Jew secretly." Rom

2.29 What can be plainer than this division? The outside Jew is a transgressor of the law. But how many Jews were there, do you think, who had no faith — men of the greatest wisdom, devotion and honesty, who strove after justice and truth with the greatest earnestness of endeavour? So too, he often bears this record of them: that they have a zeal for God, that they follow after the righteousness of the law, that they labour day and night to obtain salvation, and that they live blameless!

And yet they are transgressors of the law, because they are not Jews in spirit, but are even obstinate in their resistance to the righteousness of faith. What remains, then, if not that Freewill is the worst when it is best; and the more it endeavours, the worse it is made. The words are clear; the division is one which allows for no doubt; there is nothing which can be controverted.

SECT.6. Paul's epilogue establishes his meaning.

But let us hear Paul himself as his own interpreter. Making a sort of epilogue to his argument, he says in Rom 3.9, "What then? Do we excel them? By no means. For we have charged both Jews and Greeks, that they are all under sin."

What has become of Freewill now? All Jews and Greeks, he says, are under sin. Are there any tropes or knots here? What can a qualified interpretation, in which the whole world might join, avail against this sentence which is so plain? He says 'all,' which excepts none. He who lays it down that they are under sin — that is, that they are servants of sin — leaves nothing good in them. But where has he preferred this charge, that all the Jews and the Gentiles are under sin? Nowhere else; only where I have shown that he does so; that is, when he says, "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven upon all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men."

Rom 1.18 In the words which follow, he proves this by experience. For being displeasing to God, they were subjected to so many vices — convicted as it were by the fruits of their ungodliness — such that, they will and do nothing but evil. He then enters into judgment with the Jews separately, charging the Jew with being a transgressor of the letter; and in like manner, he proves this by their fruits and by experience: "You preach that man should not steal, and you steal. You abhor idols, yet you commit sacrilege." Rom 2.21-22 He excepts none, unless they are in spirit

Jews. Nor have you any outlet of escape here, by saying, 'Although they are under sin, what is best in them — such as reason and will — endeavours towards good.' But if good endeavour remains in them, then

Paul's assertion that they are under sin is false. For when he specifies Jews and Gentiles, he comprehends whatever is in Jews and Gentiles — unless you invert his words, and suppose he had written, 'The flesh of all

Jews and Greeks is under sin' — that is, their grosser affections.

But the wrath of God, which is revealed from heaven upon them, will condemn their whole substance unless they are justified by the Spirit.

And this would not be so, unless their whole substance was under sin.

SECT. 7. Paul is justified in his quotations.

But let us see how Paul proves his sentiment from the Scriptures — whether the words are more to the point as we read them quoted in Paul, than as we read them in their own places. Paul says,

"As it is written, for there is none righteous, no not one; there is none that understands: there is none that seeks after God. They have all gone out of the way; they have together become abominable; there is none that does good; no, not one," etc. Rom 3.10-12

Let whoever can, give me a commodious interpretation here. Let whoever dares, invent his tropes; complain that the words are ambiguous and obscure, and defend Freewill against these severe condemnations. Then I will willingly yield and recant, and become a confessor and assertor of Freewill. It is clear these things are said of all men; for the Prophet introduces God looking upon all men, and pronouncing this sentence upon them. He says in Psa 14.2-3, "The Lord looked out from heaven upon the sons of men, to see if there were any that understands or seeks after God. But they have all gone out of the way," etc. And Paul prevents the Jews from thinking that these things do not belong to them, by asserting that they especially belong to them. "We know, he says, that whatever the law says, it says to those who are under the law." Rom 3.19 He meant the same, where he said in Rom 1.16, "To the Jew first, and also to You hear, therefore, that all the sons of men, all who are under the law — that is, Gentiles as well as Jews — are unjust in the judgment of God.

They do not understand, do not seek after God — no, not even one of them — but all go out of the way, and are unprofitable. I suppose, now, that among the sons of men, and those who are under the law, are also numbered those who are the best and most honourable; those who by the power of Freewill, endeavour after what is honourable and good; and those whom Diatribe boasts about, as having the sense and the seeds of honesty implanted in them — unless perhaps, she maintains that those

How can someone endeavour after good, then, if all are universally ignorant of God, and neither care for, nor seek after him? How can someone possess a power which is profitable for good, if all turn away from good, and are altogether unprofitable? Do we not know what it means to be ignorant of God, not to understand, not to seek after God, not to fear God — to turn aside, out of the way, and be unprofitable? Are the words not most plain, and do they not teach that all men are both ignorant of God, and despise God? And then, as the next step, that they turn aside towards evil, and are unprofitable for good? We are not talking about ignorance in seeking food, or about contempt of money, but about ignorance and contempt of religion and piety. It is an ignorance and contempt which, beyond all question, are not seated in the flesh, and in the inferior and grosser affections, but in those highest and most excellent powers of man in which justice, piety, the knowledge and the reverence of God ought to reign. That is, these are in the rational faculty and in the will — and so, in the very power of Freewill itself; in the very seed of honesty, or in the very heart of that which is most excellent in man.

Where are you now, my Diatribe, who previously promised that you would willingly agree concerning the most excellent thing in man, that it is flesh — that is, ungodly — if it were proved by Scripture. Agree to this now, therefore, hearing as you do that the most excellent thing in all men is not only impious, but ignorant of God, a contemner of God, turned towards evil, and unprofitable as to good. For what is it to be unjust, if not that the will, which is one of the most excellent things in man, is unjust?

What does it mean to have no understanding of God and of good, if not that the understanding, which is another of the most excellent things in man, is ignorant of God and of good — that is, it is blind to the knowledge of godliness? What does it mean to have gone out of the way, and to be unprofitable, if not for men to lack any power in any part of them — and least of all in those parts of them which are most excellent — to do good, but only to do evil? What does it mean not to fear God, if not for men, in all their parts —especially in those better parts of yours — to be despisers of God? Now, to be despisers of God, is to be at the same time despisers of all the things of God; for instance, of the words, works, laws, precepts, and will of God. Now, what can the understanding dictate that is right, when she is herself blind and ignorant? What can the will choose that is good, when she is herself evil and unprofitable? Indeed, what can the will follow after, when the understanding dictates nothing to her, save the darkness of her own blindness and ignorance? If the understanding, then, is in a state of error, and the will is in a state of averseness, what good can the man either do or attempt?

SECT. 8. The Prophet's condemnation includes power, as well as act.

But someone may perhaps venture a sophistical distinction, and say that, although the will turns aside and the understanding is ignorant in action, the will notwithstanding is able to endeavour, and the understanding is able to get knowledge, by their own powers respectively — seeing that we have power to do many things which we do not, however, actually perform, for our question truly is about power, not performance.

I reply; the words of the Prophet include both act and power; and it is the same thing to say, 'Man does not seek after God,' as it would be to say,

'Man cannot seek after God.' This is an assertion which may be gathered from this: 'If there were a power or force in man to will good — seeing that he is not allowed to rest or take his pastime, through the impulse of the divine omnipotence, as I have shown above' — it could only be that this power was moved towards something , or at least in some one thing, and it was displayed by some sort of use.

This however is not the case; because God looks down from heaven, and does not see even one who seeks after him, or endeavours. It follows, therefore, that this power which endeavours, or is willing to seek after God, is nowhere to be found; but rather all men go out of the way. Again; if Paul is not understood to speak of lack of power, as well as lack of acting, then his argument would avail nothing. His whole bent is to prove that grace is necessary to all men. Now, if men could begin anything of themselves, grace would not be necessary. But as it is — since they cannot

— grace is necessary to them. So then Freewill, you perceive, is quite eradicated by this passage, and nothing of goodness or honesty is left in man. He is declared to be unrighteous, ignorant of God, a despiser of God, averse to Him, and unprofitable in his sight. The Prophet is a pretty strong antagonist, therefore, in his own text, as well as under Paul's allegation of him.

Nor is it a small matter, when man is said to be ignorant of God and to despise Him. These are the fountains of all wickednesses, the sink of sin, indeed, the very hell of evil. What evil will be left undone, where there is ignorance and contempt of God? In a word, the empire which Satan has in men could not have been described in fewer or fuller words, than by his calling them ignorant and despisers of God. In this is included unbelief, disobedience, sacrilege, blasphemy towards God, cruelty and lack of compassion towards our neighbour. In this, the love of self pervades all things both divine and human.

SECT. 9. Paul's big words in Rom 3.1920 are insisted upon.

But Paul goes on to testify that he is speaking of all men, and especially of the best and most excellent of men. He says, "That every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God. Because by the deeds of the law no flesh is justified before him." Rom 3.19-20 How is every mouth stopped, I ask, if there still remains a power in us by which we can do something? For a person may say to God,

'It is not an absolute nothing which is here. Here is something which you cannot condemn, seeing that it is what You yourself have given me, that it might be able to do something. This at least will not be silent, nor should it be guilty before you.'

If this power of Freewill is whole, and can do something, then it is false that the whole world is guilty, or under charge of guilt before God. For this power is no small thing, nor in a small part of the world. But in the whole world, it is a most excellent possession held in common by all, and its mouth should not be stopped. On the other hand, if its mouth should be stopped, then together with the whole world, it must be criminal and guilty before God. But with what right should it be called guilty, unless it is unrighteous and ungodly; that is, worthy of punishment and vengeance? Let her look to it, I beg, by what explanation this power of man's is absolved from the guilt with which the whole word is charged upon God's suit, or by what art it is excepted from being enclosed within the circle of the whole world?

These words of Paul's are mighty thunders and penetrating lightnings, and are truly that "hammer which breaks the rock in pieces," as Jeremiah says (23.29). "They are all gone out of the way,' "The whole world is guilty," "There is none righteous." By these words, all that is not only in any one man, or in some men, or in some part of them, but all that is in the whole world, in all men, without the exception of a single individual absolutely — is broken in pieces; so that the whole world should tremble, fear, and flee at them. What bigger words, what mightier words, could be uttered than these: the whole world is guilty, all the sons of men are turned aside and unprofitable, none fears God, none is righteous, none understands, none seeks after God? Yet such has been, and still is, the hardness and insensible obstinacy of the human heart, that we neither hear nor perceive these thunders and lightnings, but join in extolling and asserting Freewill and its powers against all these, so as truly to fulfil that saying of Mal 1.4, "They may build, but I will throw down."

There is the same bigness of speech in this saying also: "By the deeds of the law, no flesh is justified before him." Rom 3.20 It is a big saying, "By the deeds of the law;" just as this is also: 'The whole world,' or 'All the sons of men.' It is observable that Paul abstains from speaking of persons, and mentions the things they are seeking after — meaning, truly, to involve all persons, and whatever is most excellent in them. For if he had said, 'the common people among the Jews,' or 'the Pharisees,' or 'some of the wicked,' are not justified, then he might seem to have left some out, as not altogether unprofitable, through the power of Freewill and the proppingup of the law. But when he condemns the very deeds of the law, and makes them wicked before God, it becomes manifest that he condemns all who excelled in zeal for the law and its deeds. And yet, those only who were the best and most excellent had a zeal for the law and its deeds; and that was only in the best and most excellent parts of their frames, even their understanding and their will.

If then, those who exercised themselves in the law and its deeds, with the greatest zeal and endeavour of the understanding and of the will — that is, with the whole power of Freewill — and they were even assisted by the law itself, as a sort of divine helper which instructed and encouraged them — if these persons, I say, are charged with ungodliness, in that they are said not to be justified, but are declared to be flesh in the sight of God

— then what remains, I ask, in the whole human race, which is not flesh and ungodliness? We see all alike condemned, who are of the deeds of the law. Whether they exercise the greatest zeal, or moderate zeal, or no zeal at all, it does not matter. All could yield only a performance of the deeds of the law; and the deeds of the law do not justify.

If they do not justify, they prove that their fulfillers are ungodly, and leave them so. The ungodly are guilty persons, and deserving of God's wrath.

These things are so plain, that no one can even mutter anything against SECT. 10. Evasion that it is the ceremonial law of which Paul speaks.

It is common to elude Paul here, and get out by saying that, 'the deeds of the law' means the ceremonial ordinances, which have become deadly since the death of Christ.

I reply. this is that ignorant mistake of Jerome. In spite of Augustine's bold resistance, it has flowed abroad into the world and continued to this day through God's departure and Satan's ascendency. By this it has also been brought to pass, that Paul could not possibly be understood, and that the knowledge of Christ has necessarily been obscured. Indeed, if there had been no error besides this in the church, this one was sufficiently pestilent and powerful to make havoc of the Gospel. Unless a special grace has interposed, Jerome has earned hell rather than heaven for this — so far am I from venturing to canonize him, or call him a saint.

It is not true, then, that Paul speaks only of ceremonial works here.

Otherwise, how will his argument stand, by which he comes to the conclusion that all are unrighteous, and in need of grace?

A man might say, 'I grant that we are not justified by ceremonial deeds; still, a man might be justified by the moral deeds of the decalogue. So, you have not proved that grace is necessary to us by your reasoning.'

Besides this, what would be the use of that grace which has only freed us from the ceremonial ordinances? Those are the easiest of all, and may be extorted from us by at least fear, or self-love.

Again, it is a mistake to say that the ceremonial ordinances have died and become unlawful since the death of Christ. Paul never said this. He says that they do not justify; and that they do not profit a man before God, so as to free him from the charge of ungodliness. It is perfectly consistent with this, that a man may do them, and do nothing unlawful in doing so.

Just as eating and drinking are works which do not justify, and do not commend us to God; yet a man does not therefore commit an unlawful act in eating and drinking.

They also err, in that the ceremonial works were enjoined and exacted by the old law, equally with the decalogue; so that the decalogue had neither less nor more authority than the ceremonial law. And Paul speaks first to the Jews; as he says in Romans 1.16. Let no one doubt, therefore, "the deeds of the law" means 'all the works of the whole law.' For they must not even be called works of the law, if the law has been abolished, and is deadly. An abrogated law is no longer a law, as Paul knew very well. And therefore, he does not speak of an abrogated law when he mentions the deeds of the law, but of a law which is still in force, and regnant.

Otherwise, how easy would it have been for him to say, 'The law itself is now abrogated!' which would have been plain and clear. But let us adduce

Paul himself, his own best interpreter, who says in Gal 3.10, "As many as are of the works of the law are under the curse; for it is written, 'Cursed is everyone who does not continue in all things which are written in the book of the law, to do them." You observe here, where Paul is pleading the same cause as he did to the Romans, and in the same words, that he speaks of all the laws which are written in the book of the law, as often as he mentions the works of the law.

What is still more wonderful, is that he absolutely cites Moses when pronouncing a curse upon those who do not continue in the law; whereas he himself pronounces those cursed who are of the deeds of the law, adducing an opposite passage to confirm his opposing sentiment. Just as the former (Moses) is negative, the latter (Paul) is affirmative. But he does so, because the matter stands thus before God: those who are most zealous of the deeds of the law, least of all fulfil the law — for they lack the Spirit, who is the fulfiller of the law. It is true, they may attempt to fulfil it through their own powers, but they can effect nothing. Thus each saying is true: according to Moses, those are accursed who do not continue in the law; and according to Paul, those are accursed who are of the deeds of the law. For each of these writers requires the Spirit in the performance.

Without this Spirit, Paul says, the deeds of the law, however much is done, do not justify. And for the same reason, without the Spirit, as Moses says, they do not continue in all the things which are written.

SECT. 11. Paul's meaning is, 'works of the law, done in the flesh, condemn.'

In fine, Paul abundantly confirms what I am advancing here, by his own division of persons.

He divides men who are the doers of the law into two parties: the one he makes spiritual doers, the other carnal doers; leaving none between the two. For thus he speaks: "By the deeds of the law, no flesh shall be justified,' What does this mean, if not that they work at the law without the Spirit, seeing that they are flesh — that is, ungodly and ignorant of God — and their works profit them nothing? Thus, in Gal 3.2, using the same division, he says, "Did you receive the Spirit from the deeds of the law, or from the hearing of faith?" And again in Rom 3.21, "Now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested." And again, "We judge that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law." From all of this, put together, it becomes plain and clear that the Spirit is opposed by Paul to the works of the law — just as it is opposed to all other things which are not spiritual, and to all the powers and pretences of the flesh. This makes it certain that this is the sentiment of Paul, agreeing with Christ in John 3.6, that all which is not of the Spirit (however beautiful, holy, and excellent) is flesh. And therefore, even the most beautiful works of the divine law are of this character, by whatever powers they may have been wrung out.

For the Spirit of Christ is necessary. Without it, they are all deserving only of damnation. Let it be a settled point, then, that what Paul means by 'the deeds of the law,' is not only those which are ceremonial, but all the works of the whole law. It will be settled at the same time, that whatever is done without the Spirit, in doing the deeds of the law, is condemned. But this power of Freewill — truly the most excellent thing in man — seeing that we are now treating Freewill properly so-called, is without the Spirit. Whereas, being 'of the works of the law' is such that nothing better can be said of a man. He does not say, you may observe, 'as many as are of sins and transgressions against the law;' but "as many as are of the deeds of the law;" that is, the best of men — men zealous for the law — those who, besides the power of Freewill, have even been assisted by the law; that is, they have been instructed and exercised in it.

SECT. 12. All the law does is to show sin.

If Freewill — assisted by the law and occupied in the law with all its might — profits nothing, and does not justify, but is left in ungodliness and flesh, then what are we to think it can do alone, without the law?

"By the law," he says, "is the knowledge of sin." He shows here how much, and how far, the law profits a man. In other words, Freewill is so blind when left to herself, as not even to know sin, but to stand in need of the law for a teacher. Now, what can someone endeavour towards taking away sin, who does not know what sin is? This is what he can do: he can take sin as no sin, and take what is not sin for sin — as experience abundantly shows. How the world persecutes the righteousness of God which is preached in the Gospel! It vilifies it as heresy, error, and all other kinds of the worst possible names, by the instrumentality of those very persons whom she considers the best of men, and the most zealous for righteousness and godliness. Meanwhile, she boasts and brags about her own works and actions as though they were righteousness and wisdom, but in reality, they are sin and error. Paul therefore stops the mouth of Freewill with his words, by teaching that sin is shown to her by the law.

She herself is someone who does not know what sin is. This is how far Paul is from granting Freewill any power to strive after good.

And here is answered that question of Diatribe's, so often repeated throughout her whole treatise, 'If we can do nothing, what is the use of so many laws, so many precepts, so many threatenings, so many promises?'

Paul replies here, "By the law is the knowledge of sin." He gives a far different answer to this question than what man or Freewill thinks.

Freewill is not proved by the law, he says; she does not work together with it unto righteousness: for righteousness is not by the law, but by the knowledge of sin. This is the benefit, this the effect, this the office of the law: to be a light to the ignorant and blind. And it is such a light that it shows disease, sin, wickedness, death, hell, and the wrath of God, are ours; but it does not help or release us from them. She is content with having shown us what our state is. Upon knowing his disease of sin, the man is sad, afflicted, and despairing. The law does not help him; and much less can he help himself. Another light is necessary to show him his remedy. This light is the word of the Gospel, displaying Christ as the deliverer from all these. It is not Reason or Freewill which makes Him known. No indeed; how could she make him known when she herself is very darkness, needing the light of the law to show her that self-disease which she does not see by her own light, but imagines to be soundness.

SECT. 13. Confirmed by Gal 3.19 and In Galatians, too, he treats the same question in just the same way, when he asks, What then is the law? And he answers this question, not as Diatribe would, by saying that it proves there is such a thing as Freewill, but by saying, "It was ordained for the sake of transgressions, until the seed comes, to which he had made the promise." For the sake of transgressions, he says. It is not to restrain them, as Jerome dreams

(since Paul maintains that it was promised to the Seed who would come, that He would take away and restrain sin by the free gift of righteousness); but to increase transgressions, as he writes in Rom 5.20,

"The law stole in, that sin might abound."

It is not that, without the law, there were no sins, or that sins did not abound. But because transgressions were not known to be transgressions, or such great offences, the greater part, and the greatest of them, were accounted righteousness. Now, if sin is not known, there is no room for remedy and no hope, because they would not bear the hand of the physician — for they are whole in their own eyes, having no need of a physician. The law is therefore necessary to make sin known; so that, by knowing the baseness and vastness of his sin, the proud man, who seems whole in his own eyes, may be humbled, and may sigh and pant after the grace which is set before him in Christ. See what a simple sentence is here! "By the law is the knowledge of sin." Yet this sentence of itself is powerful enough to confound and overturn Freewill. For if it is true that she does not know, of herself, what sin and wickedness are, then as Paul says both here and in Rom 7.7 ("I would not have known lust to be sin, except the law had said, You shall not covet"), how will she ever know what righteousness and goodness are?

If she does not know what righteousness is, how will she ever strive after it? We do not know the sin in which we have been born, in which we live and move and have our being; or rather, which lives and moves and reigns in us. How then could we know righteousness which reigns without us, in the heavens? What a mere nothing, and less than nothing, these words make of that wretched thing called Freewill!

SECT. 14. Rom 3.21-25 contains many thunderbolts against Freewill.

These things being so, Paul makes a proclamation with full confidence and authority, saying, "But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the Prophets; the righteousness of God, I say, by faith in Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all those who believe in him. For there is no distinction: for all have sinned and come short of the glory of God; being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus; whom God has set forth as a propitiation by faith in his blood, " etc. Here Paul utters nothing but thunderbolts against Freewill.

He says that the righteousness of God without the law is manifested. He separates the righteousness of God from the righteousness of the law, because the righteousness of faith comes by grace, without the law. When he says, "without the law," he can mean nothing else, than that Christian righteousness is perfectly independent of the works of the law — such that the works of the law have no worth or power to obtain it.

He says soon after, "We determine that a man is justified by faith without the works of the law:" and he has said already, "By the deeds of the law no flesh is justified before him." From all of this, it is most plain that the endeavour or desire of Freewill is absolutely nothing. For if the righteousness of God consists without the law and without the works of the law, then how will it not much more consist without Freewill? Since it is the highest endeavour of Freewill to be exercised about a moral righteousness, or the works of the law; its blindness and impotency are aided by this. This word 'without' clears away works that are morally good; it clears away moral righteousness; it clears away preparations for grace. In short, invent whatever you may as a performance which Freewill is equal to, and Paul will persist in saying, 'the righteousness of God has nothing to do with this,'

Now, even if I were to grant that Freewill might by its own endeavour make advances somewhere — that is, towards good works, or the righteousness of the civil law, or the moral law —it still advances no way at all towards the righteousness of God, nor does God account its endeavours worthy of any regard towards obtaining his righteousness, when he says that his righteousness avails without the law. If Freewill, then, makes no advances towards the righteousness of God, what would it profit it by advancing through its own performances and endeavours (if this were possible) even to the holiness of angels? These surely are no obscure or ambiguous words; no place is left here for any tropes. Paul manifestly distinguishes two sorts of righteousness. He ascribes one to the law, the other to grace, affirming that grace is freely given without the law and its works; but that the law does not justify or avail anything without grace.

Let me be made to see then, how Freewill can subsist and be defended amidst these objections.

The second thunderbolt is that he says the righteousness of God is manifested, and is in force, to all and upon all who believe in Christ; and that there is no difference.

Again, in the clearest terms, he divides the whole human race into two parts, and gives the righteousness of God to believers, while he takes it away from unbelievers. Is anyone so mad then, as to doubt that the power or endeavour of Free will is something different from faith in Christ?

Now, Paul denies that anything which subsists outside the limits of this faith, is righteous before God; and if it is not righteous before God, it must be sin. For with God there is nothing left midway between righteousness and sin, as a sort of neutral substance — neither righteousness nor sin. Otherwise, Paul's whole argument would fail, which proceeds upon this division of things: namely, that whatever is done and carried on among men, is either righteousness or sin. It is righteousness if it is done in faith; it is sin if it is done without faith. With men, there are actions, it is true, of a middle and neutral character, in which they neither owe nor yield anything to each other mutually. But the ungodly man sins against God, whether he eats or drinks, or whatever he does, because he is perpetually using God's creations wickedly and ungratefully, without giving glory to God from his heart at any moment.

This also is no light thunderbolt, where Paul says, "All have sinned and come short of the glory of God: nor is there any difference." What could be said more clearly, I ask? Suppose a man acts by his Freewill — tell me whether this man sins in that self-endeavour of his. If he does not sin, why does Paul not except him, and instead involves him among the rest, without any distinction? Assuredly, saying all have sinned excepts none in any place, at any time, for any performance, for any endeavour. If you except a man for any endeavour or work, you make Paul a liar, because this Freewill worker, or endeavourer, is numbered among the all, and in the all; Paul should have revered him, and not numbered him so freely and so generally among the sinners.

So again, it is no light thunderbolt, Paul's saying that they are devoid of the glory of God. The glory of God may be understood with a difference here: actively and passively. Paul contrives this by his use of the Hebrew idioms, in which he is frequent. Actively, the glory of God is that with which God glories in us. Passively, it is that with which we glory in him. I think it should be understood passively here. The faith of Christ, in the Latin, expresses the faith which Christ has; but in the Hebrew, the faith of Christ is understood to mean the faith which we have towards Christ.

So the righteousness of God, in Latin, means the righteousness which God possesses: but by the Hebrews it is understood to mean the righteousness which we have from God, and before God. Thus, I understand the glory of God not Latin-wise, but Hebrew-wise, as denoting the glory which we have in God, and before God, and which may be called glory in God. Someone glories in God, then, who knows for sure, that God has favour towards him, and counts him worthy of a kind regard — so that what he does is pleasing in His sight, or whatever displeases Him is freely forgiven and borne with.

If the endeavours of Freewill are not sin, then, but goodness in the sight of God, assuredly she may boast. And with confidence in that glory, she may say, 'this pleases God,' 'God looks with an eye of favour upon this,'

'God ascribes worthiness to this and accepts it, or at least He bears with and forgives it.' For this is the sort of glory which the faithful have in God; others who do not have it, are instead confounded before him. But Paul denies this glory to all men here. He affirms that they are absolutely devoid of this glory, which experience also proves. Ask the entire party of Freewill endeavourers, without exception, and if you can show me one who seriously, from his heart, can say of any one desire and endeavour of his, 'I know this is well pleasing to God,' I will acknowledge that I am conquered, and I will yield the palm to you. But I know that no such man will be found.

Now, if this glory is lacking, so that conscience does not dare to know with certainty, or be confident, that this particular act is pleasing to God, then we may be sure that it does not please God. Because, as the man believes, so it is with him. For he does not believe that he certainly pleases God. However, this is necessary, since this is the very crime of unbelief, to doubt of the favour of God. He would have us believe with the most assured faith that He favours us. Thus we prove by the very testimony of their own conscience, that since Freewill is destitute of the glory of God, she perpetually subjects herself to the charge of unbelief, together with all her powers, desires, and endeavours.

But what will the defenders of Freewill say at last to that which follows; "being justified freely by His grace?" What is this "freely?" What is this

"by His grace?" How do endeavour and merit square with a gratuitous and freely-given righteousness? Perhaps they will say here, that they ascribe the least thing possible to Freewill — by no means a merit of condignity [i.e., worthiness]. But these are empty words; for the very aim of Freewill is to make room for merit. This has been Diatribe's perpetual complaint and expostulation. 'If there is no freedom in the will, what place is there for merit? If there is no place for merit, what place is there for reward? To what will it be imputed, if a man is justified without merit?'

Paul replies here, that there is absolutely no such thing as merit, but that as many as are justified, are all justified freely. And this is not imputed to anything but the grace of God. But with the gift of righteousness, at the same time, are bestowed the kingdom and eternal life. Where now is the endeavour, the desire, the pains, and the merit of Freewill? What is the use of these things? You cannot complain of obscurity and ambiguity; the matter and the words are most clear and simple. For what if they do attribute the least thing possible to Freewill —they still teach us that we can obtain righteousness and grace by this very little thing.

For they do not resolve that question, 'Why does God justify this man and leave the other in his sins,' other than by setting up Freewill; that is to say, that the one man has endeavoured, and the other has not; and that God respects one of these characters for his endeavour, and despises the other — that He may not be unjust, as he would be if he acted otherwise.

Indeed, even though they pretend both in their writings and in their speakings, that they do not obtain grace by merit of condignity, and do not call it merit of condignity, still they mock us with a word, and no less hold fast to the thing. For what excuse is it, that they do not call it merit of condignity, when they still ascribe to it everything which belongs to merit of condignity? For instance, that he who endeavours, finds favour with God; he who does not endeavour, finds none. Is not this plainly a merit of worth? Do they not make God a respecter of works, of merits, and of persons? For instance, that the one has himself to blame for lacking grace, because he has not endeavoured; and the other, because he has endeavoured, gets grace — he would not have had it, if he had not endeavoured. If this is not a merit of worth, I would be glad to know what can be called merit of worth. You might trifle in this manner with all sorts of words, and say that it is not really a merit of condignity, but it does what merit of condignity usually does. The thorn is not a bad tree, it only does what a bad tree does. The fig-tree is not a sound tree, but it does what a good tree usually does. Diatribe truly is not an abandoned woman, but only says and does what abandoned women are prone to do.

SECT. 17. Sophists are worse than the These defenders of Freewill have met with the misfortune described in that old saying, 'He falls into Scylla by wishing to avoid Charybdis.'

Through a desire to dissent from the Pelagians, they began by denying the merit of condignity, and by the very ground on which they deny it, they more strongly affirm it; denying with word and pen what in reality and in heart they affirm, and making themselves twofold worse than the First, the Pelagians simply, candidly, and ingenuously confess and assert a merit of condignity, calling a boat a boat, a fig-tree a fig-tree; and teaching what they think. But our "friends," though they think and teach the same thing, beguile us meanwhile with lying words, and with a false show of dissenting from the Pelagians. But in reality, they do nothing less than this — so that, if you look at the character we impersonate, you see in us the most determined enemies of the Pelagians; but if you look at our real mind, we are double Pelagians.

Secondly, inasmuch as, by this assumption, we estimate and purchase the grace of God at a far lower rate than the Pelagians. They assert that it is not some small thing which is in us whereby we obtain grace, but many great, whole, full, and perfect endeavours and performances. Our

"friends," on the contrary, account it to be a very small thing, and next to nothing, by which we earn grace.

If we must be in error, therefore, those persons err more honestly and with less pride, who affirm that the grace of God is purchased at a great price (reckoning it to be dear and precious), than those who teach that it is bought for a little, and for a very little, accounting it mean and contemptible.

But Paul beats them both together into one mass by a single word, when he says that "all are justified freely." And again, "that they are justified without the law;" "without the deeds of the law." In asserting free justification as the justifier of all men, he leaves none to work, or to merit, or to prepare themselves, and he leaves no work that can be called congruous or deserving. Rather, he breaks in pieces, by one stroke of this thunderbolt, both the Pelagians with their entire merit, and the Sophists with their little modicum of merit. Free justification does not allow you to set up workers of any sort; inasmuch as 'free gift,' and 'prepare yourself by some work,' are manifest opposites. Again, justification by grace does not allow for any personal worthiness, as Paul says afterwards in Rom

11.6, "If by grace, then is it no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace." He also says in Rom 4.4, "Now to him that works, the reward is reckoned, not of grace, but of debt." So that my friend Paul stands up as the invincible destroyer of Freewill, laying two whole armies flat on their faces with a single word. For if we are justified without works, all works are condemned, both small and great. He excepts none, but fulminates equally against all.

SECT. 18. The Fathers overlooked See here, also, how drowsy all our friends have been; and of what profit it is to a man, if he has leaned on the authority of the old Fathers, approved as those have been, through 'such a series of ages.' Have not they also been all equally blind; rather, have not they also over looked Paul's most clear and most express words? Is it possible, that any thing could be said clearly and expressly for grace, in opposition to Freewill, pray, if Paul's discourse be not clear and express?

He pursues his argument by way of comparison, making his boast of grace in opposition to works. And then, in the clearest and plainest terms, he declares that we are justified freely; and that grace is not grace if it is procured by our works. He most explicitly excludes all works in the matter of justification, so that he may establish only grace, and gratuitous justification. And yet, would we still look for darkness in the midst of this light? And when we cannot ascribe great things and every thing to ourselves, would we endeavour to ascribe very small and inconsiderable things to ourselves, just to carry the point that justification is not free, and without works, and by the grace of God? Truly, it is as if the man who denies that we are supplied with the greater things, and the all things which are necessary to justification, does not much more deny that we are supplied with the little things, and the few things — and all the while, he is maintaining that we are justified only by His grace, without works of any kind, and even without the law itself, in which all works, both great and small, both works of congruity, and works of condignity, are comprehended! Go now, and boast of the authority of the ancients, and trust to their sayings, all of whom to a man, as you perceive, have overlooked Paul, that most clear and explicit doctor! No indeed; they have, as it were, designedly gotten out of the way of this day-star, or rather of this sun — being so engrossed, truly, with the carnal imagination, that it seemed absurd to them that there could be no place left for merits.

SECT. 19. Paul's citation of the example of Abraham searched and applied.

Let me adduce the example of Abraham, which Paul subsequently adduces: "If Abraham, was justified by works, he has glory; but not before God. For what does the Scripture say? Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness." Rom 4.2

Here again, observe Paul's division. He distinctly mentions two righteousnesses of Abraham. One is of WORKS, which is moral and civil; but by this he denies that he was justified before God, even though he was just before men by it. Moreover, he has glory with men; although even this man, by this righteousness, also comes short of the glory of God. Nor can anyone say, that the works of the ceremonial law are condemned here, since Abraham lived so many years before the law. Paul speaks simply of the works of Abraham; and those were none other than his best.

It would be ridiculous to reason whether a man is justified by bad works.

If, then, Abraham is not just by any works of his, and unless he is clothed with another righteousness, that of pure faith, then he is left under the charge of ungodliness, both as to his person and all his works. It is plain that no man makes any advances towards righteousness by his own works: and further, that no works, no desires, no endeavours of Freewill, are of any avail before God; but are all accounted ungodly, unjust, and wicked. If the man is not just, then his works and desires are not just; and if they are not just, then they are damnable, and worthy of wrath.

The other righteousness is that of FAITH, which does not stand in any works, but in God's favour and His manner of accounting of us, through grace. And see how Paul dwells on that word 'accounting of us,' how he urges, repeats, and beats it into us.

"To him who works,' he says, 'the reward is reckoned, not of grace, but of debt. But to him who does not work, but believes on him who justifies the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness; according to the purpose of the grace of God." Rom 4.4-5 DRA Then he adduces David speaking in like manner of the reckoning of grace; saying, "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord has not imputed sin, " etc. Psa 32.2

Nearly ten times in that same chapter, he repeats the word imputation.

To be short, Paul compares the worker and the non-worker: leaving none between these two. He denies that righteousness is imputed to the worker; he asserts that righteousness is imputed to the non-worker, if he but believes. It is not possible for Freewill to escape or slip away here with her endeavour, or pains; for she must be numbered either with the worker, or the non-worker. If with the worker, you hear in this place that no righteousness is imputed to her; and if with the nonworker, whoever believes in God, righteousness is imputed to her. But then she would not be Freewill; she would be the new creature — the soul renewed by faith.

Now, if righteousness is not imputed to the one that works, it is plain that his works are nothing but sins, wicked and ungodly acts in the sight of God.

Nor is it possible for any Sophist to turn saucy, and say, 'though the man is wicked, yet his work may not be wicked.'

For Paul lays hold, not on the person of the man simply, but on the man at work, for this very purpose: that he may declare in the most explicit terms, how the very works and endeavours of the man are condemned, whatever those may be, and under whatever name or species they may be classed. Moreover, he treats good works because he is discoursing about justification and merit. And when he speaks of a man who works, he speaks universally about all working men, and all their works; but especially about good and honest works. Otherwise, his division into worker and non-worker would not stand.

SECT. 20. Luther omits much which he might insist upon.

Here I omit those most powerful arguments which are drawn from the purpose of grace, from promise, from the power of the law, from original sin, and from the election of God. There is not one of these, that does not by itself, utterly take away Freewill. For if grace comes from the purpose or predestination of God, then it comes by necessity, not by our pains or endeavour, as I have already shown. So, if God promised grace before the law, as Paul argues both here and in Galatians, then it does not come from our works, or from the law; otherwise, the promise would be nothing. So too, if works have any efficacy, then faith would be nothing

(though it is said that Abraham was justified by it before the law). So, because the law is the strength of sin — only manifesting sin and not taking it away — it makes the conscience guilty before God, and threatens wrath. This is what is meant by that saying, "The law works wrath." Rom

4.15 How could it be, then, that righteousness is obtained by the law? And if we are not profited by the law, then how can we be profited by Freewill, when acting without it?

Again, seeing that we are all under sin and damnation through the one offence of the one man, Adam, how can we attempt anything which is not sin, and which is not damnable? For when he says all, he excepts no one

— neither the power of Freewill, nor any workman; whether he works or does not work, endeavours or does not endeavour, he will necessarily be comprehended among the all, with the others. Nor could we have sinned, and been condemned, by that single sin of Adam's, unless it were our sin.

For who could be condemned for another man's sin, especially in the sight of God? But that sin is not made ours by imitation, or by some subsequent act of ours, since this could not be that one sin of Adam, as though we had done it and not he; it becomes ours by birth. But this is not the place for discussing that question. However, original sin does not allow Freewill to do anything else, except sin and be damned.

These arguments, then, I omit, because they are most manifest, and most powerful. Besides, I have said something about them already. Now, if I had a mind to recite all that Paul has said only to the subversion of Freewill, I could not do this better than by discussing the whole of Paul's writings in the form of a perpetual commentary; and by showing that this so-vaunted power of Free will is confuted in almost every single word of his — just as I have done in these third and fourth chapters. My special object in thus exhibiting these chapters has been first, to show the stupid drowsiness with which we have all nodded over his writings — reading them, clear as they are, in such a way as not to have the least idea that they contain the strongest possible arguments against Freewill — secondly, to show the folly of that confidence which leans on the authority and writings of the old doctors — and thirdly, that I might leave it as matter of thought, what these most manifest arguments are capable of effecting, if handled with diligence and judgment.

SECT. 21. Luther's own view of Paul.

For my own part I am greatly astonished, that Paul so often uses those universal terms 'All,' None,' 'Not,' 'Nowhere,' 'Without.' For instance,

"They have all gone out of the way," "There is none righteous," "There is none that does good, no not one," "All have been made sinners, and damned, by the offence of one." "We are justified by faith without the law, without works." So that, if a man had a mind to speak otherwise, he could not speak more clearly, or more explicitly. It is a matter of surprise to me, therefore, how it has come to pass that, in opposition to these universal words and sentiments, contrary words, indeed contradictory ones, have prevailed.

For instance; 'There are some who do not go out of the way, who are not unjust, not wicked, not sinners, not damned. There is something in man which is good, and leans towards good — as if the man who inclines to good, whoever he is, were not comprehended in the words 'All,' 'None,' and 'Not.' For my part, I would not have anything to oppose or reply to Paul if I wished it. Rather, I would be compelled to comprehend the power of my Freewill, together with its endeavour, among those alls and nones of which Paul speaks — unless some new art of grammar, or some new use of speech, were introduced.

If Paul used such an expression only once, or in only one place, one might perhaps be allowed to suspect a trope, and to torture the words which I have selected, into some other meaning. But, in fact, Paul uses such expressions perpetually. And not only so, but he uses both affirmatives and negatives together, so handling his sentiment by way of contrast and distribution — by which he arrays the several parts against each other, on both sides — that not only the nature of the words, and the sentence itself, but also the subsequent, preceding, and immediate context, together with the scope and very body of the whole discussion, unite in establishing one common conclusion: that Paul means, 'without faith in Christ, there is nothing but sin and damnation.'

It was in this way, that I promised to confute Freewill, so that all my adversaries would not be able to resist me. I think I have done so, even if they do not yield to my sentiment, as vanquished, nor hold their peace. It is not within the compass of my power to bring them to this. That is the gift of God's Spirit.

SECT. 22. Paul's crown.

But before we hear the Evangelist John, let us add Paul's finish to his argument on this subject. Where this will not satisfy, I am prepared to set the whole of Paul's writings in array against Freewill, by a perpetual commentary. In Rom 8.5, after dividing the whole human race into two parts, flesh and Spirit, as Christ also does in John 3, Paul speaks thus: "Those who are after the flesh, mind the things of the flesh; but those who are after the Spirit, mind the things of the Spirit."

Here, Paul calls all 'carnal' who are not 'spiritual.' This is plain both from the division and opposition between flesh and Spirit, and also from Paul's own words which follow: "You are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if the Spirit of Christ dwells in you. Now if any man does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." Rom 8.9 For what else does he mean here by the words, 'You are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit,' if not this: those who do not have the Spirit are necessarily in the flesh? And he who is not Christ's

— whose is he, if not the devil's? It stands good, therefore, that those who do not have the Spirit are in the flesh, and under Satan.

Let us now see what he thinks of the endeavour and power of Freewill in the carnal. "Those who are in the flesh cannot please God." Rom 8.8 And again; "The mind of the flesh is death." Rom 8.6 And again, "The mind of the flesh is enmity against God." Rom 8.7 Again, "It is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can it be." Let the advocate for Freewill answer me here, how that which is death, which is displeasing to God, which is enmity against God, which is disobedient to God, and which cannot obey

Him, can endeavour after good! For he has not been pleased to say, 'the mind of the flesh is dead, or hostile to God,' but "it is death itself; it is enmity itself. " Thus it is impossible for it to be subjected to the law of God, or to please God. As Paul had just said, 'For what the law could not Rom 8.3 728do, in that it was made weak by the flesh, God has done,' etc.

I know, as well you do, Origen's tale about three sorts of affection. One he calls the flesh; another, the soul; another, the spirit. And of these, the soul is the middle one — what may be turned towards either side, the flesh or the spirit. But these are his own dreams; he only tells, he does not prove them. Paul here calls whatever does not have the Spirit, 'flesh,' as I have

So that, those highest virtues of the best of men are 'in the flesh;' that is, they are dead, enemies to God, not subject to the law of God, nor capable of being subjected to it, and displeasing to God. For Paul not only says that they are not subjected, but neither can they be subjected. So Christ says in Mat 7.18, "A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit." And in Mat 12.34, "How can you, being evil, speak good things?" You see here that we not only speak evil, but we cannot speak good. And in another place, he says that we, being evil, know how to give good gifts to our children. Mat 7.11 But he still denies that we do good, even in the very act of giving good things. For the creature of God (which we give) is good; but we ourselves are not good, nor do we give our good things well. And when saying this, he speaks to all; yes, even to his disciples. So that these twin sentiments of Paul stand good: "The just lives by faith;" and "Whatever is not of faith is sin." In this, the latter flows from the former. For if there is nothing but faith by which we can be justified, then it is evident that those who do not have faith are not yet justified.

Now, those who are not justified are still sinners; and sinners are corrupt trees, which can do nothing but sin, and bear corrupt fruit. So then,

Freewill is nothing but the servant of sin, death, and Satan. It neither does, nor is able to do, or to attempt, anything but evil.

SECT. 23. Grace exemplified in Jews being rejected, Gentiles called.

Add that example in chapter x, taken from Isaiah, "I have been found by those who did not seek me; I have been made manifest to those who did not inquire after me."

He says these things about the Gentiles; because it has been given to them to know and hear of Christ, when they could not even think of him before, much less seek after him, or prepare themselves for him, by the power of Freewill. It is abundantly plain from this example, that grace comes so truly gratuitously, that not even a thought about it, much less anything of endeavour or pains, precedes its approach. Paul also, when he was still Saul, what did he do by that most exalted degree of Freewill which he possessed? Assuredly, he was revolving the best and most honest things in his mind, if mere reason is inquired of. But see what endeavour of his it is, by which he finds grace: he is not seeking it. No indeed; it by raving like a madman against it, that he receives his portion.

On the other hand, speaking of the Jews in the ninth chapter, Paul says that the Gentiles who did not follow after righteousness have attained to righteousness, even the righteousness which is of faith; but that Israel which followed after the law of righteousness has not attained to the law of righteousness. Rom 9.30-31 What can any advocate for Freewill mutter against these sayings? The Gentiles, when filled to the full with impiety and all sorts of vices, receive righteousness freely from a pitying God. The Jews, seeking righteousness with the greatest pains and endeavours, are disappointed. Is this not saying that, while endeavouring after the best things, Freewill endeavours in vain; that she rather turns bad into worse; that she stumbles and runs backward? No one can say that they have not tried hard, with the utmost power of Freewill. Paul himself bears this testimony of them in his tenth chapter: "They have a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge." Rom 10.2

In the Jews, therefore, none of those excellencies are lacking which we ascribe to Freewill. And yet nothing follows; indeed, the contrary result follows. In the Gentiles, none of those excellencies which we ascribe to Freewill are present; but still the righteousness of God follows. What is this, if not to have it confirmed by the most manifest example of both nations, as well as by the clearest testimony of Paul at the same time, that 'grace is bestowed freely upon the undeserving, indeed, upon the unworthiest of human beings; while it is not obtained by any pains, endeavours, or performances, great or small, even of the best and most respectable of men, though seeking and following after righteousness with a burning zeal.'

SECT. 24. John a devourer.

Let us also come to John, who is of himself an abundant and able devastator of Freewill. In the very beginning of his Gospel, he ascribes such a blindness to Freewill, that she is not able to see the light of truth — that far is she from having power to endeavour after it. For thus he speaks: "The light shines in darkness, but the darkness does not comprehend it." And presently: "He was in the world, and the world did not know him. He came to his own, and his own did not receive him."

What do you think he means by the world? Would you exclude any man from the number included under this term, if he is not created anew by the Holy Ghost?

Indeed, it is a peculiar use which this Apostle makes of the word 'world,' expressing by it the whole race of man, without exception.

Whatever he says about the world, therefore, is meant concerning Freewill, as that which is the most excellent thing in man. Now, it is said by this Apostle, 'that the world did not know the true light. The world hates Christ and his people. The world neither knows, nor sees the Holy

Ghost. The whole world lies in wickedness, or in the wicked one. All that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life. — Do not love the world.' Again, "You are of the world," he says. The world cannot hate you; but me it hates, because I testify of it that its deeds are evil." All these and many like sayings, then, are so many proclamations about Freewill; that is, about the principal constituent part which reigns in the world under the empire of Satan. For John says this even about the world, by way of opposition — meaning whatever of the world is not translated into the Spirit. As Christ says to his Apostles., "I have taken you out of the world, and have constituted you," etc. Joh 15.9

Now, if there were any in the world who strove for good by the power of Freewill — as must be the case if Freewill could really do anything — then

John should properly have moderated his expression out of respect to these, that he might not involve them by a general expression in the multitude of crimes, of which he accuses the world. Because he did not do so, it is evident that he charges Freewill with all the crimes with which he charges the world. For whatever the world does, it does by the power of Freewill; that is, by the understanding and the will, the most excellent of its constituent parts. It follows:

"But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God; even to those who believe in his name: who were born not of bloods, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God."

Having made this division, he rejects from the kingdom of Christ 'bloods,'

'the will of the flesh,' and 'the will of man,' By 'bloods' I suppose he means the Jews; that is, those who had a mind to be sons of the kingdom because they were sons of Abraham and of the Fathers — boasting truly of their descent.

I understand 'the will of the flesh' to mean the pains with which that people exercised themselves in law works. For the flesh, here, signifies carnal persons who do not have the Spirit. They have the will and the endeavour; but since there is no Holy Ghost in this will and endeavour, they have them carnally. I understand 'the will of man' to mean the pains which mankind in general takes to find favour with God — all men, whether under the law or without the law — the Gentiles, say, or whomever you will. The meaning, therefore, is that they are not made sons of God either by a birth of the flesh, nor by a zeal for the law, nor by any other human means, but only by a divine birth.

If, then, they are not born of the flesh, nor trained by the law, nor obtained by any human discipline, but are born again of God — it is plain that Freewill is of no avail here. For I think the word 'man' is taken here in the Hebrew sense, as anyone whatsoever; just as 'flesh' is taken, by contrast, for the people of Israel who do not have the Spirit: and 'will' is taken for the highest power in man; that is, the principal ingredient in But grant that we may not understand each word correctly, still the sum and substance of the assertion is most plain. Namely, by this division — in saying that men are not made the sons of God except by being born of God — John rejects whatever is not of divine begetting. This is effected, according to his own interpretation, by believing in his name. Now, the will of man, or Freewill, is necessarily included in this rejection, as not being a thing born of God, nor yet of faith. If Freewill availed anything, the will of man would not be rejected by John. Nor would men be withdrawn from it, and sent to faith and new birth only. Otherwise it might be said to him, which was said in Isa 5.20, "Woe to you who call good evil." But now, since he equally rejects 'bloods,' 'the will of the flesh,' and 'the will of man,' it is certain that the will of man has no more power towards making sons of God, than bloods or fleshly nativity. Now, no one considers it doubtful whether fleshly birth makes, or does not make, sons of God. Paul tells us so in Rom 9.8: "Those who are the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God." He proves this by the examples

SECT. 25. John the Baptist's testimony.

The same John introduces the Baptist speaking thus; "Of whose fulness have all we received, grace for grace." Joh 1.16

He speaks of grace received by us out of the fulness of Christ; but for the sake of what merit, or endeavour? For the grace, he says, truly of Christ: just as Paul also speaks in Rom 5.15. "The grace of God, and the gift by grace of one man Jesus Christ, has abounded to many." Where now is the endeavour of Freewill, by which grace is procured?

Here John says, not only that grace is received without any endeavour of ours, but even by another's grace, or another's merit — namely, that of one man, Jesus Christ. Either it is therefore false that we receive our grace for the sake of another's grace; or else it is evident that Freewill is nothing. For these two things cannot stand together: that the grace of God is on the one hand so cheap as to be obtained commonly, and everywhere, by the paltry endeavour of any man you please; and on the other hand, it is so dear as to be freely bestowed upon us only for and by the grace of one so great a man.

I would at the same time admonish the advocates of Freewill in this place, that in asserting Freewill, they are deniers of Christ. For if I obtain the grace of God through my own endeavour, then what need is there of the grace of Christ for my receiving grace? Or what is lacking to me once I have obtained the grace of God? But Diatribe has said, and all the Sophists also say, that we obtain the grace of God by our own endeavour; and we are prepared for receiving it, not of condignity indeed, but of congruity. This absolutely denies Christ; for the Baptist testifies here that we receive grace for the sake of Christ's grace. As for that figment about condignity and congruity, I have already confuted it, showing that these are empty words which in reality mean merit of condignity. They have more impiety in them than the Pelagian assertions; as I have declared. So that the impious Sophists, with Diatribe at their head, deny the Lord Christ who bought us, more than the Pelagians or any heretics have done — so utterly incompatible is grace with any particle or power of However, that the advocates for Freewill deny Christ, is proved not only by this Scripture, but by their own life. Hence, they make Christ to no longer be a sweet Mediator, but a tremendous Judge whom they are endeavouring to appease by the intercessions of his Virgin Mother, and of the Saints. Moreover, they do this by many works, rites, superstitions, and vows of their own invention. The object of all this is to make Christ favourable to them, so that he may give them his grace. On the other hand, they do not believe that he intercedes with God, and obtains grace for them through his blood — grace for grace, as it is said here. And as they believe, so it is done unto them. They truly and deservedly have

Christ for their inexorable Judge, so long as they forsake him in his office of most powerful Mediator and Saviour; and so long as they account his blood and grace more worthless than the pains and endeavours of SECT. 26. Nicodemus' case.

Let us also hear an example of Freewill. Nicodemus, I warrant you, is a man in whom nothing was lacking which Freewill can effect. Which is it that this man omits —pains or endeavour? He confesses Christ to be a true witness, and to have come from God; he mentions his miracles; he comes by night to hear and to compare the rest. Does this man not seem to have sought the things which belong to piety and salvation, by the power of Freewill? But see how he founders! When he hears Christ point out to him the true way of salvation by new birth, does he recognise that way, or confess that he has ever sought it? No indeed; he so revolts from it, and is so confounded, that he not only says he does not understand it, but he even turns away from it as impossible. How can these things be, he asks? And this is no wonder indeed. For who ever heard that a man must be born again, of water and of the Spirit, if he would be saved?

Who ever thought that the Son of God must be lifted up, to the end that all who believe in him might not perish, but have eternal life. Have the acutest and best philosophers ever mentioned this? Have the princes of this world ever learned this science? Has any man's Freewill ever made an attempt at it? Does Paul not confess it to be wisdom hidden in a mystery? It was foretold by the Prophets, it is true. But it was revealed by the Gospel, having been kept secret and unknown to the world, from What shall I say? Shall we consult experience? Even the whole world, even human reason, even Freewill herself, is compelled to acknowledge that she neither knew nor heard of Christ before the Gospel came into the world. Now, if she did not know, much less has she sought, or been able to seek, or to endeavour after him. But Christ is the way, the truth, the life, and the salvation. She confesses, therefore, whether she would or not, that by her own powers she has neither known, nor been able to seek those things which belong to the way, the truth, and the salvation. Still however, in opposition to this very confession and our own experience, we play the madman. We maintain by a mere war of words, that we have a certain power remaining in us, which both knows and can apply itself to the things that pertain to salvation. This is as good as saying that this power knows and can apply itself to Christ the Son of God, who was lifted up for us; whereas no one has ever known, or could have thought of such a person.

Still, this ignorance is not ignorance, but knowledge of Christ — that is, of the things which pertain to salvation! Do you not yet see, and almost feel with your hands, that the assertors of Freewill are downright mad when they call it knowledge, which they themselves confess is ignorance. Is this not to call darkness light? (Isa 5.20) — so mightily does God shut the mouth of Freewill, according to her own confession and experience. And yet, with all this, she will not hold her tongue and give glory to God.

SECT. 27. John 14 forestalled. Way, truth, etc. are exclusive.

Again, when Christ is called the way, the truth, and the life; and that is done by way of comparison — so that whatever is not Christ, is not the way, but out of the way; nor truth, but a lie; nor life, but death — Freewill, being neither Christ, nor in Christ, must have its dwelling place in error, falsehood, and death. Where then is this middle and neutral substance to be found — this averred substance of Freewill? And from where is it to be proved? Not being Christ (that is, the way, the truth, and the life), how does it not necessarily become error, falsehood, and death? For, if what is said about Christ and his grace were not all said by way of comparison, in opposition to their contraries, then what would all the discourses of the Apostles, and all of Scripture, amount to? For example, that outside of Christ there is none but the devil; outside of grace there is nothing but wrath; outside of light there is nothing but darkness; outside of the way, there is nothing but error; outside of the truth, there is nothing but falsehood; outside of life, there is nothing but death.

All of this would surely be said in vain, since it would not force the conclusion that Christ is necessary to us (which is their great object, however). For some middle substance might be discovered which, of itself, is neither evil nor good. It belongs neither to Christ nor to Satan; it is neither true nor false, neither alive nor dead — yes, perhaps it is neither anything nor nothing — yet it is to be called the noblest and most excellent endowment of all that is found in the whole human race.

Choose whichever you will, therefore. If you grant that the Scriptures speak by way of comparison, you can ascribe nothing to Freewill which is not contrary to what is in Christ; you must say of it, that error, death,

Satan, and all evil reigns in it. If you do not grant that they speak by way of comparison, in that case you enervate the Scriptures to such a degree, that they effect nothing, and do not prove that Christ is necessary. Thus, in establishing Freewill, you make Christ void, and tread all Scripture underfoot. Again, while you pretend in words to be confessing Christ, you really and with your heart deny him. For, if Freewill is not all error and damnation, but sees and wills things that are honest and good, and also things which pertain to salvation, then she is whole, and has no need of Christ for her doctor; nor has Christ redeemed that part of our nature.

For what need is there of light and life, where there is light and life?

Now, if this is not redeemed by Christ, then the best ingredient in the composition of man is not redeemed either; rather, it is good and sound of itself. In this case, God is also unjust in condemning any man, because he condemns that which is best in man, and which is sound; in other words, He condemns the innocent.

For there is no man who does not have Freewill. And though a bad man abuses his Freewill, still we are taught that the power itself is not extinguished in him — so as neither to strive for good, nor to be able to strive for it. Now, if it is such, then without doubt it is holy, just, and good. And therefore, it should not be condemned, but be separated from the man who is to be condemned. But this cannot be; and if it could be, then in that case the man, no longer having Freewill, would no longer be a man. He would neither merit evil nor good, nor be damned or saved, but must be an absolute brute, and no longer an immortal being. It remains, therefore, that God is unjust who condemns that holy, just, and good power which has no need of Christ, in and with a bad man.

SECT. 28. John 3.18, 36.

But let us go on with John. "He who believes on him," he says, "is not judged. He who does not believe, has been judged already, because he does not believe in the name of the only begotten Son of God." Joh 3.18

Tell me whether Freewill is in the number of the believers, or not? If she is, then again, she has no need of grace, seeing that she believes in Christ of herself. This Christ, however, she neither knows, nor has any conception of. If she is not a believer, she has been judged already: and what is this, if not that she has been condemned before God? Now, God condemns nothing except what is wicked. She is wicked, therefore: and what pious act can an impious thing attempt? Nor can Freewill be excepted here, I suppose, since he speaks of the whole man, which he says is condemned. Besides, unbelief is not a gross affection, but that highest sort of affection which sits and reigns in the citadel of the will and understanding — just as faith does, its contrary. Now, to be unbelieving is to deny God, and to make him a liar. (1Joh 1.10) If we do not believe, we make God a liar. Now, how can that power which is contrary to God, and which makes Him a liar, strive after good? If this power were not unbelieving and ungodly, he would not have said about the whole man,

"he has been judged already." He would have spoken thus: 'the man has been judged already with respect to his gross affections; but with respect to his best and most excellent affection, he is not judged, because it strives after faith, or rather, it is even now believing.'

Thus, as often as the Scripture says, "Every man is a liar," we will say upon the authority of Freewill, 'On the contrary, the Scripture lies, because man is not a liar in his best part, that is, in his understanding and will, but only in his flesh, blood, and marrow; so that all from which man takes his name — that is, understanding and will — is sound and holy.'

So it would be, in that saying of the Baptist's, "He that believes on the Son, has everlasting life: but he that does not believe the Son, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abides on him." We must understand 'upon him' to mean that the wrath of God remains 'upon his gross affections;' but grace and eternal life abide upon that eminent power of Free will — truly, upon his understanding and will. It appears from this example, that to maintain Freewill, you turn and twist by a synecdoche, what is said in the Scriptures against ungodly men, so as to confine it to the brutish part of man; hereby you keep the rational and truly human part of him safe and sound. In this case, I must render my thanks to the assertors of Freewill, since I will not feel the least concern for my sin. I will be confident that my understanding and will — that is, my Freewill — cannot be condemned (as it is never extinguished), but always remains sound, just, and holy. But if my understanding and will are to be happy, I will rejoice that my filthy and brutish flesh is separated and condemned — this is how far am I from wishing that Christ be its redeemer. Thus you see where the dogma of Freewill carries us: even to denying all divine and human, temporal and eternal realities, and to deluding itself with so many monstrous fictions!

So again, the Baptist says, "a man cannot receive anything unless it has been given to him from heaven." Joh 3.27

Cease, Diatribe, to display your great fluency here, by enumerating all the things which we receive from heaven! We are not arguing about nature, but about grace. We are not inquiring what sort of persons we are on earth, but in heaven and before God.

We know that man is constituted lord of the things beneath him — things over which he has power and Freewill so that they may obey him, and may do what he wills and thinks. But this is our question: whether he has

Freewill towards God, so that God obeys and does what man wills; or instead, whether God has Freewill over man, so that man wills and does what God wills, and can do nothing except what God has willed and done.

Here the Baptist says that he can receive nothing, unless it is given to him from heaven: so that Freewill is nothing.

So again, "He that is of the earth is earthly, and speaks of the earth; he that comes from heaven is above all." Joh 3.31

Here again, he makes all earthly who are not of Christ (and says that they mind and speak earthly things); he leaves none between the two. But Freewill, surely, is not 'he that comes from heaven.' So that Freewill must be of the earth, and must mind and speak the things of the earth.

Now, if there were any power in any man, which at any time, in any place, in any work, did not mind earthly things, then the Baptist should have excepted this man, and not said generally, concerning all those who are outside of Christ, that they are earthly, and speak of the earth.

So afterwards, in chap. 8, Christ also says, "You are of the world; I am not of the world: you are from beneath, I am from above." Joh 8.23

The persons to whom he spoke had Freewill — that is, understanding and will. And yet he says, "they were of the world." Now, what news would it be if he said they were of the world with respect to their flesh and gross affections? Did not the whole world know this before? Besides, what need is there to say that men are of the world, in that part in which they are brutish, when at this rate, the beasts also are of the world?

Again, what does Christ's saying in John 6.44 leave to Freewill? "No one comes to me, unless my Father has drawn him." He says, it is necessary that a man hear and learn from the Father himself; and afterwards, that all must be taught of God (vv. 44, 45). Here, truly, he teaches that not only are the works and pains of Freewill in vain, but that even the word of the Gospel (which he is treating here) is heard in vain, unless the Father himself speaks, teaches, and draws within. No man can come, he says. That power, truly, by which a man is enabled to make any endeavour after Christ — that is, after those things which are pertinent to salvation — is asserted to be nothing. Nor is that saying of Augustine's of any service to Freewill, which Diatribe adduces for the purpose of blurring this most clear and most mighty passage — that God draws just as we draw a sheep, by showing it a bough. She would have this simile prove that there is a power in us to follow the drawing of God. But this simile is of no avail here. For God does not show us one good thing only, but all his good things, even Christ himself — his Son.

But still, no man follows him unless the Father shows him something else within, and draws him in other ways. No, the whole world persecutes that Son whom He shows. This comparison of Augustine's squares perfectly enough with the case of the godly, who are now sheep, and know their shepherd, God. These who live by the Spirit and are moved by the Spirit, follow wherever God wills, and whatever he has shown them. But the ungodly does not come, even when he has heard the word, unless the Father draws and teaches within — which He does by bestowing the Spirit. There is another drawing within them, distinct from that without; within them, Christ is shown by the illumination of the Spirit, through which the man is married off to Christ by a most delightful ravishment.

He endures the act of a speaking teacher and a drawing God, rather than performing one himself by seeking and running.

I will bring yet one more text from this same John, who in his sixteenth chapter says, "The spirit will reprove the world of sin, because they have not believed in me." (Joh 16.9) Here you see it is sin not to believe in Christ. But this sin, surely, is not fixed in the skin or in the hair, but in the very understanding and will. Now, when he charges the whole world with this sin, and it is ascertained by experience that this sin of theirs is as unknown to the world as Christ himself — seeing that it is revealed by the reproving of the Spirit — it is plain that Freewill, together with its will and understanding, is considered captured, and condemned for this sin, before God. So then, while Freewill is ignorant of Christ and does not believe in him, she cannot will or endeavour after any good thing, but is necessarily the slave of this unknown sin. In short, the Scriptures preach

Christ by way of comparison and opposition everywhere, as I have said.

They represent everything which does not have the Spirit of Christ, as the subject of Satan, ungodliness, error, darkness, sin, and the wrath of God.

However many testimonies there are which speak of Christ, all and every one of them will fight against Freewill. Now, such testimonies are innumerable; indeed, they make up the whole of Scripture.

So that, if we try this cause at the judgment seat of Scripture, I will conquer in every way. Not a single jot or tittle will remain, that does not condemn the dogma of Freewill.

Now although our great theologians and maintainers of Freewill either do not know, or pretend not to know, that the Scripture thus preaches Christ by way of comparison and opposition, all Christians still know this, and publicly confess it. They know I say that there are two kingdoms in the world, which are most adverse to each other; that Satan reigns in the one, and on this account he is called by Christ the Prince of this world, and by Paul the God of this age; he holds all men captive at his will, who have not been torn from him by the Spirit of Christ, as this same Paul witnesses — not suffering them to be torn from him by any force, save by the Spirit of God, as Christ testifies in his parable of the strong man keeping his palace in peace. In the other kingdom, Christ reigns. His kingdom is continually resisting and fighting with that of Satan. We are translated into this kingdom, not by our own power, but by the grace of God, by which we are delivered from this present wicked age, and snatched out of the hands of the power of darkness. The knowledge and confession of these kingdoms, as perpetually fighting against each other with such might and resolution, would be sufficient of itself to confute the dogma of Freewill — seeing that we are compelled to serve in the kingdom of Satan, unless we are rescued from it by a divine power.

These things, I say, the common believers know, and they abundantly confess them by their proverbs, prayers, efforts and whole life.

SECT. 31. Omits to argue from the conflict between flesh and spirit, because no attempt has yet been made to repel what he has said about it.

I omit that truly Achillean argument of mine, which Diatribe in her noble courage has left untouched; namely, that in Romans 7 and Galatians 5,

Paul teaches us that the conflict between flesh and spirit is so mighty in the sanctified and godly, that they cannot do the things which they would.

I argue from it thus: the nature of man is so wicked, that in those who have been born again of the Spirit, not only does it not endeavour after good, but it even fights against and opposes good. So then, how would it endeavour after good in those who, not yet being regenerated, are serving under Satan, in the old man? For Paul does not speak only of the gross affections in that place — the common outlet through which Diatribe is prone to slip like an eel, out of the hands of every Scripture. But he reckons these among the works of the flesh: heresy, idolatry, dissensions, contentions, mischiefs, which reign in those highest powers of the soul — say, the understanding and the will.

If, then, the flesh maintains a conflict against the spirit by means of these affections in the saints, then much more will it fight against God in the ungodly, and their Freewill. On this account, Romans 8 calls it 'enmity'

I would be glad, I say, if anybody would remove this argument for me, and defend Freewill from it. For my own part, I confess that if it could be in any way, I would be unwilling to have Freewill given to me, or to have anything left in my own hand, which might enable me to endeavour after salvation. This is because, in the midst of so many dangers and adversities on the one hand, and so many assaulting devils on the other, I would not be strong enough to maintain my standing and keep my hold of it. For one devil is mightier than all men put together, and not a single individual of mankind would be saved. But also because, even if there were no dangers, and no adversities, and no devils, I would still be compelled to toil forever uncertainly, and to fight as one who beats the air. For even if I lived and worked to eternity, my own conscience would never be sure and secure how much she ought to do, so that God might be satisfied with her. Do what she might, an anxious doubt would still be left whether it pleased God, or whether He required anything more. The experience of all self-righteous persons proves this, and to my own great misery, I have abundantly learned this by so many years of conflict.

But now, God has taken my salvation out of the hands of my own will, and received it into his own hands. He has promised to save me, not by my own work or running, but by His own grace and mercy. I am therefore at ease and certain, because He is faithful and will not lie to me; and moreover, because He is great and powerful, so that no number of devils, no number of adversities, can either wear Him out, or pluck me out of his hand. No one, he says, shall pluck them out of my hand; for my Father who gave them to me, is greater than all. Joh 10.28-29 Thus it comes to pass that if all are not saved, some however are — indeed, many are. Whereas, by the power of Freewill, none absolutely would be; but would we all, to a man, be lost? Moreover, we are fearlessly sure that we please God, not by the merit of our own work, but by the favour of his mercy which He has promised us; and if we do less than we should, or do amiss, He does not impute it to us, but with a fatherly mind, He forgives and amends it. Such is the boast of every saint in his God.

SECT. 32. Difficulty stated and exposed.

But if this disturbs us, that it is difficult to maintain the mercy and equity of God in that he damns the undeserving — namely, ungodly men who are of such a sort that, being born in ungodliness, they cannot by any means help being ungodly; and remaining so, they are damned. Indeed, they are compelled by the necessity of their nature, to sin and perish. As Paul says, "We were all the sons of wrath even as others," Eph 2.3 being created as such by God himself, out of a seed which became corrupted through that sin which was Adam's only.

Difficulty exposed. In this state of things, we must honour and reverence the exceeding great mercy of God in his dealings with those whom he justifies and saves, even though most unworthy of such benefits. And we must at least make some small concession to his divine wisdom, believing him to be just, when to us he seems unjust. For if his justice were indeed pronounced just when it is judged by human apprehension, it would clearly not be divine justice, but differ not at all from man's. Now, seeing that God is the one true God, and is moreover totally incomprehensible, and inaccessible to human reason, it is natural

— indeed it is necessary — that his justice also be incomprehensible. Paul cries this: "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are his judgments and his ways unsearchable." (Rom 11.33)

Now they would not be incomprehensible if we could, throughout the whole of them, conceive why they are just.

What is man compared with God? What is our power capable of, as compared with his? What is our strength compared with his might? What is our knowledge compared with his wisdom? What is our substance compared with his substance? In short, what is everything of ours, as compared with everything of his?

SECT. 33. Difficulty Reproved and palliated by example.

Now, using no other precept than nature, say we confess that man's power, strength, wisdom, knowledge, substance, and everything of ours, is absolutely nothing when compared with God's power, strength, wisdom, knowledge, and substance. What is this perverseness of ours,

760 761 762 that we pull at and hale God's justice and judgment, arrogating so much to our own judgment, as to test whether we can comprehend, judge, and estimate the judgment of God? Why do we not, in like manner, say that our judgment is nothing if compared with the divine judgment?

Ask reason herself, whether she is not compelled by conviction, to acknowledge that she is foolish and rash in not allowing the judgment of God to be incomprehensible, when she confesses all the other properties of God to be incomprehensible? What! In all other things we concede a divine majesty to God; it is only in his judgment that we are prepared to deny it to him, and cannot, even for this little while, give him credit for being just. Yet he has promised us that, after he has revealed his glory, it will come to pass that all of us will then both see and feel, that he has been, and is just.

I will give an example to confirm this belief, and to console that evil eye which suspects God of injustice.

Behold, God so governs this material world in outward things, that if you observe and follow the judgment of human reason, you are compelled to say either there is no God, or there is an unjust God. As that poet says, "I am often solicited to think that there are no Gods." For see how true it is that the wicked are most prosperous, and the good, on the other hand, are most unfortunate. Even proverbs, and experience, which is the mother of proverbs, testify that the more wicked men are, the more fortunate.' "The tabernacles of the wicked abound," says Job 12.6. And the 73d Psalm complains that sinners abound with riches in this world.

Is it not most unjust in the judgment of all men, I ask, that the wicked should be prospered, and the good afflicted?

Yet, such is the course of the world. It is here that even the greatest wits have fallen to the depth of denying that there is a God, and of feigning that Fortune turns and twists everything as the whim takes her: such were the Epicureans and Pliny. Following close upon these, Aristotle, to deliver that first Being of his from misery, is of the opinion that he does not see any of the things that exist, except himself; because he considers that it would be most painful for him to see so much of evil, and so much

The Prophets, on the other hand, who believed that there is a God, are more tempted with the suggestion of God's injustice: such as Jeremiah,

Job, David, Asaph and others. What do you imagine Demosthenes and Cicero thought, when after having done all they could, they received the wages they did, in a wretched death? Yet this injustice of God — which is exceedingly probable, and inferred by such arguments, that no power of reason or light of nature can resist — is most easily removed by the light of the Gospel and the knowledge of grace. These teach us that the wicked flourish in their body, it is true, but they perish in their souls.

Thus, we have the brief solution to this insolvable question in a single short sentence. 'There is a life after this life, in which whatever has not been punished and rewarded here, will hereafter be punished and rewarded; seeing that this life is nothing but the precursor, or rather the beginning, of the life to come.' The light of the Gospel, then, which owes all its power to the word and faith, is so efficacious, that this question — handled as it had been in all ages, but never answered — has thoroughly made an end of it and laid it to rest. What then do you think will happen when the light of the word and of faith has ceased, and when the reality, even the divine Majesty itself, is revealed as it is? Do you not think that the light of glory will then be able to solve, with the greatest ease, that question which is insolvable in the light of the word, or of grace — seeing that the light of grace has so readily solved a question which could not be solved by the light of nature?

Let it be conceded, then, that there are three great lights — the light of nature, the light of grace, and the light of glory — according to the common distinction (which is a good one). In the light of nature, it cannot be explained that it is just for the good man to be afflicted, and for the bad man to prosper. But the light of grace resolves this question. In the light of grace, it is inexplicable how God condemns the man who cannot, by any power of his own, do other than sin, and to be guilty. In this case, the light of nature, as well as the light of grace, declares that the fault is not in wretched man, but in an unjust God. For how can they judge otherwise about God? For he crowns a wicked man gratuitously, without any merits; and He does not crown another, but condemns him who is perhaps less wicked, or at least he is not more wicked.

But the light of glory proclaims something else. And when it arrives, it will show that God — whose judgment, for the present, is incomprehensible justice — is most just, and this is most manifest justice.

In the meantime, it teaches us to believe the certainty of this coming event. By the example of the light of grace, we are admonished and confirmed in the expectation of it; this produces a like portent with respect to the light of nature.

SECT. 34. Sum of the argument.

Here I will put an end to this treatise. I am prepared, if needed, to plead the cause yet further. Although, I consider that I have said enough to satisfy the pious mind, which is willing to yield to the force of truth without pertinacity. For, if we believe it to be true, that God foreknows and predestines everything; and moreover, that he can neither be mistaken nor hindered in his foreknowledge and predestination; and once more, that nothing is done outside his will (a truth which reason herself is compelled to yield) — then it follows from the testimony of this same reasoning, that there can be no such thing as Freewill in man or angel, nor in any creature.

So again, if we believe Satan to be the Prince of this world, who is perpetually plotting and fighting with all his might against the kingdom of Christ, so that he does not let his captives of humankind go, unless he is driven out by a divine power — then again, it is manifest that there can be no such thing as Freewill.

So again, if we believe that original sin has so ruined us, as to make it most troublesome work even for those who are led by the Spirit, through striving against the good in them (as it does) — then it is clear that nothing is left in man, devoid of the Spirit, which can turn itself to good; but only what turns itself to evil.

Again, if the Jews, who followed after righteousness with all their might, have rather fallen headlong into unrighteousness; and if the Gentiles, who followed after unrighteousness, have freely and unhopedly attained to righteousness — then it is manifest here (as in the former instances), by deed and experience, that without grace man can will nothing but evil.

In fine, if we believe that Christ redeemed man by His blood, then we are obliged to confess that the whole man was undone. Otherwise we either make Christ superfluous, or else we make him the redeemer of only the vilest part in man. This would be blasphemous and sacrilegious.

Luther admonishes, thanks, counsels, prays.

Now therefore I beseech you in the name of Christ, my Erasmus, that you would at length perform what you have promised. You promised that you would be willing to submit yourself to the man who could teach you better things. Be done with respect to persons. I confess, you are a great man, adorned with many of the noblest gifts by God; not to mention others — with genius, and learning, and eloquence, even to the miraculous. On the other hand, I have nothing, and am nothing, except that I could almost glory in being a Christian. Again, I greatly commend and extol you for this thing also: that you are the only man of all my antagonists, who has attacked the heart of the subject, the head of the cause — instead of wearing me out with extraneous points such as the Papacy, Purgatory, Indulgences, and a number of like topics. These may more fitly be called trifles, than matters of debate: a sort of chase in which nearly all my opponents have been hunting me up to here in vain.

You are that single and solitary individual who has seen the hinge of the matters in dispute, and has aimed at the neck. I thank you for this from my heart — it is far more to my taste to be occupied in debating this question, so far as time and leisure are accorded me.

If those who have previously attacked me had done the same; if those would do so who are currently boasting of new spirits, and new revelations — then we would have less of sedition and divisions, and more of peace and concord. But God thus stirs up Satan to punish our

However, unless you can plead this cause in a somewhat different style from your Diatribe, I could earnestly wish that you would be content with your own proper good; and that you would cultivate, adorn, and advance the cause of literature and the languages, as you have done up till now, with great profit and praise. By this pursuit of yours, you have even served me not a little; insomuch that I confess myself to be greatly in your debt, even as I most assuredly venerate you, and sincerely look up to you as my superior in that particular. But God has not yet willed, nor given, that you should be equal to this cause! Pray, do not think that I say this with any arrogance.

And yet, I implore the Lord to speedily make you as much my superior in this particular, as you already are in all others. Nor is it anything new that God should instruct a Moses by Jethro, or a Paul by Ananias. If you do not know Christ, then you have failed in your aim, as to what you say, and you have done that miserably indeed — I think you must be aware yourself, what sort of a statement this is.

All will not therefore be in the wrong because you or I are in the wrong (if it is so). God is declared to be a God who is wonderful in his saints — so that we may count them saints, who are the furthest from saintship. Nor is it hard to suppose that you, being a man, may neither rightly understand, nor observe with sufficient diligence, either the Scriptures or the sayings of the Fathers, by whose guidance you imagine that you have obtained your aim. We have a pretty good hint to this effect, when you write that you do not assert at all, but only confer. The man who sees clearly through the whole of his subject, and understands it correctly, does not write this way. For my part, I have not conferred, but have asserted in this book; indeed, and I do assert. Nor is it my desire to appoint any man to be judge in this cause. I persuade all to receive my decree. May the Lord, whose cause this is, shine upon you — and make you a vessel unto honour and glory! Amen.

The historian that Vaughn refers to is Joseph Milner, who wrote The History of the Church of Christ (London, 1812), which Vaughn relied on heavily for this biographical sketch.

In his office of subaltern vicar, he had about forty monasteries under his inspection, which he had taken occasion to visit.

The most outstanding work of a creative artist or craftsman.

It is not to be inferred that Luther was at this time ignorant of the doctrine of grace, because he was ignorant of this particular subject. This is the memorable year 1517. In the preceding year, 1516, he thus wrote to a friend. 'I desire to know what your soul is doing; whether wearied at length of its own righteousness, it learns to refresh itself and to rest in the righteousness of Christ. The temptation of presumption in our age is strong in many, and specially in those who labour to be just and good with all their might, and at the same time are ignorant of the righteousness of God, which in Christ is conferred upon all with a rich exuberance of gratuitous liberality. They seek in themselves to work that which is good, in order that they may have a confidence of standing before God, adorned with virtues and merits, which is an impossible attempt. You, my friend, used to be of this same opinion — or rather, of this same mistake. So was I; but now I am fighting against the error, but have not yet prevailed.' — A little before the controversy concerning Indulgences, George, Duke of Saxony, entreated Staupitius to send him some worthy and learned preacher. The vicargeneral, in compliance with his request, dispatched Lnther with strong recommendations to Dresden. George gave him an order to preach: the sum of Luther's sermon was this: That no man ought to despair of the possibility of salvation; that those who heard the word of God with attentive minds were true disciples of Christ, and were elected and predestined to eternal life. He enlarged on the subject, and showed that the whole doctrine of predestination, if the foundation is laid in Christ, was of singular efficacy to dispel that fear by which men, trembling under the sense of their own unworthiness, are tempted to fly from God, who ought to be our sovereign refuge. Evidence to the same effect may be drawn in abundance from his letter to Spalatinus, written in this same preceding year, containing remarks on Erasmus' interpretations of Scripture, compared with those of Jerome,

Augustine, and some of the other Fathers. 'When obedience to the commandment takes place to a certain degree, and yet does not have Christ for its foundation, though it may produce such men as your Fabriciuses, and your Reguluses, that is, very upright moralists according to man's judgment, it has nothing of the nature of genuine righteousness. For men are not made truly righteous, as Aristotle supposes, by performing certain actions which are externally good — for they may still be counterfeit characters — but men must have righteous principles in the first place, and then they will not fail to perform righteous actions. God first respects Abel, and then his offering.' — Milner, iv. Cent. xvi. chap. ii.

Pope Leo X (1475-1510), born Giovanni di Lorenzo de' Medici.

. Luther quoted this boast by Johann Tetzel, in his tract against Hans Wurst.

Thomas Cajetan (1469–1534), Dominican theologian, cardinal, and opponent of Martin Emperor Maximilian I (1459-1519) of the House of Habsburg. King of the Germans from 1486, and Holy Roman Emperor from 1493 until his death. He was never crowned by the Pope because he couldn't travel to Rome.

Interregnum: the time between two reigns, governments, etc.

Andreas von Karlstadt (1486-1541), a German Protestant theologian born in Karlstadt, Franconia. During his stay in Rome, he saw large-scale corruption in the Church. In September 1516, he wrote 151 theses challenging the practices. In 1519, Johann Eck challenged him to the Leipzig Debate, which Luther joined.

[←11] i.e., Johann Eck.

Co-adjutor – an assistant to a bishop.

Philipp Melanchthon, (1497-1560). German author of the Augsburg Confession of the Lutheran Church (1530), humanist, Reformer, theologian, and educator. He was a friend of Martin Luther and defended his views. In 1521 Melanchthon published the Loci communes, the first systematic treatment of the new Wittenberg theology developed by Luther. He played an important role in reforming public schools in Germany. Ency. Brittanica.

Karl von Miltitz (c. 1490-1529) – liaison between the papal court and Elector Frederick the Wise. He met with Luther in Altenburg in 1519, and negotiated a settlement: Luther would be silent on indulgences, write a conciliatory letter to the Pope, and publish a tract supporting papal authority. Luther's silence was contingent on the silence of his opponents,

Johann Tetzel and Albert of Mainz. But Luther's statements at the Leipzig Debate, and his three treatises To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation, On the Babylonian

Captivity of the Church, and On the Freedom of a Christian, all published in 1520, made reconciliation impossible. Miltitz investigated Tetzel and accused him of fraud and embezzlement; but Miltitz was later discredited, and his accusations dismissed.

Induration: any pathological hardening or thickening of tissue.

Sophist: someone whose reasoning is subtle and often specious, drawing from Greek philosophical methods.

There is a defect in Luther's statement of the believer's union with Christ: he does not mark, he did not discern, its origin and foundation, and its consequent exclusiveness and appropriateness to a peculiar people. He refers it all to his believing; which is the manifestation, realization and effectuation of that relation which has subsisted, not in divine purpose only, but in express stipulation and arrangement, from everlasting. And this has been the source of that very faith, or rather of that energizing of the Holy Ghost, which he considers as its parent. But the thing itself, the nature of this union, is so beautifully described that, whatever its defects, I could be glad to give it all currency.

Frederick III, or FREDERICK THE WISE (1463-1525), elector of Saxony who worked for constitutional reform of the Holy Roman Empire and protected Martin Luther after Luther was placed under the imperial ban in 1521. In 1486, Frederick allied himself with Berthold, archbishop of Henneberg, to promote imperial reforms that would increase the power of the nobles against the Holy Roman emperor. In 1500 he became president of the Reichsregiment (the Imperial Governing Council), which was soon disbanded for lack of funds. He was instrumental in securing the election of the emperor CHARLES V in 1519 after refusing the crown himself. Frederick appointed Luther and Philipp Melanchthon to the University of Wittenberg, and refused to carry out a papal bull against Luther in 1520. After the ban was imposed on Luther the next year, Frederick welcomed him to the Wartburg castle, where Luther translated the Bible into German.

Much was said in the course of these discussions, about a future council. Luther acknowledged the authority of such a council; maintaining only that it must be legally convened — the civil governor being the sole rightful summoner; — and that its decisions must be regulated by the word of God. There is more of sound than substance in the recognition of this appeal, upon Luther's principles. Waving the difficulty of summoning such a general council, where deputies are to be brought together out of all Christendom, divided as it is into independent states under various supreme heads; what is the decision at last? "The testimony of Scripture is testimony of Scripture to my conscience, only so far as I am led to understand Scripture in a sense which is coincident with the general decision. If that decision is contrary to my own deliberate, conscientious and supposedly Spirit-taught views, as a lover of order I bow to the tribunal by submitting to its penalties, whether positive or negative; but I cannot confess myself convinced, or adopt the judgment of the council as my own, without violating Luther's fundamental principle, 'the word is my judge.'" (See Part ii. Sect. 12. note k of the following work.) Luther's last answer confirms the distinction which I have been marking here: that his resolution applies to the supposed decision of a council.

Gravelled: annoyed, disturbed, peeved.

Johann the Steadfast or Constant (1468-1532), was Elector of Saxony from 1525 to 1532. He organised the Lutheran Church in the Electorate of Saxony, aided by Martin Luther. This

"Saxon model" was soon implemented beyond Saxony, in other territories of the Holy Roman Empire. Luther turned to the Elector for secular leadership and funds on behalf of a church that was largely stripped of its assets and income after the break with Rome.

Maurice (1521-1553) –Duke of Saxony. He betrayed the Protestant Faith and assured his father-in-law, Philip of Hesse, that if he surrendered to the emperor, Charles V, he would not be imprisoned. However, Philip was taken prisoner and exiled; and Maurice was promoted to Elector of Saxony. Charles V then tried to reintroduce Catholicism into the Protestant territories. When Charles commissioned Maurice to capture the Lutheran city of Magdeburg (1550), Maurice seized the opportunity to raise an army; he signed compacts with France and Germany's Protestant princes against the Habsburgs. In 1552 he signed a treaty with Henry II of France, to wage a campaign against the emperor Charles V. His father-in-law was eventually freed.

'During his residence in the castle of Wartburg he allowed his beard and hair to grow, assumed an equestrian sort of dress, and passed for a country gentleman, under the name of Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff (1626-1692). Chancellor of Saxe-Zeitz, founding chancellor of the Univ. of Halle, scholar of the Reformation, and supporter of Pietists. When Jesuit Louis

Maimbourg published the Histoire du Lutheranisme in 1680, Seckendorff spent ten years collecting sources on Luther and the Reformation to refute it. This was the first scholarly history of the Reformation, and it contained nearly all sources of Luther's work then available. Dict. of Luther and the Lutheran Traditions, eds. Granquist, Haemig, Kolb,

Mattes, Strom (Baker Academic, 2017).

Cavilling (cavil): raising trivial objections.

Justus Jonas (1493-1555) – a German theologian and reformer. He was a Jurist, Professor, and Hymn writer. Jonas had befriended John Lange, a Greek scholar at Luther's old

Augustinian house in Erfurt, and Luther's friend. Jonas and Luther corresponded through Lange. Jonas took sides with Luther after the Leipzig Debate, publishing a tract that defended him against John Eck's charges. He accompanied Luther to the Diet of Worms in 1521. As a result of his association with Luther, he was deposed as canon at St. Severi in Erfurt and excommunicated. His own hero, Erasmus, attacked him for supporting Luther's more contentious approach to reform.

It is the works of the godly that are the subject of inquiry; the charge against which Luther here defends himself is, his having maintained that the very best acts of the best men, have the nature of sin.

In Paradise Lost iv, 778, 788, John Milton refers to Ithuriel as a cherub. Along with the Zephon, it is dispatched by Gabriel to locate Satan. The "grieslie King" is discovered in the Garden of Eden "squat like a Toad, close at the ear of Eve." By touching Satan with his spear, Ithuriel causes the Tempter to resume his proper likeness.

I need scarcely mention the name of Leander Van Ess. But is there no opposition to this work, among the Roman Catholics? Are there not divisions and fiercest persecutions among them on this very ground? And where, and what, are the Bible Societies of Spain, Portugal,

Bavaria and the Italian States?

Jerome Emser (1477-1527) – A German antagonist of Luther. At first Emser sided with the reformers; but he wanted a practical and moral reformation of the clergy, not a doctrinal reformation. After the Leipzig Debate, the breach between them was final. When Emser warned against Luther, Luther launched a scathing attack on Emser.

It is unclear why this is in third person, unless perhaps it was transcribed by someone on Luther's behalf. – WHG It was an acknowledged principle with him, as with our reformers, to alter as little as possible. He was more of a Cranmer than a Knox.

If his faults are required, he had in him every fault under heaven. In him, that is, in his flesh, dwelt no good thing; that is, every bad thing dwelt. His within was like ours. "For from within, out of the heart, etc., " etc. But if, as it should rather be, it is inquired what came out of him that is evil chiefly, then his vices, as is the nature of evil, were his virtues run mad: he was obstinate, fierce, contemptuous, vain. He was not unkind, as some would represent him; he had "bowels of mercies:" he was not rash; no man more deliberately weighed his words and deeds: he was not implacable; witness his attempts to conciliate that greatest of all bears, the Duke George, our tiger Henry, Carolstadt, Erasmus, and even the Pope.

This does not imply that he always interpreted Scripture lightly, or saw all the truth; any more than his skill in arguing implies that he always arrived at right conclusions, or proceeded to them by just steps. His excellency in addressing the common people, let it be observed, did not consist in his having one doctrine or one reason for them, and another for the learned; he had one Gospel for all, and told it all to all. But he had powers of language, facility of illustration, and simplicity of expression, which made him intelligible and affecting for the most illiterate.

Probably referring to the German PEASANTS' WAR from 1524-1525. It failed primarily because the aristocracy slaughtered up to 100,000 of the 300,000 poorly-armed peasants and farmers.

The capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, Constantinople, was conquered by the Ottoman Stalkinghorse: a horse behind which a hunter hides while stalking game – a false facade to enable an attack.

Zuingle and OEcolampadius, the former at Zurich, and the latter at Basil, were the great defenders of the faith in this cause. Notwithstanding the authority, ponderosity, calumniousness, and inflexibility of Luther, they manifested to the uttermost in opposing them, were enabled to "bring forth judgment unto truth." (Isa 42.3) Zuingle's great work is a commentary on true and false religion, published in 1525, to which he added an appendix on the Eucharist. Oecolampadius' principal performance is a treatise on the genuine meaning of our Lord's words, This is my "body," published about the same time. Erasmus, in his light and profane way, said that it might deceive the very elect; and being called to review it, as one of the public censors, he declared to their high mightinesses, the senate of Basil, that in his opinion, it was a learned, eloquent and elaborate performance he should be disposed to add pious, if anything could be pious which opposes the judgment and consent of the church. Zuingle testified his sense of the importance of the question by remarking in his letter to Pomeranus, 'I do not think Antichrist can be completely subdued, unless this error of consubstantiation is rooted up.' OEcolampadius traces the origin of the doctrine of the real presence to Peter Lombard; and he contends that every one of the Fathers had held that the words, This is my body, were not to be taken literally.

It was this sort of argument which brought the infidel Gibbon back to the Protestant faith, from which he had been seduced.... That the text of Scripture which seems to inculcate the real presence is attested only by a single sense, our sight — while the real presence itself is disproved by three of our senses. See his 'Memoir of My Life and Writings,' vol. i. p. 58.

Palliation: to act in such a way as to cause an offense to seem less serious.

Take an instance of the toil and sweat of his argumentation; take an instance, or two, of the calumnious fierceness with which he pursued these fraternal adversaries:

'But it is absurd to suppose the body of Christ to be in more than a hundred thousand places at once. This is not more absurd than the diffusion of the soul through every part of the body. Touch any part of the body with the point of a needle, and the whole man, the whole soul, is sensible of the injury. If, then, the soul is equally in every part of the body, and you can give no reason for it, why may not Christ be everywhere, and everywhere equally, in the sacrament? Tell me, if you can, why a grain of wheat produces so many grains of the same species; or why a single eye can fix itself at once on a thousand objects, or a thousand eyes can be fixed at once on a single minute object.

— Take another example. What a feeble, poor, miserable, vanishing thing is the voice of a man! Yet what wonders it can perform — how it penetrates the hearts of multitudes of men! And yet, not so as each person acquires merely a portion of it, but rather as if every individual ear became possessed of the whole. If this were not a matter of experience, there would not be a greater miracle in the whole world. If, then, the corporeal voice of man can effect such wonders, why may not the glorified body of Christ be much more powerful and efficacious in its operations?

— Further, when the Gospel is preached through the exertion of the human voice, does not every true believer, by the instrumentality of the word, become actually possessed of Christ in his heart? Not that Christ sits in the heart, as a man sits upon a chair, but rather as he sits at the right hand of the Father. How this is, no man can tell; yet the Christian knows, by experience, that Christ is present in his heart. Again, every individual heart possesses the whole of Christ; and yet a thousand hearts in the aggregate possess no more than one Christ. The sacrament is not a greater miracle than this.'

'The Sacramentarian pestilence makes havoc, and acquires strength in its progress. Pray for me, I beseech you, for I am cold and torpid. A most unaccountable lassitude (if not Satan himself) possesses me, so that I am able to do very little. Our ingratitude, or perhaps some other sin, is the cause of the divine displeasure. Certainly our notorious contempt of the word of God will account for the present penal delusion, or even a greater one. I was too true a prophet when I predicted that something of this kind would happen.

— If I had not known from experience, that God in his anger allowed men to be carried away with delusions, I could not have believed that so many, and such great men, would have been seduced by such trifling and childish reasonings, so as to support this pestilentious, this sacrilegious heresy.... I am all on fire to profess openly, for once, my faith in the sacrament, and to expose the tenets of our adversaries to derision in a few words; for they will not attend to an elaborate argument. I would have published my sentiments long ago, if I had had leisure, and Satan had not thrown impediments in my way.... Factious spirits always act in this way. They first form to themselves an opinion which is purely imaginary; and then they torture Scripture to support that opinion.... He gave himself seriously to the work, and produced, in the month of February or March, a most elaborate treatise in the German language, on the words 'Take, eat, this is my body,'

AGAINST THE FANATICAL SPIRITS or THE SACRAMENTARIANS.... They lay no stress on anything except their Sacramentarian tenet. Devoid of every Christian grace, they pretend to the sanctity of martyrs, on account of this single opinion.... They would persuade one that this was the great, the only concern of the Holy Ghost; when in reality, it is a delusion of Satan who, under the pretence of love and concord, is raising dissensions and mischiefs of every kind.'

— In the celebrated conference at Marpurg, proposed and accomplished by the landgrave of Hesse in 1529, for the purpose of mutual conciliation and peace, though the Sacramentarians begged hard to be acknowledged as brethren, and even went so far as to own repeatedly, that the body of Christ was verily present in the Lord's Supper, though in a spiritual manner. And Zuingle himself, in pressing for mutual fraternity, declared with tears, that there was no man in the world with whom he more earnestly wished to agree, than with the Wittemberg divines — the spirit of Luther proved perfectly untractable and intolerant. It seems he had come with a mind determined not to budge one inch upon this point. Accordingly, nothing more could be gained from him than that each side should show

Christian charity to the other as far as they could conscientiously; and that both should diligently ask God to lead them into the truth. To go further, Luther maintained, was impossible; and he expressed astonishment that the Swiss divines could look upon him as a Christian brother, when they did not believe his doctrine to be true. In such circumstances, however, though there could be no such thing as fraternal union, the parties, he allowed, might preserve a friendly sort of peace and concord; they might do good turns to each other, and abstain from harsh and acrimonious language. The vehemence, in fact, was not confined to one side, though the Swiss had learned more of modern manners than the Lutherans, and could cut deep without appearing to carry a sword — whereas the Lutherans growled more than they bit, in this fight. Still our business is with the wrong of Luther. He provoked first, he spoke worst; their acrimony was no excuse for his. His was the fury of a great man brought to the level of his equals, or even below those whom he would gladly consider his inferiors, and treat as his vassals.

Pour le rire: for the jest, or for making fun of something.

Lucian of Samosata (c.115-200 AD) was a Greek satirist. He wrote On the Death of Peregrinus, a huckster. Lucian parodies what he sees as inherent naïveté and gullibility in Christians, calling them lackeys and dolts. Porphyry of Tyre (c. 234-305 AD) was a Neoplatonic philosopher. He edited and published the Enneads, containing the works of his teacher Plotinus. His book, Against the Christians, was banned by emperor Constantine the Atticus (c. 175) insisted that Aristotle was an atheist, denied the existence of the soul, and rejected divine providence.

Horace, Carminum, lib. i. 12, par. 45. Marcellus is compared to a bright start, illuming with its effulgence the Julian line, and forming the hope and glory of that illustrius house.

Cuthbert Tunstall (1474-1559) English church leader, diplomat, and royal adviser. He was Prince-Bishop of Durham during the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary I and Elizabeth

He feared losing the pension which he received from England. Clement had made him a present of two hundred florins. He had received most magnificent promises from popes, prelates, and princes.

Objurgatory: Designed to chide; containing or expressing reproof.

Latin: the gods have deemed otherwise.

Prolixity: boring wordiness.

Irrefragable: not to be refuted or overthrown; undeniable.

See Locke's Essay, vol. i. pp. 195-200. b. ii. c. 21.

Tertium quid: some third thing similar to two opposites but distinct from both.

I was once asked, why, with such an excellent treatise as Jonathan Edwards' and others, in our own language, I thought it necessary to revive Luther. Here is my answer: Your great metaphysicians decompound man; and if they could, they would decompound God. Your great theologians do the same. But if we would really know either man or God, we must first learn to take the Bible for granted, that it is the word of God; and then study both, as drawn and described in it: not imagining a God for ourselves, by decking out some we know not what substratum with a number of what we call attributes; but remembering, that what we hear called His attributes are in reality parts of His essence, and considering, that it is that Good One who has devised, foreordained, and in his appointed time, manifested the Lord

Jesus Christ as the image of Himself, in his person and in his actings, which is our God; and that we ourselves are parts of that Adam, by his dealings with, and declarations concerning which, in Christ, He has been and is effecting the manifestation of what He himself is.

That is, scholastics, such as Anselm, Peter Abelard, William of Ockham, Bonaventure, and It may not be improper to observe that Luther himself, many years afterwards, had so good an opinion of it, as to declare that he could not revjew any one of his writings with complete satisfaction, unless perhaps his Catechism and his Bondage of the Will.

See Joh 1.17; 14.6. Eph 1.13; 4.21; Col 1.5; 1Joh 5.20.

See, among other places, Joh 1.1-14. 1Joh 1.1, 2. Col 1.15-20. Heb 1. Pro 8.22-31. Mic 5.2.

See especially Matt. 12.28. Acts 1.1, 2. 2.22, etc. 10.38.

The essence of Christ's person is God-manhood: He is God, the equal of the Father and of the Holy Ghost: He is man by the conception of the Holy Ghost in the Virgin; He is Godman in one substance, through that union of his God person with his man person, which is effected by the agency of the Holy Ghost; Who, being one in essence with his God person, inbabits that manhood of His which he has generated. What is that manhood so generated?

Its essence is a pure, spotless, sinless spirit inhabiting (in the days of his flesh, and while yet it was flesh and blood) a sinful body. Romans i. 3, 4. rightly interpreted, confirms this satisfying account of the matter: "Who was made of the seed of David according to the flesh, that is, the body; Who was declared to be Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness that is, according to his spirit which was holy (the opposition, I maintain, is between his flesh and his spirit) — from the period of his resurrection (ex anastasewv}. The whole tenour of Scripture declaration falls in with this view. His body is his connecting link with manhood, that is, with Adam-hood: Son of man is not man merely; man anyhow begotten, anyhow made, anyhow existent (as the Lord God might have made five hundred species of men); but Son of Adam, one who has his being somehow through and of the stock of Adam.

The notes referred to are explicit and full; but take an illustration, which may be of use to some, 1. from the case of Rebekah, Genesis 25.21-23. (..."Two nations are in your womb, and two manner of people shall be separated from your bowels); and 2. from Heb. 7.9, 10. (For he was yet in the loins of his Father, when etc.)

God has given a commandment, "Repent, and believe the Gospel;" "And this is his commandment, that we believe on the name " etc. This command is congruous to that manifestation which he makes of himself in his super-creation kingdom; I say rather, is congruous to what He himself is — He being, even as He has hereby shown himself to be, the God who in perfect harmony and consistency with all other perfections, is love, grace and mercy. The giving of this commandment, and the receiving of his people according to it, falls in with his great design of God-manifestation, by drawing out, as it does, what is in man, and showing HIM as dealing with what is so drawn out, according to justice and equity.

— In no way does it disparages the freeness of the grace, while it manifests to the uttermost the justness of the indignation. Which of the reprobate disobeys the Gospel edict, because he counts himself to be a reprobate? And which of them has any right to deal with himself as such?

The law is a perfect transcript of creation man's duty, in enigma; typical emblem of Christ as the unblemished Lamb, and of the law of the Spirit of life which is laid up in Him ("Your lamb shall be without blemish," Exo 12.5..." And put the tables in the ark which I had made,"

Deu 10.5..." A new covenant ... I will put my laws into their mind, " etc. Heb. 8.8-11.), and real teacher that Adam cannot obey his Maker; or rather, that creature, as creature, cannot fulfil the law of his sort. But grace has a new mind to study, and it is cast into a mould correspondent to that mind — brought to a mind which is of a much higher tone, and of another string, than that which God taught and demanded at Sinai.

I would be understood as not pretending to make full and accurate references in proof of Luther's seeings and not seeings (which would, in fact, be to analyze and anatomize the whole of his work), but merely to give a hint at each. And now, I well know how I will be arraigned of arrogance for having dared to controvert his positions, even more, to judge and to condemn him. I can only say, as Luther did at Worms; Here I stand. I cannot do otherwise. May God help me. Amen. It is the fashion to speak of Luther and the rest of the reformers as little less than inspired men, and of the era of the Reformation as the season of an effusion of the Spirit: the same sort of expression has been applied also to later times; to a supposed and, as I will hope, real revival of religion which took place in Whitfield's time.

Such expressions are unwarranted. I know of but one effusion, when "being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, Jesus shed forth that which was seen and heard," on the day of Pentecost. Granting, therefore, what I would by no means dispute, that it has been the Lord's blessed will from the beginning to make peculiar display of his Spirit at certain seasons — as in private and personal experience, so in the community of his people — and not sticking at a word, but calling this effusion, if you please; what is the extent of the benefit? It is not meant that the atmosphere is impregnated with spiritual influences, so that all who live at such a period, and within the circle of it, are made partakers of the boon. Otherwise, where did the Caiaphases and Alexanders, the Felixes and Caesars come from? It goes no further than that certain persons are specially taught, strengthened, and comforted at these seasons; and that the number so instructed and enlivened is greater than in ordinary times. It does not follow, that the blessed Spirit has, at these seasons, taught and shown all that is ever to be taught and shown of God and of his truth. The Bible and other records show that there has, on the contrary, been a progression in His teaching; in the manner of revealing, if not in the matter revealed. Though all truth is contained in, "And I will put enmity between you and the woman " etc. this truth has been made plainer, in various degrees, since the beginning; to Abraham, to Moses, to David, to the Prophets, the Evangelists and the Apostles. It would not be adventurous to affirm that, as the Prophets spoke to as well as of the Apostles' days, so the Apostles have spoken to as well of later times — times yet to come. Is it sacrilege or blasphemy to say that what Paul and John wrote and spoke will be better understood, and is even now better understood generally in the church, than it was by their own immediate hearers and readers, if not by themselves? Surely it would be preposterous to affirm that nothing lias been added to the store of evangelical learning, since Luther's time, by the discovery of additional manuscripts, and by their collation; by the improved knowledge of the original languages; by the illustrations of travellers, and other sources of intelligence, inquiry and communication. While all other knowledge is progressive, why should biblical knowledge be stationary? Has it, in fact, been so? is it even yet so? And it is plain, this remark does not apply to the elucidation of prophecy exclusively; it extends to the counsel and truthof God. Take our fourth Article as a specimen. In Luther's and our reformers' time, I suppose everybody expected to rise with a flesh and blood body, as that Article says in spite of Paul's clear words. But now, we have been taught with what sort of a body the Lord rose, and what sort of body we may look to be clothed with ourselves. (See 1Cor 15.4454. See also Bishop Horsley's Nine Discourses on Our Lord's Resurrection.) These hints must be my defence against the supposed arrogance of impugning and correcting Luther.

The Reformation did not absorb the spiritual Sun, any more than former or later periods had, or have done so. He still continues to shoot forth his rays, when and as it pleases Him; and those on whom they fall have already received their direction how to deal with them, from his own mouth, where He says, "No man, when he has lit a candle, covers it with a vessel, or puts it under a bed; but sets it on a candle-stick, that those who enter in may see the light." Luk 8.16.

Fleer: to express contempt by mockery.

Milner does not appear to have understood what the investigating Horsley has made plain: that Plato was not an inventor, nor were the Ammonians scriptural improvers of human inventions. Rather, both Plato and those from whom he copied, were retailers, in fact, of mutilated revelations. 'These notions were by no means peculiar to the Platonic school. The Platonists pretended to be no more than the expositors of a more ancient doctrine which is traced from Plato to Parmenides; from Parmenides to his masters of the Pythagorean sect; from the Pythagoreans to Orpheus, the earliest of the Grecian mystagogues; from Orpheus to the secret lore of the Egyptian priests, in which the foundations of the Orphic theology were laid. Similar notions of a triple principle prevailed in the Persian and Chaldean theology; and vestiges even of the worship of a Trinity were discernible in the Roman superstition in a very late age. Ehe Romans had received this worship from their Trojan ancestors. For the Trojans brought it with them into Italy from Phrygia. In Phrygia it was introduced by Dardanus as early as in the ninth century after Noah's flood. Dardanus carried it with him from Samothrace, where the personages that were its objects, were worshipped under the heathen name of Cabirim.... 'The Great or Mighty ones;' for that is the import of the Hebrew name. And their Latin appellation is of like import, Penates... Thus the joint worship of Jupiter, Juno and Minerva, the triad of the Roman capital, is traced to that of the THREE MIGHTY ONES in Samothrace, which was established in that island. It is impossible to determine at what precise time, but earlier than the days of Abraham, if Eusebius may be credited. — Horsley's Letters to Priestley, pp. 47-49.

Diatribe. One of the names by which Erasmus chose to distinguish his performance on Freewill. He borrows it from the debates of the ancient philosophers; and would be understood to announce a canvassing of the question rather than a judicial determination upon it. The original Greek term denotes, 1. The place trodden by the feet while they were engaged in the debate. 2. The time spent in such debate. 3. The debate itself. Erasmus'

Diatribe, therefore, is a disquisition, or disputation, on Freewill. Luther often personifies it.

Io Pæan – in ancient Greece, a hymn of praise; especially one sung to invoke or thank a deity.

The schoolmen, with Peter Lombard at their head, who arose about the middle of the twelfth century; idolizers of Aristotle; their theology abounding with metaphysical subtleties, and their disputations greatly resembling those of the Greek sophists.

Luther refers to the former editions of Melancthon's 'Common Places,' which contained some passages not found in the later ones; this among others. The divine predestination takes away liberty from man [Not choice, but unbiassed choice; freeness and contingency of choice. ED.]. For all things happen according to divine predestination; as well the external actions as the internal thoughts of all creatures. . . . The judgment of the flesh abhors this sentiment, but the judgment of the spirit embraces it. For you will not learn the fear of God, or confidence in Him, from any source more surely than when you have imbued your mind with this sentiment concerning predestination. It is to passages such as these that Luther doubtless refers in the testimony here given to Melancthon's work; and it has been inferred from the withdrawing of it in subsequent editions, that Melancthon afterwards changed his sentiments on these subjects. The late Dean of Carlisle has investigated this supposition with his usual accuracy and diligence; and concludes that he probably did alter his earlier sentiments to some extent in later life. Truth, however, does not stand in man or by man.

Too much has no doubt been made of supposed changes in the opinions of many learned and pious divines. But after all, what do these prove? We have the same sources of knowledge as they, and we must draw our light from the clear spring, not from the polluted and uncertain stream. See Milner's Eccles. Hist, vol. iv. p. 920-926, first edition.

Lubricus et flexiloquus – Lub. 'one that slips out of your hands, so that you cannot grapple with him.' Flex. 'one whose words will bend many ways, as being of doubtful or pliable meaning.

Greek mythology: Scylla was a sea nymph transformed into a sea monster who lived on one side of a narrow strait; drowned and devoured sailors who tried to escape Charybdis (a whirlpool) on the other side of the strait.

Conferri aut componi – What Erasmus professed to do, and thereupon gave the name of 'Collatio' to his Treatise: 'a sort of conference and comparison of sentiment; each disputant bringing his opinion and arguments, and placing them front to front with his opponent's. —

Proteus was a sort of Demigod supposed to have the power of changing himself into many forms.

Proteus (Greek mythology): the prophetic old man of the sea and shepherd of the sea's flocks. He was subject to the sea god Poseidon.... Proteus knew all things—past, present, and future—but disliked divulging what he knew. Those who wished to consult him first had to surprise and bind him during his noonday slumber. Even when caught he would try to escape by assuming all sorts of shapes. Ency. Brit.

Res nostra – The ministering of Christ is the business spoken of here, by a phrase correspondent with 'res bellica,' 'res navalis,' 'res judiciaria,' etc. etc. as being the trade, occupation, and sole concern of Christ's ministers, in whose name he speaks here.

Officii nostri – Off. 'What a man has to do;' 'his business,' implying a relation; such as 'munus et officium oculorum,' the office or function of the eye. Hence, 'good office, obligation, or kindness conferred.'

Gravas, ornas. The figure is mixed: gr. 'clog, load, weigh down.' Orn. 'beautify with apparel.'

Pedibus discessurus. A Roman phrase taken from their method of voting in the senate, when they dissented from the decree as proposed: they walked over to the opposite side of the house.

Ne verbis ludamur. 'That we may not be mocked by words;' 'made the sport of words.'

Rom 1.29; 1Cor 3.3; 2Cor 12.20.

Velut ille ad Rhombum. If you are indeed speaking of such assertions here, you are either a ridiculous orator, or a mad writer: a ridiculous orator if it is not true genuine Freewill which you are discussing; a mad writer if it is so. Oratory was out of place on such a subject, however sincere and disinterested the speaker might be; but orators were for the most part a venal and frivolous tribe, and some exercised their art unskilfully, while others were hired only to amuse and make sport. It is not without meaning, therefore, that Luther compares the orator and the writer; and if Erasmus is to fill the weightier place of the writer, then it is that of one who is frenzied and blasphemous.

I am indebted to the kindness of a learned friend for the reference, velut ille ad Rhombum, which had perplexed me. I can have no doubt that it refers to the fourth Satire of Juvenal, where Doraitian is represented as having called a council of his senators to deliberate what should be done with an immense Rhombus, or Turbot; with which a fisherman out of fear had presented him. Among other counsellors was a blind man, of very infamous character, as an informer, but high in the favour of the Emperor, named Catullus; 'cum mortifero

"Grande et conspicuum nostro quoque tempore monstrum This man extolled the Rhombus exceedingly, pointing to its various beauties with his hand, as if he really saw them. But unfortunately, while he pointed to the fish lying on his left hand, it lay all the while on his right.

"Nemo magis Rhombum stupuit: nam plurima dixit "In laevum conversus: at illi dextra jacebat This was not the only occasion on which he had given scope to his imagination, and praised as though he had eyes:

..."sic pugnas Cilicis laudabat et ictus, "Et pegma, et pueros inde ad velaria raptos." — Juv. iv. 113-121.

The force of the comparison, therefore, lies in Erasmus being supposed to discuss the phantom of his own imagination, instead of the real Rhombus. This phantom he might call dubious or unnecessary, without being himself impious; it was the coinage of his own brain.

But if he called the real Rhombus (the Church's confession of Freewill) dubious or useless, he wrote gravely, but he wrote sacrilegiously. He has only the alternative, therefore, of being a fool or a madman, if he places Luther's assertion on Freewill among the barren and vain.

The word praesumere is used in a rather peculiar but not unauthorized sensem corresponding to our English word 'presume,' and with its own etymology: 'preconceive,'

'anticipate,' 'conjecture,' 'imagine,' — opinari, credere, conjicere, imaginari. — I would have preferred understanding praesumere in the sense of 'anticipating,' meaning that he spoke of one subject here in his Preface, and of another in the body of his work. But the illustration does not coincide with this view. Catullus did not make two speeches, nor do I find any authority for such use of praesumere. It has a peculiar rhetorical sense of preoccupying; that is, occupying the adversary's ground before him, by anticipating and obviating his objections. — But this will not apply here.

Luther has no authority for this interpretation of the term Plerophory, which expresses no more than full evidence of a fact or truth; or full assurance of that fact or truth. But in substance, he is correct; confession (which amounts to assertion) is demanded.

Anticyra. The famous island of Hellebore, which cured mad people. Hence 'Naviget Originally, "whether I apprehend, or do not apprehend." The reference is to the previous quote. – WHG

That is, we must apprehend His existence, before we can attribute the creation to Him (Rom Luther does not choose to speak out on the subject of Erasmus' scepticism and infidelity, but hints pretty broadly at it. There is only too strong an evidence that the insinuation was just; and that it constituted the most galling part of his attack. Erasmus' object was to rise upon the ruins of Luther; but with what face could the Pope or the Princes prefer an Infidel? See

Milner's Eccles. Hist. vol. iv. 935-945.

A beautiful testimony to the confidence inspired into the soul by the Holy Ghost's teachings!

We are more sure of the truth of His assertions than that we live; and we hold them more firmly than we do the results of experience.

Abstrusa, exposita. Abst. 'thrust from us,' as into secret places; 'hidden from view,' like the apocryphal writings. Expos, 'set out in broad day,' like goods displayed for sale.

Luther appears to understand this text as most do: he knew who those were among men, whom he had chosen, with a supposed reference to eternal election. But the Greek text plainly determines it to mean, 'I know the real character and state of those persons whom I have chosen;' referring to the Twelve exclusively, as those whom he afterwards (15.19.) declares himself to have chosen out of the world.

Who was declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness," (as opposed to, "which was made of the seed of David according to the flesh," in the preceding verse) "by the resurrection from the dead." Rom.1.4. Fractis signaculis. The stone at the door of the sepulchre was sealed. Matt, 27.65-66.

Luther's affirmation and argument is of the greatest importance here. All the truth of God, he maintains, is explicitly and intelligibly declared in Scripture; in some passages more obscurely through our ignorance of words; in others more manifestly and unequivocally. But there is no truth, no dogma, that is not distinctly taught and confirmed.

A cave of singular virtue in Mount Corycus of Cilicia, supposed to be inhabited by the gods.

Resectum. Erasmus' term, taken from 'the close cutting of the nails, or hair, or beard;' or, from 'the excision of the unsound flesh in wounds.' It implies, that all the ambiguity is not yet withdrawn, though some of it may be.

Luther refers back to this passage in the progress of his work. (See below, Chap. ii. Sect. 13.) It is not the public ministry of the word, but its instrumentality in general, of which he speaks here. Scripture reveals truth to the ear, and it reveals truth to the heart. The former of these he calls an external clearness. The word which falls upon the ear is a plain and clear word. The other he calls an internal clearness. The truth which is contained in Scripture, and conveyed by a clear and plain word, is understood by the heart.

'Totus Lucianum spiras et inhalas mihi grandem Epicuri erapulam.' Luc. One of the most noted satirical blasphemers of Christianity: Epic. An atheistic heathen philosopher who inculcated pleasure and indifference.

Pontificum et Tyrannorum. These names comprehend the whole tribe of Popes, Cardinals, and Princes, by which the ecclesiastical and civil power of the Roman empire was now administered. Pont. 'Priests of high dignity,' generally; not confined to the Pope, but including also his Cardinals. Tyran. 'The civil rulers throughout the empire.' In Latin, it is used more generally in a bad sense, to denote usurped authority exercised with fierceness and violence; but not always.

Confusus, expresses the state of the mariner's mind: flactibus obrutus, his drowning body.

Detestaris, praetendis. Detest. deprecari, amoliri, avertere, deos invocando. Praetend., 'to put forwards as a reason for acting, whether truly or falsely.'

Curiosa. Applied in a bad sense to things we have no business with, 'curiosus dicitur nonnunquam de iis qui nimia cura utuntur in rebus alienis exquirendis.'

Vanos corresponds to supervacaneos used above, expressing their 'unprofitableness;' 'idle speculators.'

Greek mythology: Scylla was a sea nymph transformed into a sea monster who lived on one side of a narrow strait; drowned and devoured sailors who tried to escape Charybdis (a whirlpool) on the other side of the strait.

Status causae hujus. 'Status a rhetoribus dicitur quaestio, quae ex prima causarum conflictione nascitur; quia in eo tota causa stat et consistit.'

Omnia in omnibus. Not only 'all things in all men;' but 'all things in all things;' every jot and tittle in every single thing that is done.

Partem alteram. As opposed to 'altera pars' in the next section: considering the sum of Christian doctrine, as divisible into these two integral parts.

Curious: fussy or picky; overly concerned.

An praesciat; The Newstadt editor inserts the word necessariò here. It is not needed. What is foreknowledge, if it is not absolute; i.e. if the event is not inevitable, or necessary?

Definis. Def. does not express simply what we understand and mean by a definition; but laying out the subject matter of debate in propositions, and a supporting of those propositions by argument . Such were Luther's several Theses; with ninety-five of which, he first opened his attack upon the Popedom; or rather upon the doctrine of Indulgences: a form of discussion common in those times. Perhaps our English word 'determine' comes nearest to it.

Efficiunt quod tentant. They do not go through with the matter in hand, but leave it short: the 'vires et opera' are still undefined, neither distinctly affirmed, nor satisfactorily proved.

Urgebo. 'Driving, as you would drive cattle, or an enemy, before you.'

Liberi arbitrii vires et opera. Voluntas is 'the faculty of the will at large.' Arbitrium, 'the essence, spirit, power of that faculty.' Erasmus maintains this power to be free; Luther, that it is in bondage. Hence, 'liberum arbitrium,' 'servum arbitrium.' Vis, or vires arbitrii, the power or powers of this power. Vis, or vires liberi arbitrii; the power or powers of this power, as declared by Erasmus to be free; and so, just corresponds with our idea and term of Freewill. 'You shall define to me, what are the powers of this faculty, which is thus supposed and maintained by you to be free.' This is the crux of modern Freewillers, just as it was of Erasmus. They get on pretty well, till they are compelled to define.

This abstruse but irresistible deduction from Erasmus' concession may perhaps be stated a little more familiarly, thus: If God does not foreknow all events absolutely, there must be a defect either in his will, or in his knowledge; what happens must either be against his will, or beside his knowledge. Either he meant otherwise than the event, or had no meaning at all about the event; or, he foresaw another event, or did not foresee any event at all. But the truth is, what he willed in past eternity, he wills now; the thing now executed is what he has intended to execute from everlasting; for his will is eternal: just as the thing which has now happened is what he saw in past eternity; because his knowledge is eternal.

N. B. [note well] This whole paragraph is omitted in the Nieustadt edition of 1591.

Illude: To play upon by artifice; to deceive; to mock; to excite and disappoint the hopes of.

Eluserant, illuserunt. A play on the words eludo, illudo. Elud. 'to parry off,' 'evade.' A metaphor taken from the gladiator, who by a dexterous turn of his body, escapes the weapon of his adversary. I do not find any classical authority for understanding 'illudo' with the same reference to the gladiator. It refers to customs of a more general nature; comprehending all sorts of injury inflicted in a way of deception, or derision: 'to sport with,' or 'make sport of;' sometimes 'to ruin in sport.' Thus, these Sophists have evaded their adversaries, but they have made fools of themselves.

Agnata. 'What grows to us as a sort of monstrous appendage;' like the membra agnata et agnascentia in animals; parts that are more than should be by nature, such as a sixth finger, etc.

Aliorum obsequio. Erasmus was a forced champion, writing to please the Pope and his party at their special request. Personam sumimus. He did not really stand in his own person, but was an actor sustaining a part which had been put upon him. Alienae scenae servire expresses the drudgery of labouring through a character in which he had made himself a volunteer. Scenae servire sometimes signifies 'to temporize;' but here I prefer retaining the original figure. — This is one of the poisoned arrows of Luther's treatise; 'a hireling expectant, with only half his heart in the cause.'

A forced application of James' words, who speaks of a breach of one commandment as subjecting us to the curse of all, because such a breach is derogatory to the authority of the Lawgiver. We set ourselves up against the Lawgiver, and impugn his authority by a single wilful breach of a single commandment, with guilt of the same quality, though not of the same extent and aggravation, as if we broke all. Luther applies it to Erasmus' only meaning to have a little sport; but then it is at the expense of Scripture: and such sport, and even the intention of such sport, implies a lack of due reverence for Scripture. This first fault leads to all the impiety which follows; and therefore he who is guilty of it, is guilty of all the impieties which follow, though he did not set out with the intention of committing them. 'Guilty of all,' because one leads to all; is the seed of all. — This is not James' meaning.

Prostituere promiscuis auribits. Prostit. 'publicare,' 'diffamare,' (pro, sive prae, statuo.) Promisc. 'confusus;' hence, 'general,' 'common.'

I would crave the reader's particular attention to this description of the human body of the Lord Jesus Christ; that part of his frame which alone connected him and really connected him with the damned substance of his people. It enters into the very entrails of 'the mystery of godliness.'

Sic odiosè pungis. Pung. 'cuspide vel aculeo ictum infero.'

Pontificum tyrannidem offendere. Offend. 'aversari,' 'offendi,' 'molestiam capere;' quasi impingere, incurrere in illiquid, quod displiceat. — Another poisoned arrow. While he keeps no terms with Luther, he must still be the friend of liberty. He had gone far in satirizing the reigning abuses. But how galling the exposure!

Free. That is, preaching that these are free; that men may observe or neglect them according to their own individual conscience.

Consul, auctor, refer to the customs of the Roman Republic, of which the consul was the guardian and adviser: he was the author, or originator of measures.

Allegas, 'afferre aliquid probandi vel excusandi gratia.' A forensic expression; these were his witnesses: but what did they prove? only what a clever fellow this Erasmus is. Illustration is not argument; but here it is manifestly a substitute for it. He amuses, imposes, irritates, and bewilders by his similies, because he has nothing solid with which to answer.

Marpesian rocks: Greek mythology – Marpesia was Queen of the Amazons. She established a city in the Caucasus Mountains referred to as the Rock of Marpesia. Sometime later,

Alexander the Great built the Caspian Gates there to keep out the barbarian hordes of the north.

'Since I am reduced to this painful alternative of evils.'

Certissimum. As opposed to what Erasmus gave reason to suspect that he accounted it:

'verbum Dei et futuram vitam fabulas esse putis.'

Conturbat. Luther makes it 'troubled waters;' we, more correctly, 'the world turned upside down,' anastatwsauten (anastatoosauten).

Perversè. 'Distortedly,' in a manner contrary to their real leaning and use. Luther's charge is no less than this: what Erasmus counted evil was really good; and vice versa.

Puerilia, civilia, humana, divina. Civ. 'What relate to man as a citizen; as opposed to 'puerilia,' because it was not till man attained a certain age that he became entitled to them.

Haec alia questio est. 'Other' than that of the expediency of proclaiming it, as supposed to be acknowledged truth. Free confession is introduced by Erasmus as his third example of a dogma which, though true, should not to be circulated.

Et tibi dicere. Like his 'etiam te judice,' in Part ii Sect. 1. means making Erasmus himself the judge. — Vel conserere manus might be supposed to allude to an ancient custom, 'ex jure manu consertum vocare;' when a party expresses his willingness to go with his adversary into the field if dissatisfied with the award of the tribunal: a species of judicia combat. But I prefer the simpler antithesis of the text.

Luther's expressions are not equivocal here, but irrestrictive and direct: 'absolved all men from the law of Moses, without excepting any part of that law; and it is essential to his argument that he be understood thus comprehensively. Otherwise, what is the ground of fear?

Erasmus interposes in the form of an adviser, or physician; reprobating the course pursued by others, and suggesting a better one. This was no other than to modify the truth by squaring it to times, places, and persons.

The allusion is evidently to Phi 1.18, which fully justifies his 'quovis modo.' [any means] "What then? notwithstanding every way, whether in pretence or in truth, Christ is preached; and I rejoice in this, yes, and will rejoice." The 'every way,' or 'by any means,' is whatever spirit he is preached with, sincere or insincere.

"For all seek their own, not the things which are Jesus Christ's." (Phi 2.21) Obliquanda. Obliq. is sometimes applied to the veering and tacking of ships; but the essential idea is bending, or making crooked, what is in itself straight. It is here opposed to constanter, just as 'celanda' is opposed to 'palam.' The truth must be preached in its straightness, or perpendicularity, not bent downwards or sideways, that it may be accommodated to the taste, or lusts, or supposed unaptnesses of the hearer.

The allusion is evidently to Psa 14.6. Luther seems to have understood the Gospel or doctrine of Christ by this rod or sceptre; as he also does, though not exclusively, in his exposition of this psalm. (Vide in loco.) I would rather understand it of his own personal conduct as a prince. But according to Luther's allusion, the truth being a straight or upright rod, he who walks by it will walk straightly, or uprightly, and will not give occasion to others to walk crookedly, or pronely.

The word of God teaches that there is no respect of persons, and that God does not regard the persons of men. Col 3.25; Rom 2.6; Gal 2.6; Eph 6.9; Jam 2.1; Luk 20.21; Act 10.34, etc. etc. How contrary is it, then, to the clear testimony of the word, which declares that God mocks all human distinctions — that Jew and Greek, master and servant, or slave, rulers and subjects, pillars of the church, and men disinterested in the church, are alike regarded and disregarded by Him — to respect these distinctions, as Erasmus would counsel us in the ministry of the word! These testimonies are sometimes perverted to mean a denial of God's electing grace, which they do not in the slightest degree impugn, nor did Luther conceive so.

He maintained that grace as firmly as any man. The truth is, respect of persons in Scripture, means respect of persons according to human and earthly distinctions. In this regard, God, contrariwise to man, puts no difference between them. His distinctions, which he palpably makes, are built upon another foundation. "Where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumsion, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free; but Christ is all, and in all." (Col 3.14) But then, "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us with all spiritual blessings (or blessedness) in heavenly places in Christ; according as He has chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world," etc. Eph 1.3-4, etc.

Myrmidon: a follower who carries out orders without question.

Erasmus had said that bad decisions should be hushed up; and if spoken of, it should rather be said that they were good at the time, though unseasonable now. Luther replies, if your remark is intended to affect any decision which is founded upon the word of God, the sentiment is impious. With respect to any other sort of decisions, whether you choose to call them pious and holy, or acknowledge them to be faulty, I have nothing to do with them.

Ubi frons tua. The face is the index of sensibility; effrontery is the result of obduracy.

Luther's question implies you can have no face; you must have a brow of brass, to speak so.

We might say 'cheek' – audacity.

See Part i. Sect. 3. note i .

Prolabantur. Translate 'sensim devenire,' 'palatim accedere.'

Corycian caves: meaning that such things are reserved to God alone.

Non licet videre. Referring to Augustine's saying, that God works all things in us, rewarding his own good, and punishing his own evil. In a future part of the work, where this subject is more fully gone into — and to which I defer my observations on it as briefly glanced at here

— I trust it will appear that the word of God does not really leave us in that depth of darkness which Luther's language implies here, and which his fuller statement, made hereafter, affirms. God has not revealed himself that he might remain hidden, as unknown, or even yet more unknown than he was before; but amidst the unsearchableness of his infinity, he has, by his counsel of manifestation, which the Scripture records, unveiled much of himself to our view, which before and without it, was and must forever have remained concealed. Luther — prodigy as he was in his day — did not have the clue of Godmanifestation to guide him through the labyrinth; and therefore, he counted much that is light, darkness.

Super-erogemus. 'To lay out and bestow over and above what is due. Erogo is properly applied to public money, exacted and issued upon petition and by order; from there it is transferred to 'private expenditure.' Ut ex ubundantid super, implies a superabundance of reasons might be alleged, where only one is necessary.

Quo tandem perveniat. The contrast is between that direct going to God of the truly humbled sinner; and the circuitous, procrastinative, self-centered expectations of the man who does not yet know the whole of his lostness and impotency.

Nihil eligit. In direct contrast with the 'sibi praesumit, sperat, optat' of the former sentence; he does not desire or expect any particular combination of time and place, in which he may perform some great work for himself; but lies passive in the hands of God, leaving it to God even to choose for him. The expression reminds us of St. Paul's language, under other circumstances, which was probably in Luther's mind; "yet what I shall choose I know not."

Cognoscant. 'Nosco, vel bene nosco;' 'to know a person or thing not known before; as opposed to 'agnosco.'

Hackneyed: made too familiar by overuse and repetition.

Necessariò damnabiles. We were so created, have been so generated and brought out into manifest existence, are so constituted and so situated, that we cannot choose but be just objects of God's eternal damnation. This necessity is not blind Fate, but arises out of the appointments, arrangements, and operations of God's counselled will.

Fides vitae. Luther has some allusion possibly to Job 13.15, "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him." Faith of eternal life; the belief that he shall possess that life; is exercised by the dying man, in the moment when God is killing him. What! He gives you life, who is now killing you? Yes; so faith speaks. Even so, these apparent contradictions to the justice and other perfections of God, kill faith; but it is exercised in the midst of this death. A fine thought! But it will be seen elsewhere, I trust, that Luther misconceives and overstates this difficulty, through not seeing far enough into the counsel and actings of God. There is manifestly no injustice in the divine procedure when that procedure is viewed in its real nature and circumstances, as revealed. Nor are we without a manifested end, which the spiritual mind entirely approves and rejoices in, for that severity which is so hateful to carnal man. But it requires great depth, as-well as distinctness of vision, to see so as to be truly and indeed satisfied with this mystery of God, by which He is making himself known.

Suspicione veritatis. Interdum suspicio est 'opinio,' 'cogitatio', 'conjectura,' 'levis cognitio:' a sort of 'surmise' in that they may be true.

Noluntas. 'The negation of will;' a state supposed, which is inconsistent with the very existence of the faculty: yet this is what the opponents of 'necessity' would charge its asserters with maintaining; instead of that constrained but freely-acted obedience which is essential to the reality of God's being God, and man being his moral creature.

Our authorized version gives another turn to this passage, by dividing the verses differently.

But the original text is, 'I am foolish, and I did not know that I was behemoth before you: and I am always with you, you hold in your hand my right hand."

Luther does not really mean what his words might seem to imply, that God and Satan are co-equal rivals for the throne of man's will. Hereafter, it will be found that he firmly and explicitly maintains the universal and minute sovereignty of God, as the doer of all things.

His object here is to show the governance under which man's will is; that it is under the power and control of the devil, unless and until the Holy Ghost assumes the empire of it: when it is still a subject, though the subject of another, and that is a freedom-giving master.

The truth is, however, that God has never given Freewill (if by Freewill is meant an uncontrolled will) to any creature. Man, in his creation state, had the power of choosing and refusing, just as he has now; and the difference between his then state and his now state, consisted in his knowing nothing but good; and till the moment of trial, having no temptation to choose anything but good. When that temptation was, for the first time, presented to him, we know how he met it and the result was a corrupted faculty, which Satan rides as his packhorse. But both his seat and his riding are of the gift, and according to the will, of God; even as his dispossession is when, as and in whom God wills; not a moment sooner or later. Yet all this agency of God in no way contradicts the reality of a will in man;

God's universal and minute government consisting in his setting, or rather procuring to be set, before this faculty, such considerations as will lead the free agent possessor of it to choose just what God would have him choose.

Contra me turn assent, turn quaerit. Much of Erasmus' argument consisted of dubitative remark; hinting a fault or objection, rather than boldly stating it; and proposing questions, rather than affirming certainties.

Quid ipsa faciet. This question is no less than the death blow to Freewill, however modest may be the pretensions made for her. A false candour and a ruinous forbearance ask why we should attempt to separate what run so closely and so harmoniously together: God's grace and man's exertion? Goodwill to man, and zeal for God, demand the separation: only thus can man be made to know himself; only thus can God's proper praise be knowingly and unfeignedly rendered to him.

See above, Sect. 9. note. Lib. arb. 'The power of willing,' thus asserted to be free. Vis lib. arb.

'The power of this power,' etc. etc. 'Freewill.'

It is necessary to mark with precision the amount of this concession. Man has a rational will (not that his reason is seated in his will; it is a distinct faculty; and we should say more correctly, man has an understanding as well as a will) which brutes do not have; and through the means of which he may become the subject of spiritual influences. There is a spirit in man; and this spirit may be renewed and invigorated by the Holy Ghost, so as to discern spiritual objects, and to perform spiritual acts. But how does this affect the reality of the natural blindness and impotency of the rational will? It presupposes that reality.

Nomen. He does not mean that God should be called by this name; but that it is a property which, as to him, should be a name; it is what separates the individual, in the recognition of others, from all that resemble him.

Odibilis. I do not find any words like these, either in the Canonical Scriptures, or in the Apocrypha. Some have supposed Luther refers to Wis 37.3, "O wicked imagination, where did you come from to cover earth with deceit?"

Antiphrasis: the use of a word in a sense opposite to its normal sense (especially in irony).

Quadruplatorum. This name was applied, under the Roman law, to public informers, who gained a fourth of the accused's goods, or of the fine imposed upon him: or, as others say, because they accused persons who, upon conviction, used to be condemned to pay fourfold; as those who were guilty of illegal usury, gaming, or the like. But chiefly mercenary and false accusers, or litigants, were called by this name; and also those judges who, making themselves parties in a cause, decided in their own favour. Seneca calls those who, for small services, sought great returns, 'quadruplatores beneficiorum suorum;' overrating and exaggerating them. — Luther, however, may possibly have no allusion to these customs, but uses the term according to its essential meaning, for a 'bouncer' or 'exaggerator,' insinuating, that Erasmus' statements were of this kind. But uniting it with Histrionum rather leads us to some notorious class or community of persons.

Propria, pura, sobria. Prop. 'plain,' as opposed to| figurative; pur. simple, as opposed to ornamented; sobr. temperate, as opposed to extravagant.

Luther's distinction here is neither profitable, nor just, nor safe: unprofitable, because the amount of the exception is small and hard to define; unjust, because God does, in fact, always interpose. "He works all things after the counsel of his own will." "Not a sparrow falls to the ground without your Father;" "He is all (things) in all (things)." It is unsafe because, if Freewill is admitted anywhere, then why not everywhere? who will yield to our authority when we say, it is here, but it is not there? The truth is, man is a free-agent, though not a free-wilier in spiritual things; and he is no more free in temporal things, and in his dealings with the inferior creatures. (See Sect. 24. note.)

Pueros. Puer, as opposed to perfectos; en tois teleioiv Men of full age, as opposed to babes.

Nodus in scirpo quaeritur. A proverb for stumbling upon plain ground.

Laurent or Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457) – His textual analysis proved that the "Donation of Constantine" was a forgery. At the 1457 feast of St. Thomas, at the Dominican church in Rome, Valla opposed philosophy (the works of Aristotle and the Scholastics) to theology, and to the Word of God. He criticized the scholastics for adulterating the pure word of God with pagan Greek philosophy. He advocated a return to the Scriptures, whose truth would be revealed by a close textual study in the original languages. This was called "humanist theology." A Companion to the Worlds of the Renaissance, ed. Guido Ruggiero (Blackwell

Pub., Oxford UK, 2007), p. 341.

Quam tamen dubiam habent. The pretended ambiguity of Scripture is a point on which Erasmus laid great stress, and which Luther, hereafter, most powerfully and satisfactorily repels.

A vaunting insinuation expressed in the words of Aeneas, iv. 333, 334); by which Erasmus would lead his reader to understand, that he had a great deal still behind.

That is, for ten years prior to posting his 95 theses (1517), he too had been of Erasmus' mind.

Luther claims respect, here, for three properties of his mind and conduct: conscientiousness, scrupulous investigation of truth, and full consciousnesss of the evil he was encountering. Not only was his light poured in very gradually, and admittedly very cautiously, but from first to last, he would have been often glad to hold his tongue. When he spoke or wrote, it was because God's word was in his heart as a burning fire shut up in his bones, and he was weary with forbearing, and could not stay. (Jer 20.9.)

Commendo. Properly, to 'commit as a deposit into the hands of a trustee. I leave my character and my conduct, in these particulars, with my God.

Luther considers himself as arrayed, in opposition to the Fathers, before the judgment-seat of Erasmus. His defence must consist of self-praise and abuse of the Fathers. He declines making such a defence, and cuts the matter short by acknowledging his inferiority; and that in all the points of competition which Erasmus had introduced. — Dr. Milner understands him to reserve three; viz. the Spirit, miracles, and sanctification. But this does not appear to be the fair construction and import of the original text. If I collect the sense aright, he makes two concessions: etiam te judice; I will allow the cause to be tried even at your judgmentseat; omnibus aliis; I do not reserve a single point of superiority for myself. (Did Luther indeed mean to contest the palm on any of these three grounds of excellency?) But then he abates the force of his concessions by remarking with respect to those three distinctions which alone are of any value in the number and variety claimed for his adversaries, that in the first place, Erasmus could not define them; and in the next, he could not prove that he possessed them, concerning any individual of his vaunted host. (See Miln. Ecclesi. Hist. vol. iv. part ii. p. 863.)

It may be well, just to notice the order, in which Luther hence proceeds, in his animadversions upon Erasmus' Proem. 1. You cannot prove that they possessed these properties. 2. If they had them, they did not come at them by Freewill. 3. Show you the same. 4. At least define the power. 5. How absurd your conduct is with respect to the Fathers. 6. Some desultory objections such as, 'strange that God should have tolerated such errors in his church:' 'Scripture is not clear' — met and repelled. 7. Erasmus is reduced to a dilemma.

By 'manifestation of the Spirit,' Luther (with reference to Erasmus' taunt, 'quem nusquam ostendunt') means, 'how men are to prove that they have the Spirit dwelling and walking in them.' By 'miracles,' how the reality or falsehood of affirmed miracles is to be proved.' By 'sanctification,' the state of a saint; that is, of one effectually called by the Holy Ghost: this effectual calling, or separation of the Spirit. It is that act by which the eternally separated of the Father (Jude 1.1.) are drawn into a realized and recognised union with the separated one, even the Lord Jesus Christ — in whom (Heb 2.11.), according to eternal purpose and covenant, they are separated to God. So that 'separation from and to' constitutes the essence of sanctification, into which the Scripture-use of the term is everywhere resolvable. It is not a gradual work, the result of repeated actions of the Spirit upon the substance of the natural soul, as human authors fondly teach; but one complete and final operation, by which the natural soul (Yuch) is made a spiritual soul (pneuma) — as holy, with respect to its own substance, as it ever will be in eternity. (See 1Pet. 1.2, 22, 23; 2The 2.13; Joh 6.37, 44, 63, 64.

See also the klhtoiv agiois, 'called to be saints,' of the epistolary inscriptions.) Luther very properly distinguishes this 'sanctimonia,' 'sanctum esse vel fuisse,' from the 'habere spiritum;' that is, from the presence of the Holy Ghost with, and his consequent actings in and by, the renewed Spirit.

Multùm sed frustrá sudatorum. Horace's 'sudet multùm frustráque laboret;' implying great and inefficacious toil.

Ex usu et publicis sermonibus. Us. 'men's saying what is usually said, what others say.' Publ. serm. 'what men talk in public,' contrasted with private meditation and the secret testimony of their own hearts.

Jesu Christi dogma. Not a 'dogma taught by Jesus Christ,' but a 'dogma of which He is the subject;' 'the truth as it is in Jesus' — which is directly opposite to this fancy of Freewill.

Luther challenges him to show the effects of Freewill, in the three particular excellencies which he has selected out of Erasmus' catalogue.

Equum claudum sanare. Erasmus' burlesque illustration of their lack of miracles. Luther plays with it: 'we will not call you to practise upon so huge an animal as a horse; we will be content with something less.'

Alluding to the Lord's, "a wicked and adulterous generation seeks after a sign." Mat 16.4; Luther confines the design of God in his miracles to the gracious object of them. But does

God not also design, by these seals set upon his truth, to convict and render inexcusable the reprobate and ungodly?

Fleer: contempt expressed by mockery.

Supercilious: displaying arrogance by patronizing those considered inferior.

Sub hastam libenter ibimus. The custom of selling under the spear was derived from the sales of booty taken in war; in which the spear was set up, and the spoil sold under it, to denote where the property had been obtained. So constant, however, was the use of the spear in auctions, that 'hasta' sometimes absolutely represents the auction itself; and 'sub hasta venire' corresponds to our coming under the hammer. Luther applies it here, in agreement with its original use: he will freely come to the spear, that he may be sold as a part of Erasmus' spoil.

Buceá verborum. 'The puffed or distended cheek' is used to express 'anger,' 'pride,' or 'boastfulness.' Horace has 'iratus buceas inflet;' Persius has, 'scloppo tumidas intendis rumpere buccas.'

Land capriná, vacua theatro. The first allusion (Hor. 1. Epist. xviii. 15.) charges him with contentious trifling; like the man who quarrels with his friend about goats' hair, whether it should be called wool or bristles; 'fighting for straws' the second — 'fuit haud ignobilis Argis'

— (Hor. 2. Epist. ii. 128 130, etc.) with indulging 'a harmless but disordered fancy.' —If you cannot show us any moral effects produced by it, Freewill must be either a thing of no value, or an illusion.

Perditè. More perditi hominis; flagitiosè, 'nequiter, corruptè.'

Non nisi aversa fuerit. As opposed to 'ad gratiam sese applicet;' aversion and disgust, instead of desire and seeking.

That is, by their heart and actions, rather than by their words alone. – WHG Accidents: a logical term referring to incidental, not essential attributes (e.g. bread being white).

Seriphus was an island in the Ægean sea; one of the Sporades where, according to Ælian, the frogs never croaked; but when removed to another place, they became more noisy and clamorous than others. The latter part of the story, however, is differently told, and in a manner more consistent with the proverb: they kept their silence when transferred and mingled with others. Hence the saying, Batracov ek Serife, for a silent man, who can neither speak nor sing.

Platonis Ideis. A term used by Plato to denote the first forms of things; the sort of mental draught, according to which nature (in the language of a heathen philosopher and if only professed heathens would speak so!) has framed all her substances. 'Plato ideas vocat ex quibus omnia quaecunque videmus fiunt, et ad quas omnia formantur.'

Nosque tutò rectum agere, i.e. in rectum. More literally, safe in going straight forwards.

Quasi 'in rectum agere iter.'

Non agit in rectum." ... "in rectum exire catervas." — LUCAN.

Publicani. Not without meaning is it used here instead of publici, as opposed to privati. The publicans were government-officers, employed in collecting the public revenues; which they contracted for at a price, and lived on the produce. They were chiefly of the equestrian order, and held in honour. 'Erant publicani equites Romani, qui tributa et publica vectigalia questus sui causa conducebant.' 'Publicani autem, sunt, qui publico fruuntur.' 'Flos equitum

Romanorum, ornamentum civitatis, firmamentum reipub. Publicanorum ordine continetur.' — Luther uses the name, if I understand him aright, equivocally. While he gives them the glory of publicity, he hints at their support being derived from the fiscus, and the infamous celebrity which they had acquired by their exactions. In fact, what were the barefaced traffickers in Indulgences, such as Tetzel and others, but publicans of the worst stamp? I do not find any authority for the word publicanus, except as referred to this office.

Deucalion: Gr. mythology – son of Prometheus, and survivor of the flood. Ovid's Socordes. Quasi sine corde. 'Not only sinful, instead of sanctified; and carnal, instead of having the Spirit; but absolutely without natural intellect and feeling.'

Referring to 1Pet 3.15. "And be ready always to give an answer to every man that asks you for a reason of the hope that is in you, with meekness and fear." Petrus vester. 'Your tutelar saint and pretended founder.'

Quá formá. In a dialectic sense. 'A dialecticis sumitur pro specie subjectâ generi. Formae sunt, in quas genus dividitur.' 'Specificate,' or define it; i.e. enumerate and combine all the several ideas contained in it. — We do not ask for miracles, etc.; we do not even ask for an example by way of illustrating it; but we do require a clear and explicit affirmation of what you mean; a full and precise description of the supposed substance.

Qui ne dicitis quidem. You are not even the nightingale. (See above, Sect. 1.) They had voice enough, when speaking for themselves; but none with which to answer the questions and demands of their opponents.

Neque speciem neque nomen. They can neither define it, nor find an appropriate name by which to express it.

Mendaci vocabulo. Though they cannot find a name for it, they have a word for it: but that word is a liar; for it proclaims the will to be free, which is really in bondage. Logicians distinguish 'vocabulum' from 'nomen;' the former is arbitrary and general; the latter is descriptive and precise. What you cannot name (according to this distinction) you may speak of. 'Differunt nomina et vocabula; quia nomina finita sunt et significant res proprias; vocabula autem infinita, et res communes designant.'

Appellamus. A forensic expression, applied to advocate, witnesses, and judge; but to each, consistent with its primary meaning of 'addressing a person by name;' prosagoreuw Luther would avail himself of Erasmus' own testimony and advice, now that he has shown the dogma of Freewill to be this unauthorized and unprofitable one. Erasmus had recommended that all such things should be suppressed.

Inanibus bullis verborum. 'Prettinesses of style.' 'Bulla' is properly a bubble made by boiling water, and is thence applied to divers ornaments of dress; particularly to one in the shape of a heart, worn by the Roman youth. The quality of it depended on their rank, or degree of nobility. This they dedicated to the Lares, when they took the manly gown.

Vertumnus had, among the Latins, the same property of assuming all shapes, which Proteus had among the Greeks.

Luther does not tell us to whom he is indebted for this metrical aphorism. — Erasmus had played the physician, prescribing silence with respect to some dogmas; his own is shown to be one of them.

Erasmus had bestowed these and some other commendations upon the Greek and Latin Fathers, to the disparagement of the Reformers, as making for his side in the argument.

Luther asks whether what they had said on Freewill was a specimen of this richness of invention, and laboriousness of investigation and expression? Here they had not excelled any more than Erasmus himself; to whom Luther was not reluctant to ascribe the praise of resembling and even equalling them.

John Faber, a native of Suabia, who from one of his works against the Reformers, probably this very work, was called 'The Hammer of the Heretics.' He was advanced to the see of Vienna in 1531, and died there in 1542. His elevation was supposed to have been the fruit of his zeal against Luther. He entitled it his Pearl: but Luther would rather call it his Dunghill, an allusion to Hercules' famous labour of removing the long accumulated filth of 3000 oxen.

— For the fifth labor, Eurystheus ordered Hercules to clean up King Augeas' stables, which is the parenthetical reference here.

Dissimulárit. 'Diligenter et astutè celo, occulto, fingo non esse, quod reverà est.'

Stulov kai edraiwma thv alhqeiav. Luther connects and refers these words, as the older editions of the Scriptures and our translators have done; but Griesbach, and others after him, connect them with what follows. A very important sense is thus elicited; "the pillar and ground of the truth (and without controversy, great is the mystery of godliness) is that God was manifested in the flesh," etc. — But there seems an evident allusion to the ancient tabernacle, with its boards and sockets (the pillars, or uprights, and the silver foundations into which these were grooved; see Exod. 26.15-30), of which the Church of God is the blessed reality; even as that was the image, or figure.

Luther seems to have inferred the immaculateness of the militant and visible Church, from the above and other like testimonies; 'an entire exemption from error in a certain eversubsistent community of the Lord's people tabernacling in flesh of sin.' The Nineteenth

Article of our Church declares, more correctly, 'The visible Church of Christ is a congregation of faithful men, in the which the pure word of God is preached, and the sacraments are duly ministered, in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same. Just as the Church of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch have erred, so also the Church of Rome has erred, not only in their living and manner of ceremonies, but also in matters of faith.' — The same remark extends to each individual of the faithful. Who has not erred in his lifetime? Of whom shall we say that he died without any mixture of error in his creed? — Luther's representation, therefore, requires restriction: of that error which he is disputing about, it holds good.

Omne quod publicum erat. 'Men of public station, as opposed to private men.' Luther does not forget Erasmus' privatus and publicus.

Frequent promises are made in this Prophet that a remnant shall be left. "Unless the Lord of Hosts had left us a very small remnant, we would have been as Sodom," etc. (Isa 1.9) "The remnant of Israel and those who have escaped from the house of Jacob... The remnant shall return, even the remnant of Jacob, to the mighty God." "For though my people Israel are the sand of the sea, yet a remnant of them shall return. (10.20, 21, 22. Compare Rom 9.27) So Isa 11.11-16. But I do not find the expressions 'dregs' and 'remnant' united.

Arrianorum seculum. Arianism arose early in the fourth century; about three hundred years before the rise of the Popedom; and though condemned by Councils, it was adopted by several of Constantine's successors, and became a source of grievous persecution to those who were sound in the faith. For an account of its origin and real nature, see Milner's Eccle.

Hist. vol. ii. pp. 51-54. It was, in substance, a denial of the co-eternity, co-equality, and coessentiality of the Lord Jesus Christ with the Father. Already some secret and ambiguous attempts had been made to lessen the idea of the divinity of the Son of God. While his eternity was admitted by Eusebius the historian, he yet was not willing to own him co-equal with the Father. Arius went greater lengths: he said that, 'the Son proceeded out of a state of non-existence; that he was not before he was made; that he, who is without beginning, has set his Son as the beginning of things that are made; and that God made one, whom he called Word, Son, and Wisdom, by whom he did create us.' (Miln. in loc.) Like all the rest of heresy, it is truth corrupted; and the only solid and satisfactory answer will be given to it, not by boldly asserting and proving the real and proper divinity of the Lord Jesus, but by showing forth his whole person in its complexity; made up, as it is, of two persons, a divine person and a human person, held together by an indissoluble union: the secret being that God does all his works by this complex person's agency, who acts in his human person as plenarily inspired by the Holy Ghost. This person who thus does that will of God — of God, even the Trinity — which is referred to the Father personally, does hereby, among other subjects of manifestation, especially manifest that which we may well suppose to be the preeminent object of display in the TRI-UNE Jehovah, the threefold personality of his one undivided essence. I am aware that the term 'union of persons,' as substituted for 'union of natures,' will be deemed objectionable, till it is well-considered. But I have the authority of one of the best philosophers I know, for thus entitling the human part of the person of the 'That which can contrive, which can design, must be a person. These capacities constitute personality, for they imply consciousness and thought. They require that which can perceive an end or purpose; as well as the power of providing means, and of directing them to their end. They require a centre in which perceptions unite, and from which volitions flow; which is mind. The acts of a mind prove the existence of a mind; and whatever a mind resides in, is a person. The seat of intellect is a person.' (Paley's Nat.

Theol. pp. 439, 440, 14th Edn.) Now, is it not plain from Scripture, and the admission of all Christians, with a very few heretical exceptions, that the Lord Jesus had this human mind, distinct from his godhead?

He had, therefore, according to this description, a person distinct from his divine person. — And what is to hinder that divine person, if the will of God is so, from taking up a human person into union with himself, and acting in that person, from there, and not in his divine person? Is not that union real, which subsists between this divine person and this human person, when this human person, having been first generated, is afterwards inhabited by his co-equal, co-essential, in the unity of God? Does it not also subsist without forfeiture of distinctness? Is it not also constant and unbroken, when that divine person evermore acts in and by that human person, putting his godhead as it were into abeyance? Yet, are not his acts and his sufferings the acts and sufferings of the co-equal of the Father, and of the Holy

Ghost? There is no diminution, it is plain, of his essential godhead, in his voluntarily, and to a great end, submitting to act by and in this creature person; this constitutes him at the same time both creature and Creator: very man does the works of God, and very God does the works of man.

And if this complexity of person is thus to be realized in time, what is to hinder that person in God, in whom it is to be realized, from transacting as though he actually were this complex person, from and in the beginning? Is not Jehovah's will both immutable and irresistible? Is it not his propriety to call things which are not as though they were, and to give realized being to substances which, as yet, exist in predestination? And must he not have acted thus in this particular instance, when he chose a people of mankind to be in this complex person as a head, and gave grace to that people so chosen, before the world began?

Now, therefore, we can meet Arius upon his own ground, and confound him even there.

Admitting all that he says, and says from the plain text of Scripture, about 'begotten,' 'nonexistence,' 'was not before he was made,' 'God has made one whom he calls Word, Son, and Wisdom, by whom he did create us;' — this in no way impugns the co-eternity, co-equality, and co-essentiality of the Lord Jesus Christ with the Father: his human person, by and in which he has thus been doing all things, is the creature which Arius would describe; but he who assumed this person into union with himself is very God; which implies that he is all that God is.

Catholici. Catholic as opposed to heretical; a Greek term (airesiv airetikov) denoting 'selection,' or 'partiality,' as opposed to the profession of the whole faith.

Publico nomine et officio. They were publicly called and recognised as Christ's Church, and performed its public functions.

Soli isti inquisitores. Referring not to the Inquisition only (which was established about the year 1226; the Vaudois and Albigenses being the first objects of it); but to the whole system of espionage, confiscation, excommunication, and violence with which the lamb-like beast professed to be achieving the extirpation of heresy; while he was himself the great heresiarch [i.e., the leader of a heresy].

John Huss, and his fellow-martyr Jerom of Prague, were among the earlier and most intrepid vociferators [i.e., a loud an vehement protester] against Papal abuses. They were favoured with much insight into the truth of God, walking in the light, and treading in the steps of their immediate predecessor, Wickliff — though it has been said that they struck at the branches rather than the root of Antichrist, not sufficiently exposing the predominant corruptions in doctrine. (See Milner, vol. iv. p. 275.) They suffered death under very aggravated circumstances of perfidy, fierceness, and maliciousness, by a decree of the Council of Constance, 1415, 1416 — about a hundred years before Luther's time. Huss is supposed to have been Luther's swan, singing of him in his death, as one who would come after.

Vulgaris. Properly, 'what is possessed by the common people;' 'ordinary,' 'common,'

'promiscuous;' as opposed to 'rare,' 'choice,' 'what is the possession of a few.' The names 'Church of God,' and 'Saints,' are in everybody's mouth; but the things signified by these names are select and few.

Gloriam Dei. These substances are not only select, but hidden; the Church is an invisible community, and the saints have no outward badge to distinguish them. If they could be discerned by the eye, that Scripture would be falsified which says, 'The wicked shall not see the glory of God.' I do not find this text to which he appears to refer. The Lord's people are expressly called his hidden ones, Psa 83.3, and his act of hiding them is mentioned in Psa

27.5; 31.20. Also, the sentiment of the wicked not seeing God, is common in Scripture, though not with this allusion which is evidently a strained one, though beautiful and just.

But I do not find any Scripture which puts the two sentiments together: 'hidden, that the wicked may not see.' 'The Church,' and 'each individual saint,' is a part of that substance,

'the mystical Christ,' which God has ordained and created to his glory.

Dominion gloriae crucifixissent. Here again, we have a strained application of Scripture (1Cor 2.8); although the sentiment is correct. What the Apostle says there, he says of Christ personally and exclusively; but it is also true that in persecuting his people, they act out his crucifixion over again. They are animated with the same spirit as the crucifiers; and the Lord himself has said, applying it to this very case, "Why do you persecute Me?"

Locum satis fidelem. Loc. more strictly, 'a fund of arguments;' 'locus' et 'loci,' sunt sedes argumentorum, ex (niibus ea tanquam è promptuario petuntur. Fid. 'fide dignus,'

'trustworthy;' like pistos (pistos), it expresses either one who has faith, or one towards whom faith is exercised.

Quamvis baptisatum. Luther states this too broadly: the judgment of charity is moderate and indulgent; but surely there are deflections, both in faith and practice, which place many a baptized unbeliever beyond the bounds of the widest enclosures of charity.

See Lev 11.3; Deu 14.6.

Unde explorabimus Spiritum. Referring to 1Joh 4.1. Erasmus talks about Paul's recommending to test the spirits, but evidently his allusion is to these words of St. John.

Neque adeo de Scripturá. It is not so much the authority of Scripture, as its right interpretation, which is in dispute. Quae necdum. Lack of clearness is hinted at rather than affirmed; necdum implies, 'notwithstanding all that has been written and decreed about it.'

Neque nihil, neque omnia dicis. Erasmus says rightly, the spirits must be tried; wrongly, that there is no test of them. Also, the tests he proposes are bad.

It was in 1525 (the date of his performance), that Luther published his 'Address to the Celestial Prophets and Carolstadt.'

Judicium publici ministerii in verbo. Minis. 'The office, or body, of ministers.' In verbo. The word is to them, what the law of the land is to a civil judge. Offic. exter. as opposed to an internal function, or operation. Luther refers to the judgment of a synod, or council; a tribunal, to which he always declared himself willing to submit his own objectionable assertions. He states the matter too broadly, and was guided by an mage which he had in his mind of what might be, rather than by any exhibition of this external judgment which he had ever seen, or could appeal to as an example. A synod of real saints might be confidently looked to, as decreeing under the illumination of a light from above. But when has such a synod met since the council of Jerusalem? (Acts 15.1-31.) If, as it is probable, there are real saints in the council, who is to ensure their being the majority? While great respect, therefore, is due to a judgment of this kind, it cannot be that infallible one which Luther's commendations might seem to imply.

It is not strictly parallel to the 'external clearness' of Scripture; which he refers to, as he asserted in Part i. Sect. 4. The testimony may be imperfectly brought out; or the judges may not have eyes to see it. Would Luther undertake to say that he should himself bring all the testimony that is in the Scriptures, to bear upon any given question; or would he, had he been able to cite it, have convinced the Council of Constance, or the Council of Trent? After all, the private and internal judgment which he speaks of — the Spirit shining upon and confirming his testimony by the word — is that which the spiritual man must, and will, at last resort to, and can alone depend upon. He is thankful for, and in some sense obedient to, the judgment of pure synods (pure as such compounds can be expected to be); but he stands or falls to a higher Master. "This I say then, walk in" (or after) the spirit." (Gal 5.16) —

Enough for Luther's purpose may be admitted, however. Let all dogmas be brought to the standard of Scripture, publicly; let the leaders and counsellors of the people declare based upon them, stating the grounds of their decision. Such judgment will have its weight, though not paramount; and it will be manifested how slender, or how false, are the foundations of error. This object is obtained in a great degree, now, by the free canvass which religious opinions, as well as others, are made to submit to, from the press.

Gainsayer: here, it is one who contradicts or denies the truth of God.

Externè. As opposed to a light of the Spirit, within the soul.

Causarum quaestiones definiantur. The book of the laws lays own and recognises certain broad principles, to which the facts of each case are applied. These principles must be determinately fixed, admitted, and perspicuously affirmed. 'Status causae,' is the question of fact at issue; 'quaestio causae,' the principle of law to which it is referable.

In our version, it is not a threat, but an explanation of a fact: "If they do not speak according to this word, it is because there is no light in them," A testimony equally conclusive as to the clearness of the word; for how are we to compare declarations, and ascertain their conformity with the written word, if that word is not plain?

Originally Zec 2, a false reference: the words are found in Mal 2.7. "For the Priest's lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek the law from his mouth; for he is the messenger of the Lord of Hosts."

Deducet. Like the propempw (propempoo) of the Greeks, expresses 'the escorting' of a person to his home.

Via et semita. Via, the broad carriage-road; semita, the narrow foot-path.

Gloriosè disputat. The Apostle institutes a comparison (in chap 3) between the glory of the Gospel ministry and that of Moses, showing the superiority of the former. The scope and effect of the comparison is to magnify his own office: but the clearness of both is assumed, as the very basis of the argument; a clearness indicated in Moses by the glory of his countenance.

Our translation says "holding forth;" Luther says "tenetis:" the original word is epecontev 'exhibeo,' 'prae me fero.' But it must be possessed before it can be held forth; and if on this account they are called "lights," then what must the word itself be?

Defide sui. If these witnesses were doubtful, not clear; he would be justifying them in their unbelief, instead of establishing his claim to be received.

Face: we might say 'cheek' – audacity, effrontery.

Declarant. 'Make clear,' or 'cause to be seen;' it refers to the matter of Scripture, as interpretantur refers to the meaning of the terms: an 'avowing,' 'propounding,' or distinctly setting forth to the world,' of the testimony or truth of God which is contained and enclosed in the Scriptures.

Tantas moras traho et copias perdo. His 'copiae' are his Scripture testimonies and reasonings.

Lucidissimas et evidentissimas. Luc. 'their testimony is unequivocal;' evid. 'the terms in which that testimony is conveyed, are unambiguous.' — So that they may be compared to some of those beautiful orbs above us; which are not only luminous, but exposed to view.

See above, Sect. 14. Stat ibi. 'qui vigent,' 'in statu suo manent,' 'incolumes sunt,' 'dignitatem suam retinent;' 'nonnunquam stare dicuntur,' as opposed to 'concido;' 'loses none of its authority here.'

Christianis rixantibus. Luther does not appear to refer to any single text explicitly, but to the many warnings of this kind, which are dispersed throughout the Epistles to Timothy and Titus. The nearest references seem to be, 1Tim 1.4, 6 . ("Neither give heed to fables and endless genealogies, which minister questions rather than godly edifying, which is in faith."

" From which some having swerved, have turned aside to vain jangling.") 2Tim 2.23. ("But avoid foolish and unlearned questions, knowing that they gender strifes.") And Tit 3.9. ("But avoid foolish questions, and genealogies, and contentions, and strivings about the law; for they are unprofitable and vain.")

Originally, "humour." Lat. Sensu suo cedere. 'Sensus' is properly, 'the frame of thought, or of feeling,' whatever that may be; 'the state of mind.' 'Communis sensus, which follows just below, is properly, 'the common judgment, or feeling, of mankind;' and it is thence transferred to express a certain imaginary standard of judgment, or court of appeal, the voice of unadulterated and unsophisticated nature, which we call 'common sense.'

This should be Act 6.10. There is a good deal of confusion in Luther's reference to this history. He represents the violence with which they rushed upon him at the close of his defence (especially when he had testified 'that he saw the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God'), as expressed before his apprehension and arraignment, and he refers the whole transaction to Acts 7, in which the first incidents are recorded in the preceding chapter.

Reus agebatur. Re. ag. 'He was arraigned;' eá quaestione, 'on this indictment;' this was the law-crime charged: status causae, 'the question of fact to be tried.' — Luther intimates that his address to the council is resolvable into this main subject: 'a defence against the charge of having blasphemed the Temple.' Such being the charge preferred against him, he repelled it by maintaining that it was not at all criminal to speak against the Temple; for that was not God's ordinance. Probably, he had been led by the Holy Ghost to aim at beating down the idolatrous attachment which the Jews showed to their Temple, in his reasonings with those who arose and disputed with him. But it is expressly said, "they suborned men who said, We have heard him Speak blasphemous words against Moses, and against God." (Act 6.11) And afterwards; "And set up false witnesses who said, This man does not cease to speak blasphemous words against this holy place, and the law." (Act 6.13.) It should seem, therefore, that more was charged against him, with respect to this blasphemy, than he had really spoken. Perhaps his defence — or, as I would rather call it, his address — may be correctly said to have had a broader basis than that of merely repelling a charge of having blasphemed the Temple; viz. that of proving, that the great body of their nation had always been "resisters"of the Holy Ghost; and by inference, therefore, that they were such now, in what they had done to Jesus. From the Patriarchs downwards, their plans and efforts had always been in direct opposition to the counsel and purpose of God, as declared to them by those in whom the Holy Ghost spoke. (See Heb 1.1-2. Gr.) Whatever was the accusation, and however he might design to repel it, the clue to his discourse seems to be found in vv. 51-53.

"you stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, you always resist the Holy Ghost" — (not as striving in their own souls, but as testifying in those whom God sent to be his instruments for drawing out the enmity of their carnal mind) — "as your fathers did, so do you." — On this broader basis, however, he contrives to build an answer to his own peculiar charge respecting the Temple; by showing that this very Temple furnished one proof of their resistance to the Holy Ghost — their idolized Temple had not originated from God, but was man's device. It was, in fact, David's own suggestion, which he was forbidden to execute; and rather acquiesced in, than appointed by God (just as in the former case of appointing a king, 1Sam 8-12); when the honour of building it was appropriated to Solomon. (2Sam 7;

1Chr 17) God's Temple (not only the spiritual one, but the material fabric also) was deferred till the latter times (Eze 40-48); and Solomon's was but an abortive birth, arising from the precocity of man. The Lord gave way, as it were, to man's device, that he might show him its instability and vanity. God instituted a tabernacle ("Our fathers had the tabernacle of witness in the wilderness, as he had appointed, speaking to Moses, that he should make it according to the fashion that he had seen." Acts 7.44, etc.) — a fabric more suited to the then state of his Church and nation — but the well-meaning vanity of his aspiring worshippers, would have a stately temple, as if walls and roofs could contain him! "However, the Most

Subsumit. I do not find any authority for this word; but taking the general principle of the preposition sub, when used in composition (secretly, diminutively); the amplification in the text seems most nearly to express the author's meaning. 'Tandem concedit... At ibi subsumit.' subs. implies 'a secret, or partial, retraction of his concession.'

Unde et in eos. In contradistinction to their fathers.

The Council of Constance, A. D. 1415. was Luther's day, and even our day, as compared with that of Christ and his first Martyr. It was the dawn of the Reformation.

Pertinaciter resistere,fortiier impugnare. The unsuspected case was the real case: notwithstanding all his ostentatious professions of humility, Erasmus was not only rejecting the clearest evidences of truth — which is bad enough — but even fighting against what he knew to be truth — which is far worse.

Excrescence: an abnormal outgrowth or enlargement of some part of the body; here of the flesh.

Mirabiliter suscitetur. Mir. would express either the nature or the degree of influence exerted; but here it must be the nature: the very least degree of the Holy Ghost's regenerating energy, applied to the natural soul, produces this result; an energy which does not admit degrees. One soul is not more regenerated than another: and every such act of regeneration is a miracle; an exercise of super-creation grace, and of super natural power, effecting a supernatural constitution and state, in those that are the subjects of it. "Unless a man is begotten from above, he cannot see the kingdom of God." "Unless a man is begotten of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." "Of his own will he begat us by the word of truth." "Everyone who does righteousness has been begotten of him."

See especially John 12.37-41. It is remarkable that this passage of Isaiah is quoted more often than any other in the New Testament; being found in each of the Evangelists, in Acts

Apprehendunt . More proper than our version comprehend; which implies 'compassing about,' and so (translatively) 'taking in the whole of a substance.' ou katelaben auto, 'did not lay hold of it, so as to possess it;' 'did not receive,' or 'admit' the light; but (as Luther explains it) remained darkness still. See Sleusner in v. katalambanw (katalambano) 'excipio,'

1Cor 1.23. Our authorized version, and most copies, read "Greeks:" by which St. Paul frequently denominates that part of the world which is not Jewish, such as Rom 1.16. It would seem to give more point to Luther's antithesis here: but "Gentiles "is the more authentic reading. See Griesbach's text and note in loc.

Exordium, an introduction or preface to a topic.

Putet, sentiat. Put. is rather the matter of reasoning and argument; sent. is rather the matter of sense. Both are intermixed here, though each has its distinct appropriation: he thinks about the sun, he handles the stone. — A double error is pointed out by the illustration.

These ungodly men assert what is not, and deny what is.

Luther does not distinguish here, as he ought to do, between what Satan has made of us, and what Satan personally does in us. The soul of man, in its natural state, is so blinded and hardened and satanized, that even if there were no immediate agency of his upon any individual soul, the effect of 'one' or even 'many' words of God (unaccompanied by his quickening Spirit) would not be such as Luther describes; but it would still reject the truth!

A forced application of the words. The Lord is there speaking of the words being a sure index of the mind. Luther seems to have some confusion in his mind, from Luke 19.22. "Out of your own mouth I will judge you," etc.

A Greek term, which may express either affirmation or negation; but here it clearly denotes affirmation, with an allusion either to the 'explicit avowal of private opinion,' or to 'the judge delivering his sentence in court.'

Praejudiciis. A forensic term, expressing either, 1. 'precedents which apply to an undecided cause;' or 2, 'matters relating to the cause in hand, which have already been decided;' or 3, 'a previous judgment of the cause itself;' as here. These men had sat in judgment upon this question before, and had decided it.

Jam et tu pone. Luther here retorts Erasmus' own words upon him. "Et tamen illud interim lectorem admonitum velim, si etc. ...ut tum denique sibi ponat ob oculos tam numerosam seriem eruditissimorum virorum, etc. ...tum illud secum expendat, utrum plus tribuendum esse judicet tot eruditorum, tot orthodoxorum, etc. ...praejudiciis, an unius aut alterius privato judicio.'

Privatus etc. The substance is, 'Insignificant Luther, whom Erasmus taunted with his obscurity, and with his contempt of these great men (though, in fact, he had only shaken off the yoke of their undue authority without expressing any sentiment of contempt), would never have so vilified them in his privacy, as Erasmus the man of name and fame was doing by his public extolment of them.'

Cornuto syllogismo. Corn. syll. Dilemma; so called, because the horns of the argument are, in this kind of syllogism, so disposed that to escape the one, you must run upon the other.

The term 'horns' is applied to argumentation, from a certain disposition of forces, naval as well as military, in which they resemble the horns of the crescent moon.

Disputatiunculam. Disp. The diminutive implies a discussion subordinate to the main point in debate.

See Part i. Sect. 5. note q. Lucian, the Epicurean philosopher of Samosata, in Syria, ridiculed all religions; and he served Christianity, without meaning it, pretty much as Erasmus was doing — by depreciating the fashionable and reigning idolatry. He died wretchedly, A. D.

180. — Much of his writings is in dialogue — Erasmus' favourite composition — with which he interweaves many 'true stories' of very doubtful credit.

Bald and bare; without any appendage of amplification, resolution of parts, or illustration.

The idea is that of a mould not filled up: the definition is not commensurate with the thing defined.

See Part i. Sect xxv. note.

Vertible: able to turn or be turned; changeable.

'A fixed rule,' as opposed to whim, taste or chance; 'sober,' as opposed to 'extravagant,'

'plain,' or 'proper,' as opposed to figurative,' 'strictness of speech,' (i.e. words used in their own genuine and natural sense) as opposed to 'metaphor;' logic' as opposed to rhetoric.'

Andabatae. A man fighting in the dark, with his eyes blinded: a name given (quasi anabatai sive antanabatai) to certain fencers, or gladiators, who fought on horseback with their eyes covered; or more properly, to the man who went into the chariot to fight with the charioteer.

It was one of the games of the Circus, where the peculiarity consisted in the conflict being maintained in the dark. Jerome has the expression, 'More andabatarum, gladium in tenebris ventilans;' alluding to the former of these customs.

Scotus. The celebrated Duns Scotus, a Franciscan; the great opponent of Thomas Aquinas, the Dominican. He acquired the name of the 'subtile doctor,' as his opponent did that of the 'angelic doctor.' Heraclitus, the weeping philosopher, was characterised as 'tenebrosus,' or 'obscure;' from the enigmatic style in which he communicated his reveries. Socrates is said to have expressed an admiration of some of his pieces, so far as he could understand them; but to have intimated the danger there was of being drowned in his incomprehensible depths.

Moderni. Quasi hodierni. The subtile doctor and his contemporaries, together with those who preceded them, from Peter Lombard downwards, were but men of 'today,' compared with the ancient logicians and with the Fathers. Also, the Schoolmen were divided into three classes, like the Academics: old, middle, and new. Scotus was of the last.

Crassè. 'Dull, heavy, fat-headed ,' as contrasted with their wire-drawn refinements.

Luther speaks here, as theological writers commonly do. But the truth is, the Law required faith, and the Gospel requires works: though the form of the two several dispensations was as Luther represents them. The Law was designed to shut the Church up unto faith; the Gospel, to open it by that faith which is itself a work (for "this is the work of God, that you believe on Him whom He has sent." John 6.29) to those works which alone are acceptable to God; viz. the actings and manifestations of a self-emptied, contrite, and believing soul.

He does not speak of any particular word or work of God, but of His whole word, and of His whole work; excepting only what he does by His special grace, in and upon the hearts of his people.

Babbler. Spermologov (spermologos) is a term of contempt, applied properly to persons who went about the forum picking up the seeds and crumbs, or whatever else might fall between buyer and seller, and making a living out of them. Hence it is applied to a loose, ignorant, unordered, and unmeasured speaker; one who retails the sort of refuse, or common-place scraps, which he has picked up in the streets. New Gods [foreign gods, Gr. xenos] not in the invidious, or disparaging sense of demons, or of xaimoned (xaimoned), but some additional deities: objects of worship, having the same sort of claim to reverence which the rest of their multiplied divinities had.

He says Acts 24; but the allusion is manifestly to Acts 26.

Intrà extrà. On this side of it, or beyond it; when joined with the preceding words 'infrà, suprà,' these express the universal comprehension of the word and work of God; as containing all that is above, beneath, and on all sides of us —with only one exception.

That is, adherents to the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.

Erasmus has made Freewill greater than itself. Luther makes a pun on this, and intimates that he has even out-heroded Herod here; not only exceeding philosophers, etc. but even his own extravagant self.

Peter Lombard (c. 1096–1160) – a scholastic theologian, and Bishop of Paris. When he arrived in Paris about 1134, Bernard of Clairveax recommended him to the officials of the church of St. Victor. He taught at the cathedral school of Notre Dame for ten years, where he met Peter Abelard and Hugh of St. Victor. He authored Four Books of Sentences, which became a standard textbook of theology. Martin Luther wrote glosses on the Sentences, and John Calvin quoted from it over 100 times in his Institutes. Lombard's most controversial doctrine in the Sentences was identifying charity with the Holy Spirit (Book I, dist 17). He said that when a Christian loves God and his neighbour, this love literally is God; the Christian thus becomes divine and partakes in the life of the Trinity. This form of mysticism was widespread in the Middle Ages.

They ascribed the power of discerning, out of hand; but the power of choosing good, conditionally.

Catholicum . Cath. 'Ad omnes pertinens,' 'quod ubique et apud omnes disseminatum est, et ab omnibus recipi debet.' 'What all are bound to receive as true.'

A sarcastic allusion to Rev 13.10; 14.12.

Master, etc. A title with which Peter Lombard was dignified, from his work entitled 'The Sentences,' by which he was svipposed to have rendered the same service to Divinity, which Gratian, his contemporary, had done to Law. He was the father of scholastic theology, which succeeded that of the Fathers; his work being considered as the great source of that science in the Latin church. He died A. D. 1164.

Turning words topsy-turvy.

For example, 'Nothing is all things.' Why, God made all things out of nothing. You might call that 'nothing,' 'all things;' but this is by referring the term 'nothing' to the thing itself, and 'all things' to the existent One — who being present, communicates being (which He has in himself) to this 'nothing.'

Velut externè affingunt. The gift of the Spirit, though of course not inherent, they represented as inseparably attached to the free will; and so it is communicated as matter of course.

Inflatura. A figure taken from blowing a bladder, or raiding a bubble, or making a musical instrument sound aloud: 'to give size, or substance, or sound, to this empty, speechless thing.'

Ecclesiasticus: also known as Wisdom or Sirach, in the Apocrypha.

The Greek text, from which our authorized version is a faithful translation, omits the words 'conservabunt te,' and 'adjecit mandate et praecepta sua.' Also in verse 17, 'bonum et malum.' The Syriac, or vulgar Hebrew, in which this book was originally written, is lost, although Jerome professes to have seen it. What Jesus the Son of Sirach produced in the Syriac, his grandson translated into Greek, for the benefit of his countrymen in Egypt, who, by long disuse, had forgotten the Hebrew tongue.

The rest of the chapters of the Book of Esther, which are found neither in the Hebrew, nor the Chaldee.

Graecas calendas. A day that will never come; a Latin proverb taken from the Greeks having no calends to their months, as the Latins had. A calend is the first day of each month in the Super aristas incedis. Applied proverbially, to 'one who affirms nothing absolutely.' He skims the ears of corn, fearing to set his foot on them.

Pelagius. The great heresiarch of Freewill, in the fifth century; a native of Wales, and supposedly a monk of Bangor who exchanged his original name of Morgan, for the more imposing one of Pelagius.

We read Psa 4.6, "The Lord lift you"up," etc., as a prayer; but it may with equal propriety be read as an affirmation.

Nostra omnia sic perlastravit. I refer the 'nostra omnia' to the sacred records, the authorized documents of Christianity; not to the writings of Luther and his friends. Perlastr. does not express real insight into the things contained in those documents, but complete outside inspection. This is just the sort of knowledge which Luther would choose to ascribe to him, and which is amply sufficient to exempt him from the plea of ignorance.

'Us,' as opposed to everybody. He represents him as playing at peep with the learned; and as deceiving the people by his tricks on words, by which he gave the same word as many faces as Vertumnus, who plagued the wise; he deceived the vulgar. Vertumnus had many faces: hence, 'Vertumnis verborum ludere,' to play at making words like Vertumnus; that is, different in appearance, while are really the same. Erasmus could say and unsay everything by his copiousness, versatility, and ambiguity of words.

Erasmus does not introduce the word 'harsh' in describing this first opinion. Luther ascribes it to him, as implied in his description of the other two.

The definition says, 'can apply itself to those things,' etc. The approvable opinion says, 'It leaves man in possession of desire and endeavour,' etc.

'Not only ruining her own cause, but establishing her adversary's.'

Pillion: A seat behind the rider of a horse.

Quod disdiapason conveniat. A Greek proverb, denoting the greatest possible dissimilitude.

I object to this distinction, as I have already done to the same in substance (Part ii. Sect.

19.); nor can I believe it was in the mind of the Apocryphal writer. Man did not have Freewill given to him in the exercise of one set of his relations (those to the creatures, for instance) , more than in another. Dominion and superiority did not confer Freewill. He was, in reality, made accountable for his use of the creatures; they were not given to him to do what he pleased with. But, if it had been so, this would not have prevented his liability to have his will moved by a power without him. Insubjection and unaccountableness are of a perfectly different nature from Freewill. A despot may be ruled within, as well as a slave.

But, taking the writer to mean that he was left to do his own will, this does not necessarily imply more than that he was left a free agent. And this he was left, with respect to all his relations, higher as well as inferior; and so are we. The difference between Adam's state before his fall, and ours who have been begotten of him — after having fallen in and with him — does not consist in his having been in any way independent of God — which we are not — or having had a will that was inaccessible to divine control — which we do not have — but only in his ignorance of, and freedom from evil. He knew only good, and the devil as yet had no part in him. But even in that state, he did only, and only could do, what God willed that he should do; and though without excuse in choosing evil (as having faculties and capacities, and being placed in circumstances, by and in which he should at once have rejected the temptation), did so choose, through the operation (not indeed compulsory, but efficacious) and according to the will of Him who does all things: whose glory as well as prerogative it is to govern a world of free agents.

Grammar: these are moods or verb tenses in Greek, which affect the meaning of the word.

De sequelá. What follows, or is supposed to follow, from an assertion proved or admitted, but is not the immediate point in debate. 'Consequence,' deduction,' 'inference.'

It is not Luther's business to state where this difference of reception arises; which is only through the free favour of God, making some to be his friends by his Spirit working in due season, while he leaves others in their native enmity. Luther would not hesitate to assign this cause; but here he only deals with the fact that the Lord tests and evinces these different characters of men, by such calls to obedience.

"Therefore by the deeds of the law no flesh shall be justified in his sight; for by the law is the knowledge of sin." (Rom 3.20) "Moreover, the law entered that the offence might abound."

(Rom 5.20.) "What then does the law serve? It was added because of transgressions." (Gal 3.19) "Therefore the law was our schoolmaster to bring us to Christ." (Gal 3.24)

As distinct from a fraction. See note on p. 166.

Tutum libero arbitrio tribuentibus. The Pelagians spoke more wisely than many who oppose them. They maintained 'the integrity of Freewill' as an absolute power of willing good. Freewill is Freewill, and if there is anything of it in man, there is the whole of it.

Luther no doubt refers to Eph 2.8, "For by grace are you saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God." His interpretation, if I understand the text rightly, is incorrect: it is not faith that is spoken of as the gift of God, but 'his whole salvation.' The truth of his affirmation, however, though not fairly deducible from this text, is unquestionable; and it may be shown from particular testimonies, as well as from the general tenour of Scripture. [For example,] Mat 16.17; Joh 6.44, 65; Eph 1.19; Col 2.12 (to which many others might be added) are decisive.

Deem: here it means to judge or declare, and not just indicate or suggest.

Suo ipsius gladio jugulatur. By quoting a passage for herself, which directly contradicts her.

Cum adesset Spiritus. Luther assumes that Adam, in his creation state, had the Spirit; of which there is no proof, and the contrary seems evidently to have been the fact. Made perfect after his kind, it was no part of his creation dues or gifts to have the Spirit. He was formed to glorify God, as his creature: which implies a substance distinct from, and existing in a state of severance from his Creator; like a piece of mechanism put out of the hand of its artificer. He was left to himself, therefore, having his own high moral powers and acquirements, but no extrinsic aid; to make trial and to show what man in his entireness is, and what he would become through temptation, if not inhabited by his Creator. This trial and manifestation would furnish an inference with respect to other creatures; even as the same inference had already been furnished by the angelic nature. But this trial could not have been made, and this exhibition therefore could not have been effected, if he had possessed the Spirit; or in other words, if he had been united to God — so united that he could not have been overcome. That union, therefore (as Luther, and others with him, would say), was dissolved; the Spirit which he had possessed was withdrawn during his temptation. Then, was he any longer the same substance, or person, which had received the command? On this representation, the command was given to him, having the Spirit; and he was tested, not having he Spirit. — So demonstrable is it that Adam did not have the Holy

Ghost, whose in-dwelling 'does not pertain to the perfection of man's nature.' — But the argument from Adam's state to ours is quite strong enough without this unwarranted assumption of Luther's. He that had just come out of the hands of his Creator, made in his image, and pronounced by him to be 'very good,' could not stand against a single and solitary tempation: therefore, what should we do?

As opposed to that 'stale and rejected' thing which good is to us.

I cannot help regretting that Luther, after the example of his opponent, has given so much space to this Apocryphal testimony from Ecclesiasticus. I could have been glad if he had not only stood upon his right, which he hints at in the opening of his discussion, declining to answer; but had used the occasion to protest against the honour put upon this book, and the rest of its brothers and sisters, by binding them up in our Bibles and reading them in our churches. The collateral matter of the argumentation, however, is highly valuable; and Luther could afford to make his adversary a present of an argument. Here, indeed, he may almost be said to have used a cannon to kill flies. For is it not Adam, clearly, of whom the Preacher speaks; whose will is not the matter in debate? And what, as we have seen, is said even of that will, which might not be said of ours? It was left free to choose; and if it should choose good, good would result from that good.

Vi sententiae, consequentiae et rerum hue cogitur.

Referring to the 'satis probabilis opinio;' 'sed non relinquat, quod suis viribus ascribat.' See above, Sect. 8.

Alieno imperio. 'A dominion out of himself;' so that he is no longer his own master.

Ut sonant. The sound, as opposed to the sense, or real import. [Biblical Hebrew, unlike modern Hebrew, does not have future or past tenses; but it does have the indicative: perfect or imperfect. – WHG]

I admit Luther's principle, but I demur to the application of it, both here and in the parallel to which he refers, Gen 3.16. The original passage is one of great difficulty. I incline to the interpretation which our authorized version gives to it; and refer the words which are immediately under remark, as that appears to do, not to sin, but to Abel. "If you do well, shall you not be accepted? And if you do not do well, sin lies at the door. And his desire shall be to you, and you shall rule over him." Well, and not well, relate to the then-known will of God. Was Cain ignorant, with what sort of offering God was to be approached? — Whatever might be said of later times, Cain must have heard all about Eden, the serpent and the woman, the serpent's seed and the woman's seed; and must have seen the coats of skins.

Cain despised "the way;" he would have none of Christ. — Then, God's words are adapted to quiet and to instruct him. We know that a man can no more come by Christ, unless it is given to him from above, than he can come by the law. But this was not the thing to be shown him; he was to be reminded of the sole way of access, that he might make the fullest developement of himself, if he should continue to neglect and despise it. And since jealous and angry fears were now arising in his mind with respect to his brother — chiefly, lest he lose the earthly superiority attached to his primogeniture — he is pacified with an assurance

(doubtless connected with the fore-mentioned condition) that sin's dominion would remain in his hands; an assurance conveyed in words very nearly resembling those by which Eve was warned of her subjection to Adam. The Septuagint gives another turn to the former part of the verse, but clearly refers the latter as I do; and so in Gen. 3.16. According to this view, the words of this text have nothing to do with Freewill, though it seems the Hebrew

Rabbins, as well as Luther and Erasmus, thought they had. (See Pole's Synops. in loc.) If they must be referred to sin, not Abel, then Luther's interpretation is correct, and his answer is unanswerable. If the words are taken indicatively, then they are a promise of God, which was broken as soon as it was made.

Inculces. A figurative expression from 'treading in with the feet;' hence it is applied to those efforts by which, like the pavier ramming down his stones, we aim to drive or beat our meaning into a person's head. Erasmus not only repeats, but pursues long desultory arguments, heaping one upon another, to prove his point.

Libertas eligendi. Choice there must be, or there is no will; but that choice may be made under a wrong bias. This is properly the question of Freewill; viz.: whether the will is under such a bias or not.

Imo nulla patet. Referring to what he has said before, about God's doing everything; and our doing all we do, by necessity. So, even the way of evil is only broad and easy, 'si Deus permittat.'

Tota ratio et virtus legis. Rat. a word of very extensive and various signification, expresses 'the nature, order, object, structure, and relations of any substance.' 'Principle' seems best to express it here, as comprehending both design and constitution. Rat. et virt. The law is both framed for this purpose, and effects it.

I insert 'this,' because the two ibis, which follow, make it plain that it is not knowledge in general, but this knowledge in particular, of which he speaks.

Inter os et offam. 'The mouth and the cake;' but I have preferred the more common proverb.

Et vos. It would be read with more spirit in the form of a question: — 'And do you so suddenly make,' etc.?

Luther is abundant in reply to this passage from Deuteronomy. 1. It proves too much. 2. It is not ridiculous, if the way is supposed shut. 3. The law gives knowledge of sin. 4. Imperative verbs are not indicatives.

The reference to Deut. 3 appears to be incorrect. These expressions are all found in the 30th; and those like them in Deu 27, 28, 29. But chap. 3 is a mere narrative.

Unseasonable: not in keeping with; inconsistent with.

Totum, as opposed to particula ejus reliqua; that small remaining particle of Freewill which Erasmus professed to support and prove: his texts would make it an integer, not a fraction.

Originally, "sciolous Diatribe": knowing superficially or imperfectly.

Explode: to show a theory or claim to be baseless.

Contra causam et scipsum. Not only in opposition to the cause he was advocating, but even to his own admissions and assertions. But what a string of charges is here! — Sciolist! a mere smatterer in learning and knowledge. — Pelagian! which every would-be orthodox disclaims — negligent, desultory, undiscerning, heartless! quam nihil vel intelligas vel afficiaris causae!

Sine suis viribus. He plays upon 'the approvable opinion;' which leaves aside endeavour, but does not leave it to be ascribed to Freewill's own power.

Satis forti contentione. Cont. is sometimes used in a rhetorical sense to express one of the parts of an oration; 'disputatio sive disceptatio,' as opposed to 'quaestio' or 'controversia;' what might properly be called 'the argumentation.' But here it is used in another rhetorical sense, to express 'contrast, comparison, or antithesis;' 'Moses' folly,' set in array against She imputed this to Luther: she would make either him or Moses absurd; the real absurdity lay in adducing arguments which either proved nothing, or proved the opposite.

If he can do what is bid, there is no need of the Spirit; if he knows he cannot, there is no longer any use for prescribing it.

Ad gratiam. Not, what is often understood by grace, 'the gift of the Spirit;' but what grace truly is in its essence: 'the free favour of God.'

Ridicula. .seria. . necessaria. Ridiculous may have respect either to the laugher, or the laughed at; what we do in sport, or suffer as objects of sport. The law neither mocks nor makes a fool of herself, though her ordinances are impossible to man; she neither mocks by calling merely to expose, nor subjects herself to derision, by speaking where she has nothing to gain.

Offam seems to be some allusion to Cerberus. Virgil's Aeneid vi. 420. In Greek mythology, Cerberus is the three-headed dog, guarding the entrance to Hades. Exiting (as well as entering) the underworld is accomplished by giving Cerberus a mead-soaked barley cake.

Percurrere. Luther applies the same term to his review of Erasmus' preface, implying short and lively animadversion [harsh criticism] rather than grave and elaborate research. So, just afterwards, 'recensere;' 'enumeration,' or 'recital,' rather than 'investigation.'

Obruatur copid, seems to be some allusion to the dragon, Rev 12.15. "And the serpent cast out of his mouth water, as a flood, after the woman, that he might cause her to be carried away by the flood."

The reference seems to be to verse 21, where our translation has it, "And your ears shall hear a word behind you, saying, This is the way, walk in it, when you turn to the right hand, and when you turn to the left."

Isa. 45.20; 52.1, 2. Jer 15.19. The reference was originally Zechariah, but it seems to properly belong to Malachi 3.7. See above, Part ii. Sect. 13. note o .

Verbo gratiae oblate. The expression, 'offers of grace,' is exceptionable, as implying freeness of choice; in direct contrariety to Luther's position and arguments. The truth is that, while he abhorred free choice, he liked free offers. I could have been glad if he had expressed his meaning more definitely; which is little else than the promises of God received in such a way that they are generally set forth to us in holy Scripture; that is, received as promises of free favour made to persons of a certain character; and not to individuals, as such. What but these are the very and legitimate stay of God's eternally foreknown, elect, predestined, and now quickened child, in the day of his tearing and smiting? Is he to hear a voice, or see a vision, or receive some providential token, personal to himself, before he presumes to call upon the name of the Lord? Are not these, "Ho, every one that thirsts;" "To this man I will look;" "Come to me, all you that travail and are heavy-laden;" "The same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon Him" — his warrant for drawing near, and his first words of consolation? But these, at last, are not offers of grace by which God throws himself, as it were, at the knees and feet of his creatures subjecting himself to a refusal; no, with full assurance that he must receive one, unless he superadds a special and distinct impulse of his own to secure acceptance — but testimonies of his own mouth, and hand, and ordinances, borne to those souls which he, in his own good time, has made ready to welcome them, that he will bind up, and heal, and own these poor destitutes, amidst the gathered remnant of his heritage.

Verba, ut posita sunt. Without additions, such as Erasmus'.

I do not know that any reasonable objection can be made to Luther's paraphrase of Jeremiah 15.19, and Malachi (he calls him Zechariah) 3.7. But the quotation from Jeremiah seems perfectly out of place: it is a personal matter between the Lord and his Prophet, a converted man: what has this to do, then, with the question of Freewill?

Quaerat unde possit. I have been inclined to connect these words with the preceding sentence, by which he is admonished what he ought to be; and having understood and discovered this, he is admonished to seek the power which he has no place where he might get it if Diatribe were not to intervene, etc. The punctuation, however, forbids this connection, and it does not appear to be Luther's meaning. He imputes it to Diatribe's false suggestion that if man, warned that he ought to turn to God, does not find out his own impotency, and seek his conversion from God. But there is much more that goes to this seeking than Luther seems to include in it: under the clearest light, men will still resist conviction — and the heart to seek, is as much a gift, as conversion itself.

More literally, 'since the meaning of the commander and the demander is equal on both sides.'

Dilige Deum. Ama Dominum. Dil. and am. are here used as of like import. Sometimes they are put in contrast, and that is done variously; diligo being sometimes the stronger, and sometimes the weaker term. In distinguishing them, 'amo' may be understood to denote the love of appetite; and 'diligo' the love of reason.

Forma legis. More literally, 'the shape, mould, or image of the law;' 'what is comprehended in it.

Scotistis et Modernis. See above, Part iii. Sect. 2. notes.

Luther's distinction between law words and gospel words, as applied by him in these two sections, severally and comparedly, is arbitrary, indefinite, and unavailing. Arbitrary inasmuch as he pretends not to have any recognised authority for it, and he applies it inconsistently; sometimes calling words of exhortation or command 'gospel words;' and sometimes confining that term to words of promise, as opposed to them. 'Turn to me' is a law word; 'I will turn to you' is a gospel word. Indefinite because he gives no fixed rule by which to determine what is one, and what is the other; but, according to his own account, he leaves it to the discerning reader. Unavailing because a gospel precept is not less impracticable than a law precept to the free will. — In my view, he confounds matters; for 'return,' or 'repent,' is surely not a law precept, but a gospel one: the law knows nothing of repentance. — The truth is, he has given his answer to all these testimonies already. They are requirements; call them law requirements, if you will, or gospel requirements; they are something for man to do; and as he very properly argues, they are meant to show him what he ought to do, but they do not imply any power either towards Law, or towards Gospel.

Properly, the law is 'the law of the Ten Commandments,' under which, speaking less precisely, may be comprehended all those precepts which fall in with the nature and design of that 'transcript of the creation law of man,' but nothing which regards his relations as a fallen, or as a restored creature. Luther speaks confusedly on this subject, as other writers do, not discerning the origin, design, and nature of that institution. The law did not speak till Moses; it spoke only to the Jews, or the then visible church of God; it was a preparation for, and it was a fore-preached Gospel. A law word, therefore, rightly understood, is also a gospel word: a word which prepares by compelling a sense of need; and which — while it

"shuts up unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed," and which now has been revealed — impliedly promises and exhibits Him who was to be, and who now has been and is, its fulfiller and perfecter.

Sic versat. Vers. implies a forced application of it; as if you were to turn a body that is already in motion, out of its natural course; or give motion to one that is at rest.

See above, Sect. 23. note a.

His state as a sinner is a state of eternal death, the just punishment of his sin; and he has the beginning of this state in his now realizing apprehensions of it. When converted, he is delivered from this state of punishment; and when he lives, he is brought into the joy of this changed state.

Revocaret et erigeret. Revoc. implies 'departure;' the soul has gone further and further off from God, through despair of mercy: erig. implies 'fallen,' 'thrown down,' 'prostrated' like

Saul before the witch of Endor.

The Psalms abound with expressions of this sort: see especially the 38th and 88th; from the latter of which, these words appear to be a quotation. "For my life draws near to the grave"

(v. 3); or, according to the older version, "to hell." (v. 2.) See above, note a. The account I have given there of Luther's meaning is abundantly confirmed here. Mercy is to be preached, and what he calls 'offered' generally to all men; but only those in whom the law has done its office will receive it. And whom did Luther understand by these, but God's elect? His offer, therefore, is a nugatory offer to all but the elect; and these must receive it — not 'physically' must, but 'morally.'

Luther's answer to Erasmus' argument from Ezek. 18.23 is threefold. 1. It proves too much.

2. It proves no more than other gospel words; that is, words of promise and mercy. 3. Such words prove against Freewill by implying that, without them, man could only despair.

See above, note i, where I have objected to this distinction between law words and gospel words, and to the statements generally made respecting the Law, as though it were opposed to the Gospel. Luther is chargeable here with arguing per sequelam, for which he so much blames Erasmus. 'God's word of promise proves that man could only despair without it.' —

The true answer to Erasmus' argument from this text (which, according to Luther's distinction, is a gospel word — but then there is quite as much supernatural help necessary to make a gospel word availing, as to fulfil a law word —) is that it proves nothing on either side. Inferences may be drawn both ways; against as well as for, and for as well as against: but the affirmation respects only the mind of God. He declares that he does not will death.

What does this assert concerning the natural powers of man? For a fuller view of the doctrine set forth in this and like texts, and of their place in the great scheme of Godmanifestation, see the next Section and its notes.

Luther has given what he considers the true answer to Erasmus' objection drawn from this text; it is a gospel word, for the consolation of the law-stricken; and it declares that we have no right to ask any more questions. I do not approve the exact point to which he brings the debate, nor can I agree with him that it ought to just end here. Luther speaks, and many others like him, as if only the law (meaning the law of the Ten Commandments) could do the office of abasing and prostrating man. In effect, this assumes that the law was given to man from the beginning, and that Moses' giving of it was but a republication: otherwise how were those saints emptied of self and prostrated, who lived before Moses, such as Abel,

Enoch, Noah, and the rest? But what proof is there of the law having been given from the beginning? Express proof is afforded in Romans 5 that the law was not till Moses. "For until the law, sin was in the world: but sin is not imputed when there is no law. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, " etc. (vv. 13, 14.) The truth is, it is not the law, but the Holy Ghost (using the law, it is true, as his instrument more generally, where it has been given, but by no means universally using it so) — who does not need the law, but has enough proofs to supply about man's sin; of his "earthly, sensual, devilish" mind; without having recourse to that summary of creation duty — that humbles, empties, and makes ready for the manifold Scripture-declarations of God's entire readiness to receive the penitent freely.

These are indeed made such by God, and they can only be made such by him; though it is not his plan usually to tell us how we have come, and alone can come, to this mind, when he testifies of his love and good-will towards it. So that the question arising from this admitted state of things: 'some receive, others do not receive, this and like gospel words,' is not properly why some are lawstricken; or more correctly, why some are prostrated, and selfemptied, and self-despairing; but why some have the Holy Ghost, and others do not have it; in other words, this is why there is an election of grace. I cannot agree with Luther that we have no right to ask this question; or in other words, that the Scripture does not afford an answer to it; for here is the secret of God.

If it is asked why such a man is elect, and such a man is not elect, it is most true that we have no answer; this is God's secret; we have nothing to do with it. But if the question is, why are there elect and non-elect, we have to deal with it and we can give an answer: it is to the manifestation of God. This is the end of all his counsels, and of all his operations. For some observations on Luther's accepted aphorism 'Quae supra nos, nihil ad nos,' and upon 'his apparent setting out of two Gods,' one of which we have nothing to do with; and for the correct answer to Erasmus' insidious question, 'Does God deplore,' etc., see notes t, v , and x, which follow.

Religiosius. 'By religious considerations.' — The multitude might look into the entrance; priests might enter into the penetralia; but the multitude might not go in to explore. If they did, they were filled with terrors; appalling sights confounded them. Just so, and with still more fearful apprehensions of a religious nature, we are prohibited, says Luther, from attempting to penetrate the secret of God. But the question is, where does this secret begin?

Luther says, 'in the fact that some are touched by the law, and others are not.'

Super omnem Deum praedicatum et cultum. Literally, 'above all the proclaimed and worshipped God.' I question the soundness of Luther's interpretation of this text, and consequently of the argument which he draws from it — although the distinction which he labours to establish is, with some modification and amplification, the root of the answer to the objection. "Who opposes and exalts himself above all that is called God, or that is an object of worship," is the more correct rendering of the original text. The meaning seems to be that this Antichrist would both oppose himself to, and exalt himself above, every object of worship, both true and false — 'every being that is called God, and every substance which is worshipped.' It therefore has nothing to do with distinct views and considerations respecting the true God, but only marks the extravagant claims which this Antichrist would make, and which would be allowed by his votaries, as compared with the several objects of worship received in the world. — The word of God, however, does clearly recognise a distinction between God, regarded as the legislator, governor, and judge of his moral creation — or in any other relations which he may have been pleased to assume towards the whole, or certain parts, of that creation; and God, regarded as he is in himself, and as separated from such relations — also, between that will of His which he has revealed for our obedience (what may therefore be called his legislative will), and that free, infinite, and eternal will of His, from which this legislative will has emanated, and by which, in perfect consistency with all his assumed relations, and with that of legislator among the rest, he regulates his own conduct (what may therefore be called, by way of distinction, his personal will): in other words, between his commands and his mind. — God, who made the worlds, the sole Being, subsisted in his trinity of co-equal persons, infinite, and all-blessed, before he made them. Is it presumptuous to say why he made them? Has he not unequivocally told us? His end is, as it must be, seated in himself. (See Vaughan's Calvinistic Clergy defended,, p. 64 73. 2d Ed.)

He will show himself — WHAT HE is — so far as infinite can be shown to finite, to certain moral and intelligent creatures, whom he will make capable of apprehending, adoring, and enjoying him, in their measure. Hence, the whole counsel, process, series, and results of creation, in which I include all that belongs to Creator and creature-ship. Hence the true distinction between the hidden and revealed God — which properly is no other than God the revealer and God the revealed. Creation in this wide extent is only God's revealer; and having revealed much of him in reality, there is yet much at last in God which is not, and cannot be revealed. Thus, we see that this hidden God, or rather this absolute God (so-called because He is not circumscribed by relations, which relations, however, can only be such as He has seen fit to assume; and which he has seen fit to assume for the one great end of selfmanifestation), is the same God with the revealed and circumscribed God; and that, so far from being an unknown God in this regard, he has revealed himself in his relative and circumscribed capacity, for the very purpose of making himself known (so far as the incomprehensible can be made known) in this absolute and uncircumscribed capacity.

So, again, with respect to his secret and his revealed will; or, as I have more correctly distinguished them, his personal and his legislative will; while these are distinct, they are neither opposed to each other, nor unconnected with each other — his legislative will subserves his personal will, and it is his ordained and specially-devised instrument for accomplishing it. By this accomplishment, his great purpose is achieved, in submitting himself to his various creator relationships (to wit, self-manifestation).

In the observations which follow, I do not confine myself to the words immediately under review, but I comprehend the whole of Luther's expressions and reasonings in this and the three succeeding paragraphs.

Luther does not seem to have apprehended the union and concordance of these two distinct views, in which both God and his will are set forth to us, while he so strongly marks their distinctness; and thus, his answer (not being the whole truth; that is, not being THE TRUTH; which consists in a harmonious combination of many parts) has an air of evasion and sophistry (to which he does not seem to have been insensible himself), and is, in reality, unsatisfying and repulsive. Is it true, that the proverb, 'What is above us, is nothing to us,' has its rightful application here? Is it true that we have nothing to do with this God of majesty, as Luther calls him; the absolute God? What is the knowledge of God — that last, highest, best gift of promise — if not the knowledge of this God? the communication of which is, as we have seen, the very end of creation and of revelation. Again, is it true that the revealed God, or relative God, wills only life? or according to Luther's own way of stating it, that God has revealed himself in his word only as that God who offers himself to all men, and would draw all men to himself? — Why then does he tell us in that self-same word, that indeed for this very cause he had raised Pharaoh up, to show in him His power; and that His name might be declared throughout all the earth? That it was of the Lord to harden the hearts of the Canaanites, that they should come against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no favour, but that he might destroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses? — That Hophni and Phinehas did not hearken to the voice of their father, because the Lord would slay them? — That he smells a sweet savour of Christ in those who perish? — That whom he will he hardens? — That there are those ordained of old to condemnation? Those appointed to stumble at the stone? — Those whom he has commanded to fill up the measure of their iniquities? — That He is, in short, a potter having power over the clay, and using that power? — Has he proclaimed all this concerning himself in his word? Does he, moreover, make that word his great instrument of bringing these things to pass; and is it true nevertheless, that his word stands in contrast, no, in direct opposition to himself, so that we are wisely counselled to attend to his word in contrast, and even in opposition, to God who gave it? Had Luther discerned the simple end of creation and revelation, God manifesting himself as what he really is in his essence (in which essence, hatred of that which is contrary to himself is as much a part as love of that which is like himself); and seen that by means of creation and revelation, God is actually effecting this end he would not have talked of salvation being the revealed God's alone work; nor have said that we have to do with his word, but not with himself; nor have warned us that we have nothing to do with His inscrutable will (including in this all that Luther includes in it)

— when that inscrutable will is made a matter of instruction in his word, and is declared to be what he is continually fulfilling in us; what the Lord Jesus thanks his Father for; and what his people find to be their great source of light, and strength, and joy. How remarkable it is, that Luther should here silence his opponent with "No, but O man, who are you that replies against God?" when, with the interval of only a single verse, the Holy Ghost had furnished him with a clue to the whole counsel of God, and with an answer to those very questions which he says it is not lawful to ask, or possible to get resolved. "What if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction; And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had before prepared for glory, even us, whom he has called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles?" Luther both speaks and means incorrectly here — but he says rather more than he means. It is not against the sober, hallowed use of the knowledge of this inscrutable will (for though there is that which is inscrutable in it, there is also that in it which may be known, for he has told it to us), but against those who denied, or confounded, or impugned, or reviled these distinctions, and would hear nothing of God's sovereign majesty, and of his secret counsel, that he is aiming his dart here.

Psalm 107.20. Luther applies this healing 'to all men;' but the Psalmist declares it only of 'those who cry unto the Lord in their trouble and in particular dispensations of his hand.' —

This is not all men. [Luther has not said 'all men', so I'm not sure what Vaughan refers to. In the next sentence, Luther admits God's sovereignty 'in all things.' Here he distinguishes those in whom God is himself the worker of their death (presumably those who are the objects of His wrath), and those in whom He finds death where He would not have it: these

He heals (redeems). Luther thus affirms the condition of all men, as born into sin and death; and out of them God redeems some, who are His elect. – WHG]

Yes — and works life and death, and all things in all things, through the agency of that proclaimed, or relative God; and in perfect consistency with — indeed, by means of — that legislative will which regulates man's duty as his moral creature. By 'legislative,' I mean all which can be called 'enactment,' as given by God, of whatever kind; whether to one nation or to the whole world; whether Law or Gospel. See note above.

It is as the proclaimed or relative God, not as the hidden or absolute God, that he both saves and destroys; and He does this by means of his legislative enactments, not in contradiction to them. The power which he gives to his elect and saved, and which he withholds from the reprobate and damned, is distinct from these legislative enactments; and while it proceeds from the relative God, it does not proceed from him in his legislatorial relation, but in another which is distinct from and not commensurate with it, although its subjects are also subject to that relation and to its requirements. It is no part of the legislator's office to give power, or to withhold it. He may do either. He may work anything, everything, upon, around, above, or beneath him, but He leaves the subject of his enactments a free agent: and this God does, and ever has done.

Thus it was in creation strictly so-called; God, having assumed the relation of Creator to man, gave him a law (Gen 2.17) "But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, you shall not eat of it; for in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die." It was no part of his relation, as Creator, either to withhold temptation from his creature, whom he had "made upright," "in his own image," "good," "very good "(but as we noted before, Sec xviii, not having the Holy Ghost, and therefore not held to God as though by a chain, but subsisting in a state of severance from him); nor yet to sustain him by new powers (additional to those which he had received at his creation), in a crisis of temptation. The result was that he fell; and the whole human race (which had been created in him, and of which the several individuals had a distinct personal subsistence in him, and were parts of his substance when, having first apostatized in heart, he afterwards put out his hand, and took, and ate) shared in his ruin. It is by the instrumentality of this law, then, that God both saves whom he personally wills to save, and destroys whom he personally wills to destroy: saving those to whom, by a super-creation relation which was given them in Christ Jesus before the world began, he grants his special grace; and destroying those from whom he withholds the same, in perfect consistency with all creation dues and obligations.

Thus it was in God's dealings with the nation of Israel, and with his visible church, as for a season co-extensive with that nation. Once he had formed the seed of Abraham into a nation, and had assumed the relation of king to that people, he gave them a law by which, instrumentally, he kept them for his own, so long as it was his personal will to keep them, and scattered them when it was the counsel of his personal will to scatter them.

Israel, like Adam in Paradise, broke the. law nearly as soon as it was given him; but, by so doing, he prepared the way for all God's future dealings with him.

By the same law instrumentally, He, in their ecclesiastical relation, saved whom he would save, through the bestowal of a grace which was not of their covenant; while he at the same time destroyed whom he would destroy, through the withholding of that grace, in perfect consistency with the provisions of the same.

Thus it is also in the Gospel Church, and in the commanded preaching of the Gospel to all nations, and tongues, and people. God, in the relation of the offended sovereign of the human race, commandeth all men every where to repent; giving them what may be called the law of repentance and faith, and demanding of them a state of mind which is suited to their condition as fallen and guilty creatures. 'Repent, and believe the Gospel.'

Implicitly, but not explicitly, this is the demand, and the alone demand, which God has made upon man, even the whole human race, since the Fall; and shall continue to be so, till his mystery be finished by the Lord's second coming. The form of this demand has been varied, the knowledge of it has been varied; the law, eminently so called, has been interposed to the church, God has "winked at times of ignorance;" but a Manasseh's humbledness of mind, with a peradventure of mercy the only demand which, in consis tency with the recognition of those primary transactions in the Garden, and with the realities of the case, could be made is in truth the only demand whit.i has been made upon the sons and daughters of fallen Adam, from the period of the ejection out of Paradise until now: a demand which has served to mark the only difference that can ever be found to subsist between the several apostate members of an apostate head; viz, continued apostasy in some, and restoration in others.

By this legislative will of his, instrumentally, he fulfils the counsels of his personal will; saving whom he has predestined to save, and destroying whom he has predestined to destroy.

Luther has in substance given the right answer to this cavil from Ezekiel, but has given it, as we have seen, in an exceptionable form; exceptionable, as it respects the distinction he institutes, 'hidden God and revealed God;' and exceptionable, in that he does not show the sameness of this God, which is thus distinguishingly regarded. It is to be remembered, that the words bear only by inference and consequence upon the question of Freewill (which is the question in debate), whatever may be the correct interpretation of them; neither does

Erasmus represent them fairly. Erasmus speaks of wailing and working: but where does Ezekiel say that God "wails?" He says only, I would not. Erasmus argues, 'God deplores; therefore, it is not his doing that they die; therefore, it is their own doing; therefore, there is

Freewill.' It is inference two deep; each of which requires proof. What if their death is selfwrought? Why may they not have previously forfeited their Freewill, and therefore die under bondwill? We might hold ourselves excused, therefore, from entering at all into this cavil; it is truly nihil ad nos [nothing to us].

But there are reasons why we should rather meet it in the face; and the answer has, by implication, been given to it already. Some would say, why not at once knock if down with "Secret things belong to the Lord?" (Deu 29.29) a convenient text for a perplexed disputant!

My answer is, that text does not apply here. The Prophet is not speaking of the principles of divine conduct, but of those providential events and arrangements by which God realizes and fulfils them. It was in the counsels of God to bring the nation of Israel to obedience at the last, through a long course of abandonment and punishment. But at that time, they had the word given to them (" the word is near you, even in your mouth, and in your heart; that is, the word of faith, which we preach." Compare Romans 10.5-10 with Deu. 30.11-14), which they would at length obey. Now, they had nothing to do with these intermediate events which God would bring about; it was theirs to use that commandment (or rather that Gospel which the commandment fore-preached) looking through the type to the reality which he commanded them that day. Besides, if we were at liberty to use this text here, we must learn from it that we have nothing to do with election and reprobation at all: as some are fond enough of admonishing us. For it is not a question, who is individually of the one class, and who is of the other, that is to be answered here; but whether there really are such distinctions, and why there are such. (See above, note r .) Then, meeting the question fairly, though not fairly attached to the question of Freewill, how does this assertion in Ezekiel comport with the God-willed death of a sinner?

Not to insist upon the peculiarities of the case to which this solemn declaration of God is annexed (the house of Israel was brought into peculiar relations to God, and the case of an Israelite was therefore considerably different from that of uncovenanted transgressors).

This is not to notice the ambiguity of Erasmus' expression 'his people' (God works no death in his people properly so-called, though he works death in many who have a name to be his people, and are not) without insisting that the original words ֹץפּאִם־אֶחְה֗יְהוִas well as the qelw, not Boulomai, of the Septuagint, express inclination rather than determination — and so the sentiment conveyed may be no more than what our translators have assigned to them, 'have

I any pleasure at all,' 'for I have no pleasure;' implying only such a reluctance as is not inconsistent with a contrary decision though Luther, as well as Erasmus, makes it 'nolo;' waving all such objections, which do not shield the vitals of the truth, though they may serve to parry off a blow from its extremities (for clearly here is God at least declaring his dislike of that death which he nevertheless inflicts, and which we affirm that he wills); the true account of the matter, and that which comprehends all possible cases, has been furnished in the two preceding notes; asserted in note l, and illustrated by examples in note u .

The relative God, in his character of Israel's legislator and sovereign, declares in this chapter that he will deal henceforth both nationally and spiritually with that people, each man according to his own ways; and, in effect, preaches the Gospel to each individual of them, saying, 'Repent, and live.' At the twenty-third verse [where Erasmus quotes the text unfairly by joining the oath of v. 3 with v. 23; but it is no part of it], he signifies that he has no pleasure in the death of him that dies: in the three last verses, he exhorts and remonstrates, and repeats his gracious assurances. But it does not belong to these and like relations, to give grace and power; and, without such grace and power, exhortations promises and threatenings are all, and alike, vain. But is God therefore to withhold them? Man, without this superadded grace, ought to obey them; ought, though he cannot — cannot through a self-wrought impotency. And are there no reasons, no satisfying reasons, why God should give them? Are these not among his choicest instruments by which he effects the manifestation of himself — manifestation of himself, through the manifestation of what is in man; "that you might be justified when you speak, and clear when you judge." — His elect obey; his non-elect harden themselves still more under his outward calls. Thus, whether the case set forth in Ezekiel, is considered as the peculiar case of the national Israel, or the general case of the visible church having the Gospel preached to it (that Gospel which is in one view a statute, enactment, or commandment; while, in another view, it is the Jubilee trumpet, by which the Holy Ghost proclaims liberty to the Lord's captives); we see in it, at last, only a further exemplification of what has been shown already: the relative God revealing the absolute, and his legislative fulfilling his personal will. — Luther meant nothing contrary to this statement, though his language might seem to imply it.

Frigere necessariò. Frig. A metaphor taken from vegetable or animal substances, which are nipped with cold. These exhortations, etc. have no warmth, no life, no power, no meaning in them, without Freewill.

'Ut eitharoedus; Ridetur, chordâ qui semper oberrat eadem.' — Horace, Art. Poet. 355.

Libero campo. I understand it, 'liber ab hoste. seu antagonista;' but I do not find any parallel.

Se ipsam comedit. What this animal is, and whether real or fabulous; I must leave in some doubt. The lobster comes nearest to the description of which it is said, 'At the same time that they cast their shell, they also change their stomach and intestines. The animal, while it is moulting, is said to feed upon its former stomach, which wastes by degrees, and is at length replaced with a new one.' — Bingley's Animal Biography, vol. iii. p. 511. But the pelican seems the more probable allusion here; whose method of taking its sustenance from its pouch, might well account for the figment of its eating itself, or preying on its own stomach.

The scolopendra discharges its own bowels, in order to disgorge the hook; and the scorpion, inclosed with burning coals, stings itself to death: but neither of these seems applicable here. The name bestia is said to he ascribed properly to wild and noxious animals, but not confined to these; while bellua expresses size rather than fierceness.

See Luther's commentary on Deuteronomy, in loco, where he notices and chides this unjustifiable use which the Sophists make of it. He gives another turn to the "secret things" of the preceding chapter; considering them as secrets revealed to Israel, that he may obey.

Also, he understands St. Paul's application of this text as an accommodation of the original words, not a quotation according to their true sense, as spoken by Moses. But his comment will be found strongly to confirm the view which I have given of this text, in note x . Moses' words can only be fulfilled, he says, under the Gospel. Yet Moses says, "See, I have set before you this day life and death, " etc. Then what is more natural, than to understand him as calling upon them to see the Gospel in their Law, and to yield a gospel obedience to that Law? — which every spiritual Israelite no doubt did.

Manibus palpa. If you cannot see, or hear, submit to have your finger put upon each letter, that you may trace it out; as a child is taught to read.

Praemansum porrigentem. Proem. A word of doubtful authority, but well-fitted to express the first process in the art of teaching, by which the scholar eats as it were out of the master's mouth.

Tractandas accepisti. In Deu 31.9-13, the ordinance is, "And Moses wrote this law and delivered it to the priests, the sons of Levi, who bore the ark, the covenant of the Lord, and to all the elders of Israel. And Moses commanded them, saying, At the end of every seven years, in the solemnity of the year of release, in the feast of tabernacles, when all Israel is come to appear before the Lord your God, in the place which he shall choose, you shall read this law before all Israel, in their hearing. Gather the people together," etc. etc. See also vv.

24-26. Also Jos 8.31-35. Also Neh 8.1-8. Also 2Chr 17.7-9; 30.22. — I render the expression 'ore assiduo' continually. But if I could have found authority for the use of the word

'assiduus,' I would rather have given it a reference to what is said in Nehemiah, "And the Levites caused the people to understand the law, etc. So they read in the book in the law of God distinctly, and gave the sense, and caused them to understand the reading." Luther is correct, then, in suggesting that the Levites (including the priests under this name) were to handle or discourse on the law to the people, and not simply to read it. And although he anticipates the injunction as given on this occasion, it had in substance been given before (see Deu 10.8-9.) at the second delivering of the Tablets.

I do not quite fall in with Luther's interpretation of this text, as I have hinted in note x of Sect. 28. and note c of Sect. 30. (Why are we to shut out Paul in our interpretation of it? Is not the Holy Ghost the best commentator upon the Holy Ghost's words?) But I do not the less resist its application in support of Freewill. The thing required is near you, what ought to be in your mouth and in your heart. Is it therefore immediately and necessarily there? and is that of our own giving and getting?

Quibus solutis. Sol. 'Quod ligatum est, a vinculis libero;' the bands of these captive texts having been loosed: they had been tied and bound in the service of Freewill.

Optative: indicating an option or wish.

Totam vim, as opposed to a fraction; liberrimam potestatem, 'the absolute and unrestrained use of this integral power.'

Quae constat contradictione manif. Its constituting elements are power and no power; which cannot subsist together: what becomes of the compound then?

Originally "king of the flies." Luther alludes to Beelzebub in Mat 12.24, which means 'lord of the flies;' also called " prince of the demons" there. This is a double-insult to Diatribe: she is both weak and evil.

Veram et justam aciem.

Luther seems to have confounded this passage in Mat. 23 with Luke 19.41-44. "And when he had come near, he beheld the city, and wept over it." etc. It is remarkable that the words which are so closely parallel in Luke 13 were not spoken at the same time with those recorded in Mat. 23. The latter were spoken in the Temple at the close of the Lord's public ministry: the former while he was yet in Galilee.

Suo illam jaculo. Nothing less than a complete Freewill can repel the objection here brought by Diatribe: therefore, either there is a complete Freewill, which she denies, or all such objections have no weight at all.

Luther expresses this more briefly, but obscurely: 'de secretâ, iliâ voluntate majestatis non esse disputandum.'

Scrutandis. attingere. Scrut. comes nearest to our rummage: (videtur esse a scrutis, quasi sit ita in loco aliquo praetentare, et versare omnia, ut etiam scruta misceantur." Hence it is applied to a dog hunting by the scent. It expresses the search for a thing, rather than the improper handling of the thing found. So Luther applies it here; as is plain from 'attingere:' the attaining to, or reaching the thing which was gone after.

See 1Cor 1.23; 2.2; Col 2.3. In this latter text, Luther gives the sense strictly according to the original, which our version does not: en w eisi... apokrofoi.

See above, Sect. 23. note a (page 171).

Luther gives two answers to this cavil from Matthew 13 — 1. It is equally inconsistent with Diatribe's statement. And 2. It is the incarnate God, not the God of Majesty, who speaks here. I must strongly object to this latter solution. It implies a difference, indeed a contrariety, between the mind of God and the mind of Christ; and thus it destroys the very end for which Christ came: the manifestation of God as His express image. It does this by not only negating the fulfilment of that design, but absolutely intimating that he has given us false views of God by showing a mind which is the reverse of His, as though Christ willed salvation where God wills destruction. Yet he tells us, "I did not come to do my own will, but the will of Him that sent me." Joh 6.38 "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent me, and to finish his work." Joh 4.34 "I do nothing of my self, but as my Father has taught me, I speak these things." Joh 8.28 "I have manifested your name to the men that you gave me out of the world." Joh 17.6 And truly, though we will know far more of God hereafter, than we can know here — so that "Where there is knowledge, it will vanish away" — our knowledge of God will be derived to us through Christ ("the lamb which is in the midst of the throne shall feed them, and shall lead them to living fountains of waters"), and we will never know anything of God contrary to that which Jesus has exhibited of Him.

The true answer to this cavil in substance, however, has already been given. (See Sect. 28. notes t v x .) Standing in peculiar relations to Israel as his typical nation and his visible church, God had been calling that people to repentance from the beginning. Their history, their institutions, their lively oracles, their ordinary and extraordinary ministers, had caused them to be peculiarly, and above the rest of mankind, without excuse, even before Christ came. These were so many 'I woulds, and you would nots'— not Christ saying and willing one thing, and the Father another; but Christ calling to them by the Father's commandment, and they refusing. But now he had come personally and visibly among them, and could say,

"If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sinned, but now they have no cloak for their sin. He that hates me, hates my Father also. If I had not done among them the works which no other man did, they would not have sinned; but now have they both seen and hated both me and my Father." (Joh 15.22-24.) And what is all this, but God in certain assumed relations uttering his voice to those connected with him by these relations

(in other words, declaring his legislative will), which those to whom it is uttered, should without doubt obey; and if they did obey, they would live according to his promise. But 'ought to obey' is not therefore 'having the power to obey;' and 'not having the power to obey,' is not 'therefore the command is given in vain.' Herein man is manifested; and God is manifested by his dealings with man. If Israel 'would,' then he would have been gathered; if Jerusalem 'would,' she would have remained to this day. But it was only by a grace not belonging to those relations by which God had connected himself with Israel during that period, that Israel could then have been made willing. Israel had all given to him which belonged to those relations. To withhold trial, or to administer super-creation and supercovenant grace, that he might stand, was no part of the dues which God had made himself a debtor to him to perform. And therefore Israel — justly tried, and no more than justly tried

— having manifested what was in him with such aggravations of guilt, incurred a sentence which is declared to have been the requital of all the righteous blood that had been shed upon the earth from Abel to Zechariah. (vv. 35, 36.) The guilt of that generation was indeed extreme. But who would say that it was not the concentrated guilt of the intermediate ages and generations of that people, together with their own, which was so shortly to be visited upon them? Carnal reason will not hear of the children being visited for their fathers' sins; but both Scripture and experience testify of this reality to the spiritual mind. The incarnate

God, then, has no will contrary to the God of Majesty; or more intelligibly, Christ's will and the Father's will are one; Christ's tears (see above, note m) do not imply any repugnance to the divine counsel. Here, the legislative is, as in the former instances, the executor of the personal will. With respect to the tears which he shed over that woe which he was shortly to inflict, and of which he well knew the length and breadth, the depth and height — it may be remarked that the Lord Jesus had a human soul, as part of his complete human person, distinct from his divine person (See Part ii. Sect. 8. note r) — and that such expressions might, without impropriety, be referred to that part of his complex frame. "We do not have a high priest who cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, but was in all points tempted as we are, yet without sin." Heb 4.15 He had all the sinless feelings of a man, and therefore might not incongruously weep at such a woe. But where is the contradiction to Scripture and right reason, in understanding that God himself is moved with compassion at the very grief and pain which He inflicts in just judgment? "Therefore my bowels are troubled for him." Jer 31.20 "Have I any pleasure at all in the death of him that dies?" Eze 18.32

"For he does not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men." Lam 3.33

It is pleasing to notice how nearly Luther approximates the truth — viz., 'That Christ was eternally foreordained as Christ, and by a covenant subsistence, he assumed his person and personal relations as the risen God-man, before the foundation of the world' — in the defence which he makes against the cavil that 'Christ had not yet come.' He declares that everything was done by the Prophets in Christ's name, and that all expressions of mercy from the beginning may be rightly called the will of Christ. This will of Christ, according to Luther's representation of it, is perfectly distinct from that of the Father (his language implies that it is contrary to it), so that there must have been a distinct agency of Christ from the beginning. Truly, this is so — though not exactly as Luther understood and would have it represented. I have often been surprised that, while most of those who know anything of Christ are ready enough to acknowledge that regard was had to his sacrifice from the beginning (for how else could any soul of man, such as Abel, Enoch, Abraham,

David, etc., have been pardoned and accepted), so few distinctly recognise his personal subsistence and agency, as Christ, from the same period. Although it is in this regard that he is called "the Word," "the Word of life," "the life," "that eternal life," etc. And although he is a distinct personal agent, to use the blessed materials of his future coming and dying in the flesh — as a Priest-king — was not less necessary to the salvation and glorification of every individual of the saved who lived and died before those events had been realized, than was the article of his death. In what Luther says about abstaining from what he calls 'the secret will of majesty,' he speaks indistinctly, injuriously, and contradictorily: indistinctly, because there is a use as well as an abuse of such inquiries, which he ought to have distinguished; injuriously, because his observations would go the length of deterring men from even recognizing such a will, and so they would mar the joy and fear and gratitude and love of the Lord's people; contradictorily, because he afterwards recognises and makes assertions about it. Christ truly impinges on some of God's reprobates! — Still, a hint or two may be borrowed with advantage from Luther's statement. God, in addressing himself to the world as He does by the Gospel to be preached everywhere, clearly sets himself forth to as many as have a heart that is in any degree softened and turned towards him. This is done in the form and character of the Father of mercies who is not willing that any should perish. Such should not be deterred and frightened by the knowledge that He has his reprobates. The melting heart is not the heart of a reprobate. But is he to shut his eyes to the fact that God has his reprobates? No; that fact combined with the consciousness of his own personal impotency, turns to him for a testimony. Nor without that testimony can he regard God as he should now, or in any future stage of his experience; for without it, the God whom he serves is not the true God.

Epicycles. A little circle whose centre is in the circumference of a greater; or a small orb which, being fixed in the deferent of a planet, carries it round its own axis, while it is itself carried round the axis of the planet. An invention of some bungling philosophers to account for the anomalies of planetary motion.

This text does not seem to bear on the point in hand; viz. that we should not scrutinize the personal will of God; or as he terms it, 'the will of majesty,' or sovereignty. Luther understands 'their seeking God daily, and desiring to know his ways, and asking of him the ordinances of justice; as if they not only complained of God's appointments towards them being unjust, but were prying curiously into their secret springs. But does God, speaking by his Prophet, really mean any more than that they were hypocrites and formalists, yet expected the acceptance of true and devout worshippers? Accordingly, they were answered by showing them that their fasts were not such as he had chosen, and that the worship which he accepts is the reverse of theirs. 'Ask of me the ordinances of justice,' are the only words which bear at all upon the subject; and these do not necessarily imply, or with any probability imply here, a spirit of curiousness.

Rationem scrutari. Rat. More literally, the method of that will. 'Ratio' expresses most nearly the 'all about it.' Scrut. (see last Section, note p) does not necessarily denote a bad state of mind; though it is clearly so here: a mind which doubts the fact that God has such a will, questions his right to have it, and cavils at its decisions. To inquire what the word of God has recorded concerning this will with deep reverence — and to meekly, rejoicingly, submit to that record — would not be making war as the giants of old did against Jupiter.

See here a confirmation of my remark in Sect. 28. note t, that Luther is protesting against the impugners and deniers of that will which is distinct from God's legislative will, not against its sober investigators and maintainers! His answer to the cavil from Matthew 23 and like passages is, 'Yes, but there is another will behind this, which is contrary to this, and which we must be content to leave with asserting it. God as revealed, or as he afterwards describes him, Christ the incarnate God, wills only life; but there is another will of God, a will not expressed by this incarnate God, which wills death; and therefore these things which appear to prove Freewill (by inference) may still be said, and yet man be in bondage.

This is because, while He deplores, he does also not deplore. This latter will is not to be searched into or acted upon; it is only to be asserted and believed. Deny it if you dare; you will only be running your head against the wall, making war against God. For objections to s this statement, and for a more consistent answer to the cavil, etc. see note in the last

Section. — Luther says worse than he means, but he means ignorantly. It had not been given to him to know the mystery of God and the Father, and of Christ. He did not understand how God is not hiding himself behind Christ, but making himself seen in Christ; so that it may be truly said, "He that has seen me has seen the Father: if you had known me, you would have known my Father also; and from now on you know him, and have seen him."

Frigent. See above, Sect. 29. note y.

It is you who take away all warmth and life from such passages as these, by making the will a contradiction; it can do nothing, it can do all things: these assertions destroy each other, and leave nothing as the result, unless they mean opposite things, such as 'yes,' and 'no,' at the same instant.

Tropo. Any figurative mode of speech, as opposed to one that is plain, simple, and straightforward, whatever the particular nature of the obliquity is — whether grammatical, as here, or rhetorical.

Luther gives three answers to these texts. 1. Erasmus is inconsistent with himself. 2. They teach human impotency. 3. They insinuate the possibility of divine help, and glance at his predestinative favour. — In some instances, doubtless, as in Matthew 19 and its parallels

(Mark 10, Luke 18), a peculiar design may also be traced — the teaching of the natural man's impotency, and the hint at what God, according to his eternal purpose, will do in his people

— but all these, multifarious as they are, may be resolved into, 'the Lawgiver speaks,' whose voice implies neither power in man, nor promise in God. The end is not always conviction of sin in mercy; sometimes it is "whom he will, he hardens;" but always, it is man made to show what he is, to the more perfect manifestation of God by him. See Sect. 28. notes t v x.

Natura, necessitas. By 'nature,' in this connection, I suppose he means an inherent, settled, constitution of things,' which produces actions involuntarily: by 'necessity,' he means 'a compulsory influence' exercised on such a constitution, from without.

The inconsistency is Erasmus': his Freewill is necessity; but according to him, it is the subject of reward.

Such is Luther's representation of the New Testament as contrasted with the Old, and of the Gospel. The New is 'promises and exhortations;' the Old is 'law and threatenings.' The Gospel is 'the Spirit, and grace unto salvation, offered to all men through Christ, who died for all.' Note that he distinguishes between the Spirit and grace, though not very correctly; it is the Spirit as given to the justified, of which he speaks: but this is part of the grace of God; that is, "of the things which are freely given to us of God."

For some objections to this statement, as it respects offers of grace, see above, Sect. 23. note a; as it respects the opposition between the Law and the Gospel, see above, Sect. 24. note l.

The Gospel is certainly to be preached to all — to the reprobate as well as to the elect; but with what propriety this can be called an offer of grace to all, or to any, may be fairly questioned: much more, with what consistency such language can be used by one who so stoutly maintained, as Luther did, both the impotency of the natural man, and the Godmade difference between the elect and the reprobate. With such views as Luther had of the atonement, as though Christ had shed his blood for those from whom it was the Father's good pleasure to hide the mysteries of his kingdom; and with such a lack of insight into the first principle of divine counsel, operation, and revelation — even God's design of manifesting himself; in short, with such a lack of insight into God, it was impossible that he would not speak inconsistently. Indeed it would be little if inconsistency were all. Such language is illusive, perplexing, and subversive to man; and while it aims to beautify God, it defames him! He is correct, however, to some considerable extent: he nobly asserts, that salva tion is altogether gratuitous, the produce of the Father's mercy, conferred upon the hell-deserving through the alone merit of Christ's death. He nobly asserts, that the preceptive parts of the New Testament are for the called and justified only. But why is the Old Testament to be thus set in array against the New? Where is the law and threatenings in the book of Genesis? What more truly Evangelical words are to be found in the New

Testament, than in Isaiah and the other Prophets; in the Psalms, and in Luther's favourite book of Deuteronomy? The Old Testament, as our 7th Article wisely speaks, is not contrary to the New: for both in the Old and New Testament, everlasting life is offered to mankind by Christ, who is the only mediator between God and man, being both God and man. The truth is, even the Law itself, as I have already remarked, is Gospel in enigma; and the scribe that is instructed in the New Testament finds the Old its best commentator and confirmer — what has instructed the same family in its tenderer years, and now makes the "young men" perfect. — I should speak rather differently of the Apostles. They were to be what he describes, with the exception of one of them; but they were not this yet. If they could be truly said to know Christ at all, till the day of Pentecost had fully come, they knew him "after the flesh." (2Cor 5.16) But it is not to the Twelve exclusively that the Lord addresses these words (Mat 5.12), nor of them exclusively that he speaks. His precepts were for the regulation of their conduct, and of the conduct of all his converted people (while walking through the wilderness of this world, in his kingdom), as they would hereafter be called, one by one, into vital union with him. His elect have the sacrament of that union in their baptism. But they have the reality of it when, either before or after receiving that sacrament, the Spirit has been given to convert and to dwell in them. — Luther's argument, however, is not shaken by this distinction. The Lord speaks as to real members of his kingdom; to persons who are therefore above and beyond that state of Freewill which is the matter in dispute. — Already Luther has shown Erasmus to be inconsistent with himself in arguing from this text (see Sect. 35). His second answer is: 'this text (to which all other New

Testament precepts might be added) does not apply.'

Quo modo. How, in point of action; what he must do that he may be entitled.

Consider that Constantinople fell in 1453. And by 1525, the Ottoman Empire controlled much of the western world. Their first major defeat would not be until Lepanto, in 1571.

Wishing for the fruits of war, won't win the war. That's a logical fallacy of monumental proportions, as Luther strongly impresses by this comparison.

For this distinction, see above, Part i. Sect. 11; Sect. 25.

Detestentur, execrentur . For the proper meaning of detestor, see above, Part 5. Sect. 7. note l . It is opposed to 'obtestor,' such as calling God to witness unto evil and not unto good.

'Malum alicui imprecari, Deos testes ciendo;' 'execrari.' Here, however, I understand it literally, according to its derived meaning; and so, 'exsecror,' which properly denotes removing out of sacred relations, or subjecting to a curse. The allusion is to 2Pet 2.10-15.

"But these. . . . speak evil of the things they do not understand, and will utterly perish in their own corruption; and will receive the reward of unrighteousness." Blawfhmentev. The original text makes the reference plainer than our version.

"All seek their own, not the things which are Jesus Christ's." (Phi 2.21) Not content with seeking their own glory, etc. in their dealings with man, they seek it even from the hands of God: He is to do them good, not himself.

Erasmus objects, that 'so much mention of good works and reward, in Scripture, is inconsistent with mere necessity, which can have no merit.'

Luther answers, though not exactly in this order: 1. Merit and reward are as inconsistent with your Freewill (which can will nothing good) as with mine. 2. Reward is a matter of promise; which implies nothing about power, the sole thing in question. 3. Merit and reward are not inconsistent with a necessity of immutability, though they are inconsistent with a necessity of compulsion. (See above, note h .) Merit is not necessarily merit of worth; reward may be a consequence of actions, in which there is no merit of worth. 4. The kingdoms of heaven and hell earn their children severally; their children do not earn them.

The two first of these answers are valid; and if it were merely so many rounds of the boxer, or so many grapplements of the wrestler, which we are watching the result of, we must give the palm to Luther: he has supplanted, he has knocked down his antagonist. But we want to hear something against merit and reward: and here, Luther is evasive and subtle in his reasoning, though correct in his conclusion. Necessity of immutability does not necessarily imply absence of merit, because that which the will cannot do for itself, it may be changed by another to do. Luther has supplied the basis of a solid and satisfactory answer in his fourth reply, while he has neither opened it, nor appears to be sensible of its force and marrow. 'The kingdoms earn their children severally, their children do no earn them.'

Upon Luther's principles, it is impossible to give a solid answer to the objection of merit.

For, if Christ has died alike for all — if he has done and suffered the same both for the elect and for the reprobate, so that there is no difference between them as far as it respects his merit (which is the essence of the doctrine of Universal Redemption) — then either there must be merit in the individuals of the elect, or there is repect of persons with God. He makes a different award to some, than what he awards to others — meritorious or unmeritorious alike — through partiality. Nor will it suffice to say (as Luther does), that this reward is mere matter of consequence, like the man swimming out of water, etc. God sees somewhere, that which demands His justice should differentiate: and since this difference is not in Christ, it must be in the individuals themselves. The true answer is that God has assumed distinct, super-creation relations to his elect, in Christ, which renders it imperative upon him to give them grace and glory, each in its season. This is the true meaning of the kingdom of heaven earning her sons: there are relations of and belonging to that kingdom, which communicate the power that is necessary to inheriting that kingdom, consistent with all that God is, and to the manifestation of him as that God which he is. So again, with respect to the kingdom of hell, that kingdom has relations which have procured its inhabitants and inheritors. The devil has had a power given to him, by which he has drawn legions into his service, and is bringing those legions to be his companion in torments.

These are legions, not of devils only, but of reprobate and accursed men. From this number, equally ruined by the devil and self-destroyed with the rest, are rescued the elect people of God, through their super-creation relations to God in Christ — or as it has just now been expressed, through the relations of the kingdom of God. God, of his distinguishing favour, has granted them membership in this kingdom. Merit and reward are made nearly as much a stumbling-block to the maintainers of free grace, as the sin and impotency of the natural man are to the merit-mongers, with this difference: that the stumbling-blocks which may be thrown on the path of truth are capable of being overcome and removed; while falsehood may pass by, and cover over, but she cannot expose and expel her stumbling-blocks. Too often, however, the sincere and strenuous advocates of truth defend her cause weakly, and even dangerously. Who will be satisfied, for instance, with that answer to an objection brought against the truth, which assumes that there is no such thing as "recompense of reward" in the Bible; no soldier's crown; no servant's wages; no agonistic palm; no 'for' to the call of the blessed of my Father; or that all these things and sayings are resolvable into what Christ personally has done; and might, if he saw fit to do so, according to that will of his and of the Father's which is represented as no other than perfectly arbitrary, be bestowed upon his enemies and blasphemers, just as righteously as upon his servantfriends? (See John. 15.15).

The true objection to merit and reward is, that, as generally understood and represented, they suppose something of good in the natural man; in that self-ruined, self-damned, and self-made-impotent thing which has merited Hell before he was born into the world, and can merit nothing but Hell.

But, what now if it pleases God to give to this self-ruined, self-made-impotent thing new powers, under a new relation, and by a new title? Is there anything to prevent God from accepting an equivalent, if such can be found, for that punishment which is the just reward of this his moral creature's sin — and of his own free, sovereign, and distinguishing favour

(as it respects the subject of his infinite, everlasting, and inestimable bounty), placing him in new relations, and endowing him with new capacities as the fruit of those relations? And why may this new-made creature, so related, so capacitated, and so connected, not act in a manner worthy of those relations, and so entitle himself to those results which the God of all grace has seen fit to attach to the maintenance and fulfilment of those relations?

This is just the state and case of the eternally foreknown, elect, predestined, given and received people of God, in Christ Jesus, their grace and glory Head. Contemplated as now already self-destroyed and fallen in Adam, under express sentence of death — with all that awful hereafter which was implied though not expressed in that sentence — the Lord Jesus, by making himself sin for them, and dying with them, renders it consistent in God to raise them up from the dead, and to bring them out into a new state of being, with new relations, capacities, enjoyments and privileges, in him. In a figure, they are said to have risen with Christ; in reality, the indubitability of their future rising was publicly sealed and manifested to the whole world by his rising. I say publicly, because it had been secretly sealed in the eternal covenant transactions of the Three in Jehovah, before the worlds. "This is that grace which was given to us in Christ Jesus before the world began." (2Tim 1.9) Regeneration, in its most correct view, is a partial fulfilment of the personal resurrection of the Lord's elect: it is the resurrection of the soul or spirit. "The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and those who hear shall live." (John 5.25) By it, they are brought into a resurrection state; they are shown to be of those who shall hereafter rise with a body like His, and are now called to serve him in an intermediate state, as "God's workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God has before ordained that we should walk in them." (Eph 2.10)

When we speak of good works, people are apt to run immediately into the idea of law works, as if the Ten Commandments were to be brought back again: not considering that 'good' is a relative term; and that good works must therefore be those which are consistent with the relations under which we stand when performing them. If it were possible for renewed man, in the days of his flesh, to keep the whole law, he would not thereby do good works. The law is for creation man; the Gospel is for super-creation man. It is the obedience of a redeemed sinner, to which he is called in Christ Jesus. It is an obedience analogous to that fuller and more distinct manifestation of God, which he has made of himself in his new, after-creation kingdom. To this obedience, as many as have been created, or built, in Christ Jesus from the very first — as Abel, etc., have been called and brought, according to their measure of faith.

Thus they are, essentially, grace receivers of grace powers, called and enabled to act in a manner worthy of a grace reward. Here is a reward then, not of mere consequence, but of merit: of merit, which has worth or dignity in it, yet all the while is grace — free, distinguishing, sovereign grace. Thus grace reigns; but it is through righteousness: which means, if the connection of those words are duly observed, not merely through Christ's being personally righteous; but through and by way of righteousness as it respects the persons of his people (compare Rom 5.20-21 with the whole of Rom 6 which follows, especially ver. 14-23).

Many, doubtless, will cavil at this statement; but it is for lack of distinguishing things which essentially differ; it is for lack of understanding the true nature, origin, design, consti tuent subjects, and provisions of the kingdom of God; it is for lack of understanding that the members of that kingdom are persons already saved ("Who has saved us, and called us with a holy calling;" "for by grace you are saved;" "unto us who are saved, it is the power of God"); not men striving for life to get life, but already-living men; not natural men, but men joined to the Lord, and who are one spirit with him, who constitute the reward-earning community. Concerning them, it is God's glory that, being brought out as they are in the face and heart of the world — a world made up of hypocrites, or false professors of his name on the one hand; and of declared enemies and persecutors on the other — they "should walk worthy of the vocation with which they are called;" they should walk worthy of God, who has called them to his kingdom and glory;" they "should be counted worthy of his kingdom," and should manifest him to be the righteous God in recompensing rest to them (their consummation and bliss), when he recompenses tribulation to those who have troubled them."

If this statement is duly apprehended, it will give their legitimate force and meaning to countless passages of Scripture which some bring forward to contradict the truth of God, and others pare down and mutilate to maintain it. — The essence of the distinction, too, that the grace which earns reward is truly super-creation grace, furnishes a sure test by which to try and convict hypocrites. How common is the language, 'O, I know I have nothing that I have not received.' Yes, but how have you received it? Grace is that principle in the divine mind which makes distinctions: grace is not only favour, but free favour; not only free favour, but separating favour. In the case we are considering, separating favour is shown in a way of mercy; that is, it is shown to those who have deserved a contrary sort of treatment.

Have you received, then, by a new and super-creation title which differentiates between Adam's self-destroyed and wholly-destroyed sons alike? Or is it that you have cultivated your natural powers — or if it rather pleases you, that you have improved that gospel-grace which is bestowed on all, and put all into a capacity of working out their own salvation? The answer will unmask the man: grace knows itself, and knows its origin.

In asserting that the kingdom of hell has earned, and is earning, its subjects through a power which God has given to the devil, I would be understood to intimate that the devil could neither be, nor continue to be, without the will of God; and that hell is filled through his agency: by which, in perfect consistency with all creation relations and obligations, ruin was originally brought upon man; and by which he secures and retains for himself that spoil which it is the Father's good pleasure that he should carry off to his glory.

Sequelam mercedis, meriti dignitatem. The expression seems inverted; 'worthiness of merit' is taken for 'merit which has worth in it.' The meaning clearly is this: 'reward follows as a consequence, but there is nothing of meritorious worthiness in the subject.' Luther, in what follows, overstates the matter of disinterestedness; and afterwards he virtually contradicts himself. We are not called to be insensible to the end, but we are urged to keep it in view; and why, except as a source of encouragement? This he presently affirms. What, indeed, is that phrase 'following because,' if not an admission of the same thing? The cure for servility is, "to the praise of the glory of his grace" — 'saved already' — the triumph sure'

— 'Christ magnified by my body' — God does all our works in us' — 'we will do what he enables' — 'we will suffer what he appoints to us' — 'happy by the way' — 'how much more happy when in my Father's house!' — There is nothing mercenary here; but the end is neither hidden, nor undesired. See above, note l.

Excitantur, consolantur, eriguntur. Exc. is a more general term, applicable to any who want excitement; but erig. applies especially to those who have fallen or been cast down, and so want raising up. How beautifully this process is described in Ezek. 34!

Luther quotes these words as if they were parts of the same sentence: but the one is part of 1Cor 15.58; the other of 1Cor 16.13.

Here we are reminded again of the defect of Luther's views. It is not arbitrary will, but the counselled will of God accomplishing the best end by just and necessary means, which gives occasion to this arrangement. The declaration of his truth by the word, to the self-madeimpotent is necesary to the manifestation of himself, through his dealings with them. The "Even so, Father," would be enough; but he has been so kind as to show us more; and there are places and seasons where this 'more' should be brought into sight. See Sect. 28. notes t v x .

The original text in Deuteronomy 8.3 says, א֥עַל־צָוָֹל־מכּ , 'Every that proceeds," meaning no doubt, as the Lord quotes it, 'every word of command which he gives.'

Thus it is God's word which imparts to the natural bread its power of nouishing; but still he is pleased to use that bread: so the spiritual bread of the word only nourishes when he gives the word for it to do so; but still he uses that spiritual bread, when he wills to nourish.

Erasmus argues that it is necessary to their being called ours, that they be done by our own natural powers. Then they are wholly done by our natural powers, for he calls them ours without addition or subtraction. —Then there is no Spirit and race in our good works. —

Another of the 'nimis probats' [also approved].

Luditur. 'Ludo se, delectationis causa, exercere.' I do not know any classical authority for this passive form of the verb 'ludo.' — Verbum, etc. luditur.

Astrueret. 'Juxtà struo,' 'propè extruo:' not super-structure,' but 'additional or contiguous structure.' — Luther here objects to flying off from the proof alleged, in pursuit of something more remote.

Inanis. We say, 'without form;' but Luther has it 'without substance;' having nothing in it, or upon it.

Luther answers, 1. it is inference. 2. The text is against you. 3. Such use of Scripture is criminal.

Malleus. More properly, 'a mallet;' 'fabrile instrumenum ad tundendum.' – a club.

Vi insitâ. Ins. properly, 'what is inserted as a graft;' but transferred to signify 'what is natural, innate, inherent.' 'Naivus, innatus, ingenitus.'

Assumsit. Scil. ad probandum. What he elsewhere expresses by 'probandum suscepit.'

We have here Luther's usual, exceptionable expression about 'offers.' (See Sect. 23. note a); and his mention of the person of Christ suggests over again the importance of the distinction of which I remarked in Part ii. Sect. 8. note r . If we do not keep the divine and the human person of Christ distinct, but regard him simply as a person who has put another nature, the human nature, upon his former and eternal, divine nature; his whole history and the things said of him are a Babel: not so if we are brought to apprehend him as the coequal of the Father and of the Holy Ghost acting in and by a human person which he has taken into union with himself. — The text evidently proves nothing for Freewill: it only says

"as many as received him;" without saying by what power; Avhethe natural or supernatural.

I do not agree with Luther, in it being the making of the old man into the new man: it is thi state of privilege and glory, into which the son of Adam and child of the devil has been brought, by that preceding process of transmutation.

See note f , Sect. 36.

Ineptissimè longè absurdissimè. Inept. The weaker term; denoting properly, 'unaptness,'

'impertinence,' 'silliness;' absurd. 'the extreme of incongruity and extravagance.' 'Ineptus est tantum non aptus; absurdus, repugnans, abhorrens: itaque absurdus majUs quiddam. significat; velut qui surdis auribus audiri dignus est.

Referring, no doubt, to Rom 3.5-8.

Annoy: to harm or molest, like a dog tearing at the flesh.

Invadere et exigere. Inv. expresses the assault upon the person: 'in aliquem locum vado;' ingredior (et ferè cum aliquâ vi, aut impetu), aggredior, irrumpo, irruo. Exig. 'extrà ago;' educo. Saepè est reposcere, flagitare, in re pecuniariâ: itemque, exigendo obtinere. — The figure is that of a bailiff seizing a man's person and demanding payment of a debt.

It is not necessary to suppose this ulterior design, neither will it extend to all the cases which the Apostle had in view; though such effect is frequently produced by the instrumentality of these Scriptures. Such appeals are among the strong manifesters of what is in man; in him as what he has made himself, not as what God made him; in him, therefore, without excuse.

By such manifesters, God, as his pleasure is, both hardens and converts. In chap. ii. it is an exposure of the heart of the Jew as boasting himself against the heathen; in chap iii. it is the infidel disporting himself against the truth: whose damnation is shown to be just by the language which he uses; the language of a heart, which has made itself vile.

See Sect. 36. note f Gospel precepts, whether from the Lord's mouth, or Paul's pen, are words to the Lord's called only; showing how the saved should walk: that we, having been delivered out of the hands of our enemies, might serve him without fear, in holiness and righteousness before him, all the days of our life. (Luk 1.74, 75.)

Concipit. 'Translatè ponitur pro efformare, comprehendere, intelligere;' 'forms an idea.'

I cannot think Luther very happy in this illustration: the hatchet and the saw have no choice in the hand of the carpenter; but we are led freely, delightingly.

Quae sanè agnosco. Fateor enim. Qu. sa. ag. expresses the perfect self-possession and consciousness with which he acknowledges the words as his. Sanè. 'Sana mente aut sensu, ubi nihil fuci aut fraudis est.' But it is not honesty and simplicity, so much as calmness, sobriety, and stedfastness of judgment, that he claims for himself, in the recognition and restatement of what he had advanced. Fateor enim implies an avowal made under circumstances which might tempt to the suppression of it. His adversaries were the persons to make confession of the evil at Constance, not he: on his part, it was the proclamation of an accordant sentiment, not an antagonistic one; but still, it was testimony borne in adversity — borne, as with a halter round his neck.

"Quantula sint hominum corpuscula." Juv. x. 171, 2 Death testifies; but it is, as an unwilling and compelled witness: she would rather boast of her prey, than proclaim its littleness.

This splendid paradox of Wickliff's has been brought into discussion already (see Part ii, Sect. 22.), and is the very essence of divine truth, though so offensive to the enemies of truth, and of many who account themselves its advocates. Wickliff, with all his blemishes, was a truly great man; enlightened to see and teach much of the mystery of God; more, I am ready to say, than many who came after him and carried off his palm. Most of these acknowledged his worth indeed: for more than a century, those who had light did not disdain to acknowledge that they walked in his light; such as the Lollards, Huss, Jerome, and others. Erasmus gives him to Luther; and Luther is not ashamed to receive and confess him. Certainly, my friend the Dean has not done him justice; yet he tried, I admit, and meant to do justice to him. But this necessity, was what the Dean did not thoroughly relish, though he tolerated it: and so he apologized where Wickliff himself would have gloried; and when he professes to give a brief sketch of his doctrines as extracted from his writings and other authentic documents, while he admits that his distinguishing tenet was, undoubtedly, the election of grace, he does not tell us what he held about it, nor even mention this paradox, which seems to have been considered as the centre and heart's core of his creed.

The Dean appears to have attached too much importance to Melancthon's judgment, who was so warped by the Sacramentarian Controversy, in which Wickliff's name was drawn out against the Lutherans, that he went to a great extreme in denying Wickliff's light; declaring that he had found in him, also, many other errors (beside this on the sacrament), and that he neither understood nor believed the righteousness of faith. I admit that he had much darkness mingled with his light; confusion with his clearness; pusillanimity with his boldness; sophistry with his plainness; rashness with his honest zeal for reform. But I am rather inclined to measure a man by what he has of good, than by what he has also of evil.

And when I see Wickliff acknowledged as the first open champion and declarer against the abominations of Antichrist; when I read such profound and luminous testimonies to the "hidden wisdom " in his writings; when I hear martyrs calling him their apostle, and a Cobham 'solemnly professing before God and man that he never abstained from sin till he knew Wickliff — but that after he became acquainted with that virtuous man and his despised doctrines, it had been otherwise with him;' when I recollect, that he was the first who gave the Bible to our nation in English, and vindicated the right of the common people to read it; when I find the more determined of the reformers of the sixteenth century owning him as their forerunner, and their revilers casting him in their teeth — then I am ashamed to ask what doctrine he held about tithes; to doubt his sincerity, because his circumstances drew him into an undesirable degree of mixture with carnal statesmen; to weigh the words which he dropped, in the hour of the power of darkness, in a pair of scales; and to rejoice in finding evidence, as the result of much pious search, that this celebrated champion did belong to the church of Christ. Huss in the flames, and the Swift receiving his unintombed ashes, my witnesses shall be that he spoke by the Holy Ghost.

We have heard of the Council of Constance already (see Part ii. Sect. 8. note v); it was numerous, turbulent, and long: it put down three Popes, and erected one; raved about reform, and confirmed sword-preaching — the outrages of the Teutonic knights in Poland and Prussia; where they obtained a professed subjection to the Gospel by fire and sword! — condemned a dead saint, and burnt two living ones; denied necessity, made a Sigismund blush, and did one good thing amidst all these bad ones, by setting Councils above Popes.

Succenturiatus. 'Succenturiati dicuntur, qui explendae centuriae gratiâ subjiciunt se ad supplementum ordinum.' Luther would consider himself as 'the leader of an army of reserve;' though such an army would be unnecessary, since the two invalidated texts would keep their ground. — Pugnae fortuna. Luther says here, 'more Ethnicorum' who, it is well known, ascribed everything to Fortune, erecting temples and altars to her, and accounting

'Fortunatus' ('favoured by fortune') the most illustrious title they could ascribe to their generals. But Luther well knew the God of battles; nor did he mean to ascribe their issue to any other than Him; "even the Lord strong and mighty, the Lord mighty in battle!"

Elusit. It was evading the natural and legitimate interpretation of those words, when she practised with them so as to pass them off as assertives.

Adjectas. affictas. Adj. 'addere,' 'adjungcre:' affict. 'saepius est fingendo addere.'

Utrobique. In both parts of the discussion — the former, where Freewill is maintained; the latter, where its opponents are repelled. Incomprehensibilis. 'Uncatchable;' if there were such a word!

Superciliousness: the trait of displaying arrogance by patronizing those considered inferior.

Ubi urgemur, elabi. Elab. The primary idea is that of the snake slipping out of the hand, or water gliding secretly from its source; this is tranferred to a 'silent escape from a pursuing enemy.' Urgr. is the state of one driven along by the goad or spear, when he can advance no further. (See Part i. Sect. 9. note d .) In this state, says Erasmus, they cry out "trope,"

"trope;" as a sort of new discovery which they have made.

Extende manum. Facile vobis. See above, Part iii. Sect. 6. Ezek. 18.31.

Non de textu ipso. Since it is not interpretation, it must refer to genuineness. It is not like Ecclesiasticus 15, where the authority of the book quoted is doubtful; or other texts which might be named, where the soundness of some particular verse or word might be disputed, though the book were authorized — but whether the acknowledged text is to be understood tropically, and whether certain proposed interpretations are admissible.

Simplicem, purumque. Simp. 'Free from figure.' Pur. 'Free from human additions.'

Circumstantia verborum evidens.

Absurditas rei manifestae.

Quam grammaticae... habet. Luther had no doubt where the use of speech was derived to man (meropev anqrwpoi); however some heathen and demi-heathen philosophers may have made it matter of speculation: even from God who prompted its exercise when he brought the animals to Adam to see what he would call them (Gen 2.19,20); and who afterwards came down to confound that one language which he had given. (Gen 11.5-9.)

In Roman mythology, Vertumnus is the god of seasons and change.

Quod non queas aliquo tropo cavillari. You have but to insinuate that the texts brought to prove it are figurative, and do not mean what they seem.

Origen of Alexandria, the great father of mystical and allegorical interpretation, suffered martyrdom in the 69th year of his age, A. D. 254. There was much, no doubt, to condemn in him, but something also to commend. While strangely defective in his perceptions of divine truth, he was learned, upright, disinterested, and laborious: a man of conscience and of magnanimity. Philosophy and literature were his bane. He did much mischief to the church by his style of interpreting Scripture, not only in rendering human fancies for a season fashionable, to the exclusion of plain truth, but, as a remote consequence, by bringing even the sober use of types and figures — that pregnant source of lively and particularizing instruction — into the contempt with which it has now for some ages been loaded. Two sentences of his are worthy to be preserved. On the words, "We conclude that a man is justified by faith" (Rom 3.28) he says, The justification by faith alone is sufficient; so that, if any person only believes, he may be justified, though no good work has been fulfilled by him. On the case of the penitent thief, he writes, He was justified by faith, without the works of the law, because, concerning these, the Lord did not inquire what he had done before; nor did he stay to ask what work he was purposing to perform after he believed; but the man being justified by his confession only, Jesus who was going to Paradise, took him as a companion and carried him there. — His Hexapla furnished the first specimen of a Polyglot.

Porphyry, a Platonic philosopher who lived in the same century with Origen, made great use of his fanciful interpretations, in reviling Christianity. From the serious pains taken by the ancient Christians to confute him, it may be presumed that his works (which are now chiefly lost) were subtle and ingenious; but his testimony, like that of most other infidels, has been made to redound to the establishment, instead of the subversion, of the Gospel. (See Chap. xxi. Cent. iii. of Milner's Ecc. Hist, where a remarkable assemblage of testimonies to this conclusion is skilfully adduced: and see, especially, vol. ii. of Fry's Second Advent, where

Gibbon is made the same sort of unintentional witness.) Porphyry censures Origen for 'leaving Gentilism, and embracing the barbarian temerity.' Whereas Origen was, in fact, brought up under Christian parents, and a man of Christian habits from his youth. He compliments Origen on his skill in philosophy, but ridicules his introduction of it into the Scriptures; which, as this enemy justly teaches, abhor such an associate.

Jerome, the renowned monk of Stridon, in Pannonia, had a good deal of the spirit of Origen.

Luther says even Jerome was a man of prodigious learning, lively eloquence, and vigorous mind, but of small discernment in the truth — one taught of man, more than of God. He was born under Constantine, A. D. 331. He was the contemporary of Augustine, and his opponent; he was ever, and all his days, a controversialist — peevish and vain; self-righteous and superstitious; but sincere and devout. To him, the Romish church owes her Vulgate. In his very voluminous expositions, he speaks at random. He is allegorical beyond all bounds, and almost always without accuracy and precision; he lowers the doctrine of illumination in 1Cor 2 to things that are moral and practical; he hints at something like a first and second justification before God; he asserts predestination and then retracts it, as it were; he owns a good will as from God in one place, in another supposes a power to choose to be the whole of divine grace; he never opposes fundamental truths deliberately, but though he owns them everywhere, he always does so defectively, and often inconsistently. It must be confessed, the reputation of this Father's knowledge and abilities has been much overrated. There is a splendour in a profusion of ill-digested learning, coloured by a lively imagination which is often mistaken for sublimity of genius. This was Jerome's case; but this was not the greatest part of the evil. His learned that ignorance availed more than any other cause, to give a celebrity to superstition in the Christian world, and to darken the light of the Gospel. Yet, while he was unruffled by contradiction, and engaged in meditations unconnected with superstition, he could speak with Christian affection concerning the characters and offices of the Son of God. (See Miln. Eccl. Hist, vol ii. p. 481.

Deum nuncupativam. A sort of titular God; one called, but not really so. See Part ii. Sect. 8.

Luther, as we all know, is not very sound here. His consubstantiation of the sacramental elements avoids a trope; but the trope here falls in with his admitted exception, 'Scripture herself compels us to receive it.' The same portion of matter cannot be extended in two places at the same moment. The bread, therefore, which the Lord held in his hand while instituting the ordinance, could not at the same instant be bread and hand; or bread and body. The same is true of the cup: it must have been a distinct substance from the hand which held it; and therefore it could not be really the Lord's blood; which could indeed only be drunk as poured out, and at the instant when He spoke, was still in his veins. Add to this the simple but decisive illustration which was suggested to Zwingle's mind in a dream, and which was so greatly blessed in the use he was afterwards led to make of it. 'You stupid man, why do not you answer him from the twelfth of Exodus, as it is there written, "It is the Lord's passover." — Luther calls the Sacramentists promiscuously the new prophets, and not very ingenuously. For even Carolstadt disclaimed all connection with the Celestial

Prophets, as they were called — while Zwingle and OEcolampadius, in whom were the sinews of the contest, afforded no pretence for such imputation. Miln. Eccles. Hist. vol. iv. chaps, vi. ix. pp. 772-810, 990, etc. 1127, 8.

Distenta et illusa. Dist. 'Distractus, duplici curâ occupatus; cui duo simul res, diversis partibus, curam injiciunt. Rectiùs à 'distineo,' quam 'distendo,' ducitur.

Nulli grammatico ferendas. Gram. 'ad grammaticam periens;' but this term, it seems, was especially applied to those who interpreted classical writers; such as Donatus, Festus,

Polinius, Asconius and others; not to teachers of grammar: inferring from grammatista, which is sometimes used invariously.

Affectatas. So, in the last section, 'affectatis proprio ..ebro tropis;' 'nimio, aut pravo, affactu et studio cupitus, ..esitus.' 'De re majore studio et curâ conquisitâ et elabor..' Our English term 'affected,' as opposed to 'natural,' implies the same thing: what is factitious [i.e. artificial], and the result of that. It is not 'the design with which,' that is marked in these two passages, but 'the labour and search employed.'

Has. . . . probatissimorum sunt doctorum. The sentence is ungrammatical.

Utcunque amoliri dicta. Amol. dier. prop, de iis et magno conatu et molimine dimoventur.

Animulae. We are reminded of the Emperor Adrian's animula vagula blandula. Anim. vel contemptûs, vel blanditiae ..sâ. Here, it implies 'tenderness;' a weakling soul, tenderly felt for, by the Lord and by his messengers.

Industriâ consentiente. Indust. 'Vis ingenii quâ quippium cogitamus, et adipiscimur. Itaque supra naturam et ingenium cogit studium, et artem, et laborem.' He refers to the 'affectas tropis' and 'affectatas interpretationes,' which he reprehended in the last section. There was much of scholastic art in cloistered industry in them; but he must have light from heaven — the Holy Ghost's testimony either in the word, or in the palpable, new-wrought miracle — before he would be satisleithat there is a trope in these words.

Anaxagoras, a philosopher of Clazomenae, the preceptor of Socrates, among many other paradoxes, is said to have insisted that 'snow was black, because it is made of water.'

Quis non... Theologus. If a man's own whimsies, without search or proof, are to be protruded as doctrines and interpretations of Scripture, then we have but to open the book and consult our fancy, and straightway we may dub ourselves divines.

Quos diluit. Dil. properly 'lavando aufero, as the water washes the sides of the canal, or the heavy rain washes away the labours of the husbandman: hence it is transferred to the removal of filth from any substance; and particularly, in a forensic sense, to the purging of a charge. 'Diluere crimen est purgare refellere, criminibus respondendo et accusationes refutando.' 'Si nollem ita diluere crimen, ut dilui.' — Cic. pro Milon.

An unsupported dogmatic assertion.

Isa 63.17. Our authorized version reads it as a question, "O Lord, why have You made us to err," etc.

Perdidit. 'Apolluw, apoballw, destruo, everto, deperdo, Si vocem spectes, est a per et do; si notionem, a perqw, vasto, esse videtur.' There is a miraculous peculiarity in Israel's case as a nation: perishing, he does not perish; destroyed, he is still preserved. I therefore hesitated to render perd. according to its natural and proper meaning; and was disposed to adopt 'give up,' 'abandon,' 'cast off,' or 'scatter.' This would not, it seems, have been incongruous with its essential meaning. But why would Luther have used this term in preference to the others? Has their dispersion not in fact been their destruction as a state, city, and nation?

Induration: any pathological hardening or thickening of tissue. Here, a hardening of the heart.

Benefacit. tolerat. Benef. "heaps his benefits;" tol. "endures with much long-suffering."

If God hardens by conferring benefits, why is he said to have hardened Pharaoh rather than the children of Israel? If God shows mercy by afflicting, why is he said to have had mercy on Israel in afflicting him, and not on Pharaoh?

Luther admits that there is a different effect produced in different characters; the good profit by both good and evil; some use, and others abuse, both kindness and wrath. But the question here is, what character will we assign to God's dispensations of judgment and of mercy as falling generally upon men; upon good and evil intermixed: cum simul de bonis et malis loquimur? The result will be that God's mercy is anger; and his anger is mercy. — The truth is, God does harden by mercies as well as judgments; and he does soften by judgments, as well as by mercies. But both the hardening and the softening are distinct from the dispensations which are made the instrument of producing them. It is a variety in the spirit which meets with them, and upon which they act, which causes variety in the result.

Permovetur — 'Valdè movetur;' what goes through the substance and disturbs it throughout; not merely stirs the surface and margin.

Remittit peccatum. So far as withdrawing present judgment may be taken as a sign of forgiveness: but was his sin blotted out? — any one of the sins which had instrumentally provoked the visitation?

Volendo voluntate illá imperscrutabili. See above, Part iii. Sect. 28. notes t v x .

Luther's drift is, 'There must be a will of God distinct from that which he has revealed for the regulation of man's conduct: what he calls the inscrutable will, or will of the hidden God. My quarrel against him is that he does not show the connection and coincidence between these two wills; and he does not show a reason for this apparently harsh conduct. See, as before.

Tempestate pluviae liquefaciente.

Cujus numine omnia temerè fiunt. Chance is the God.

For Zeus went yesterday to Oceanus, to the blameless Ethiopians for a feast, and all the gods followed with him; but on the twelfth day he will come back again to Olympus. — ILIAD, A.

Aristotle, the disciple and opponent of Plato, the tutor of Alexander, the great master of rhetoric, belles lettres, logic, physics, metaphysics, and heathen ethics, was little better in theology than an Epicurean; one of those who have learned that the Gods spend a life without care. (Hor. 1. Sat. v. 101.) It is said in excuse for the less explicit parts of his system, that he attached himself to the principles of natural philosophy, rather than those of theology. He maintained the existence of a God as the great mover of all things which have been put into motion from eternity, and will continue in motion to eternity. Thus he maintained the eternity of matter as well as of God. He painted this God finely: — 'the necessary being;' 'the first, and the most excellent of beings;' 'immutable, intelligent, indivisible, without extension;' 'He resides above the enclosure of the world;' 'There He finds his happiness in the contemplation of himself.' — How apt is the expression by which Luther describes him as painting God! (pinxit) a rhetorical term applied to that sort of discourse 'which is embellished with tropes and figures, which display much genius, but charm by their sweetness, rather than edify by their intelligence.' \ Aristotle's God, then, is one who keeps order in the heavens, but interferes in a very limited degree with earth.

'All the movements of nature are in some sort subordinated to him; He appears to be the cause and principle of every thing; He appears to take some care of human affairs. But, in all the universe, He can look upon nothing but Himself; the sight of crime and of disorder would defile his eyes. He could not know how to be the author either of the prosperity of the wicked, or of the misery of the good. His superintendence is like that of the master of a family, who has established a certain order of things in his household, and takes care that the end which he has in view be accomplished, but shuts his eyes to their divisions and their vices, and only takes care to obviate the consequences of them. He stamped the impress of his will upon the universe when first he projected it like a bail from his hand; and it is by a general, not minute, superintendence, that he sustains it. The perpetuation of the several species of beings is his grand object: which he secured by his one first impulse.'

(I am indebted to the Abbé Barthelemi's Anacharsis for this concise but eloquent view of Aristotle's Theology, vol. v. chap. Ixiv.)

Has Luther calumniated this philosopher? Yet this heathen teacher was made the great model for instruction to the Christian church, both as to form and substance, for many ages.

During the second period of the reign of the schoolmen, which began early in the thirteenth century, his reputation was at its height: the most renowned doctors wrote elaborate commentaries upon his works. The predominance of his philosophy — 'a philosophy, which knew nothing of original sin and native depravity; which allowed nothing to be criminal except certain external flagitious actions; and which was unacquainted with any righteousness of grace, imputed to a sinner' — was itself a corruption, and the fruitful source of other corruptions which cried aloud for reformation, and which THE REFORMERS of the sixteenth century exposed and suppressed. (See Miln. Eccles. Hist. vol. iv. p. 283.)

Correptione. The word has occurred several times before, and I have rendered it by 'correction,' 'chastening,' 'severity.' It properly denotes hastily snatching up a substance, and is sometimes applied to the seizure of the body by disease. Hence, it is transferred to a figurative cutting short; "At that time the Lord began to cut Israel short" (2Kng 10.23); and so, to 'reprehension, chiding and chastisement' in general.

Sap. vol. praesentiá elig, discern, inspir. omissá.

Simpliciter, as opposed to figuratively. See Sect. 3. note q .

The Manichees, so-called from Manes their founder, arose in the reign of the Emperor 'Like most of the ancient heretics, they abounded in senseless whims, not worthy of any solicitous explanation. This they had in common with the Pagan philosophers, that they supposed the Supreme Being to be material, and to penetrate all nature. Their grand peculiarity was to admit two independent principles, a good and an evil one, in order to solve the arduous question concerning the origin of evil.'

'Like all heretics, they made a great parade of seeking truth with liberal impartiality, and were thus qualified to deceive unwary spirits who, far from suspecting their own imbecility of judgment, and regardless of the word of God and hearty prayer, have no idea of attaining religious knowledge by any other method than by natural reason. Like all other heretics, they could not stand before the Scriptures. They professedly rejected the Old

Testament as belonging to the malignant principle; and when they were pressed with the authority of the New, as corroborating the Old, they pretended the New was adulterated.

— Is there any new thing under the sun? Did not Lord Bolingbroke set up the authority of St. John against St. Paul? Have we not heard of some parts of the Gospel as not genuine because they do not suit Socinian views? Genuine Christian principles alone will bear the test, and not fear the scrutiny of the whole word of God.'

Augustine, who lived about a century after they had first arisen, describes them to the life, after having himself smarted under the poison of their arrows for about twelve years — seduced partly by their subtile and captious questions concerning the origin of evil, partly by their blasphemies against the Old Testament saints. With respect to the person of Christ, their heresy was like that of the Gnostics, or Docetae: worthy children of Simon Magus!

They held that the Lord Jesus Christ had no proper humanity; the mere phantasm of a man having glided, as Luther here describes it, through the virgin's womb, and afterwards expired on the cross.

'Yet though my ideas were material,' says Augustine, 'I could not bear to think of God being flesh. That was too gross and low in my apprehensions. Your only begotten son appeared to me as the most lucid part of you, afforded for our salvation. I concluded that such a nature could not be born of the Virgin Mary without partaking of human flesh, which I thought must pollute it. Hence arose my fantastic ideas of Jesus, so destructive of all piety. Your spiritual children may smile at me with charitable sympathy, if they read these confessions of mine; such, however, were my views.' —Milner in Augustine's Confessions, Eccles. Hist. vol. ii. pp. 314-327.

Æstuat et contendit. Æst., denoting violent heat in general, is especially applied to the boiling and swelling of the sea when it ebbs and flows, or rises in surges and waves.

Contend. expresses the full stretch of every nerve and muscle in close conflict.

Toto mundo totisque viribus. Mundus is properly 'the stuff of the world' — the materials of which it is constituted — and it is thus transferred to all kinds of furniture and provision, especially to 'women's dress and ornaments;' 'instrumentum ornatus muliebris.' I would not be sure that Luther does not have some allusion to Madam Diatribe's adornments here.

Luther has not exactly hit the nail on the head here. He declares that God makes 'wicked man;' and that he so makes him, through the faultiness of the materials which he has to work with, being fitly compared to a carpenter who makes statues of rotten wood. Moreover, this faultiness of the materials arose from the sin of the first man, who was created having the Spirit — what he elsewhere calls 'the firstfruits of the Spirit' (Part iii. Sect. 18.), which he lost by his sin and fall, thereafter being deserted by God, and left to himself. I deem both these propositions objectionable and false. God neither makes sinners; nor did he withdraw the Spirit from Adam by reason of his sin, and so, through him, from the race which has sprung from him; for Adam never had the Spirit.

When God created man in his own image, he created every man. The substance of every individual man and woman which exists, has existed, and shall exist till the trumpet sounds and the dead are raised, was enclosed in the first man, Adam. No new matter of human kind has been brought into existence since that moment; no human being has been created, therefore, posterior to it. (See Locke's Essay, book ii. chap. xxvi. sect. 2.)

Nor was this creation the mere production of a mass of human substance, like so much clay in the hands of a potter which was afterwards to be moulded into distinct vessels.

Distinctness and individuality of subsistence was given to the several individuals of the human race in that instant. This appears from other considerations which might be stated, as well as from these eminently: 1. Man is spoken of, and spoken to, as plural. ("Let them have dominion." "Male and female he created them" "God blessed them, and God said to them, Be fruitful and multiply." "And He called their name Adam, in the day when they were created.") 2. God is declared to have created them male and female: a fact which the Lord

Jesus refers to (Mat 19.4, 5; Mar 10.6), as indicative of his Father's will concerning marriage. (It is clearly not the formation of Eve to which he refers, but that act of creation which distinctly preceded the making of the helpmate) 3. God is said to have chosen his people to be in Christ before the foundation of the world; which implies that the whole race was contemplated as personally and individually subsistent, in a state prior to the exercise of that choice.

Having thus given a distinct personal subsistence to every individual of the human race in Adam, when the Lord God added the procreative power, and gave command to exercise it, he did essentially make every individual: the substance about to come forth in the Lord's time, into manifest existence and distinct personal agency, was already formed; the power and the authority which would be necessary to its production, were superadded. Then, if this was God's 'condidit' (Luther's term, 'made,' 'formed,' 'built'), has He made wicked man?

Is that saying of the Preacher hereby, and hereby only, not shown to be true, "God has made man upright?" (Ecc 7.29) The only consideration which can have any show of involving God in the propagation of the wicked, is that he did not at once destroy the offender and those who had offended in him. But, without suggesting counsel and design here (we are dealing with facts), the living substances were formed; the power and the authority for production had been given; a curse was upon them, which they must be brought out into manifest existence so that they might be seen and known to bear. — I can only remark that these, or some such reasons, which arise out of the reality of their previous distinct subsistence, seem absolutely necessary to the vindication of God from the charge of propagating sin. — If it is asked, then, but how could those who had no eye to see, no ear to hear, no hand to put forth, commit an act of disobedience? The answer is, Adam was the sole personal agent ("By one man sin entered into the world;" "by one man's offence, death reigned by one;" "by the offence of one judgment condemnation came upon all men to "); but every individual of the race was enclosed in, and was part of his substance, so that he could not do anything in which any one of them was not one with him.

My head offends; but where is my hand and my foot, in the transgression and in its punishment? — This is the Scripture view of the fall — 'one personal agent, but every human being partaker with him in the offence' — is decisively shown from Rom 5.12. Whether ef w is rendered in whom ("through him in whom all sinned" — which I greatly prefer), or for that: the words which follow make it plain that all men are dealt with or rather, all men, from Adam to Moses, were dealt with on the ground of the first transgression. I have no other clue to my own character; I have no other clue to my own state. Nor can I othenvise explain what is thus made clear in the spirit and behaviour of other men. And does not the church of England recognise this account of the matter in her baptismal service, when she prays that the infant may receive remission of his sins by spiritual regeneration; and afterwards instructs the priest to speak to the god-fathers and god-mothers in this way: you have prayed that our Lord Jesus Christ would grant to release him from his sins. What sins?

— This is the reality of 'original sin' from which flowed 'original guilt,' from which flowed 'depravation of nature,' so commonly mistaken for it. This alone constitutes every son and daughter of fallen Adam a fallen creature; not merely a child of the fallen, but themselves, individually and personally, fallen from their own original uprightness, in him. — I hinted that this is not the place to speak of the counsel and design with which all of this was done.

But it is obvious that hereby a way was made for that further and more complete developmcnt of God (by the assumption of new relations), which could not be made by simple creation, but to which creation was the stepping-stone. (See Part iii. Sect. 28. notes l and v .)

Luther is again mistaken (see Part iii. Sect. 18. note t ) about the creation state of man; speaking as though the possession of the Spirit were a part of his endowments. — 'Desertus a Deo ac sibi relictus... naturam peccato, subtracto spiritu, vitiatam.' — The Lord God having formed his animal structure out of the dust of the ground— a compound mass — breathed into his nostrils breath of "lifes" and man became a living soul. This continuity of soul and body — simple soul, and compounded body — soul, which was an image of Him that is a Spirit; and body, in which he resembled and was partaker with the brutes — constituted his essential nature; the solution of which continuity constitutes death. So constituted, he had capacities with which to learn, and sources of instruction from which to derive much knowledge of God. The Lord God conversed with him face to face, and he dwelt among the teaching creatures of His hand; even as he was himself the most teaching of all creatures.

But where is the Spirit, meaning the Holy Ghost? Had Adam possessed this, had the Spirit dwelt and walked in Him — that is, been continually present with Him, acting in Him and by Him — he would have possessed union with God: a privilege which was not essential to his condition and relation as the moral creature of God, but which might, or might not, be added to it. It is plain from this, as from other considerations, that it was not added: for if it was added, then it was either conquered in the temptation, or it was withdrawn prior to it. I do not know what a conquered Holy Ghost can mean; and if it was withdrawn prior to the temptation, then its withdrawal would constitute him a different creature from that to which the temptation law had been given.

Luther's misapprehension has much to do with a mistake about the Spirit's actings. He seems to have thought, as many now do, that there might be a sort of fast and loose playing of the Spirit. The Spirit, when given, acts in earnest and efficaciously. — If Luther were to ask, Does he always act efficaciously in the Lord's called people, now? I would answer that the cases are not parallel. We have the Spirit not as our own, and in our Adam-selves, but in Christ. When we fall, it is not 'the Spirit conquered,' but the Spirit not energizing: which could not have happened to Adam. Luther's expressions are ambiguous as to the period when the Spirit was withdrawn, whether before, or after the temptation. In a former note

(Part iii. Sect. 18. note t) I have dealt with him as representing it to have been withdrawn before the temptation. A careful comparison of the several passages in which he refers to it leads me to conclude that he supposed it was not withdrawn till after the sin had been committed.

But now, being simply a creature, and therefore mutable, he was liable to fall by temptation.

Accountability implies account to be rendered; account implies trial; trial implies the presence of that in the tried substance which may be turned to evil. Was this not precisely

Adam's state and constitution? 'Good,' 'very good,' as he came out of the hands of his Creator, his good might be made evil. Those appetites and passions the appendages of his will, which in his creation and until evil was suggested from without, were pure. They were fixed on fit objects, and acted in purity; but they were liable to be turned to other objects, and thus to become evil. Desire for knowledge, desire for pleasant food, taking pleasure in what is beautiful to the eye — all of which were sound and pure in creation — might thus, by suggestions thrown in, become evil, just as infectious fever, or the serpent's bite, poisons healthful blood. If no evil were suggested, there would continue only good. The suggestion, by being entertained, mars them.

Then, God was debtor to Adam, to withhold temptation from him; or to minister supercreation aid, fortified as he was by creation endowments, to keep him from falling; or to heal his wounds, and restore soundness and peace to him, when he had freely fallen?

Tam acutâ disputatione. A sharp, keen, refined distinction: something like what is ascribed to the "word of God" (Heb 4.12) "piercing even to dividing asunder the soul and spirit, and the joints and marrow." Disp. 'the act of disputing,' or 'the debate held.'

Simpliciter credere. 'Simply,' as opposed to arguments and investigations. Faith receives implicitly what God explicitly declares.

Balbatiendo . Properly, to 'lisp, stammer, or stutter.' There seems to be some allusion to 2Cor 11: "Would to God that you could bear with me a little in my folly: and indeed bear with me." "I speak as a fool." "I speak foolishly."

Self is their idol, to the dethronement of God. Their own interests and gratification are sought, not God's. Phi 2.21.

Illo malè, istis benè. More literally, 'he does well with, and he does ill with.' Azit cum must be understood.

This is very much like saying, 'does good because he is good, and is good because he is good.'

It is too much like the 'ipse dixit' of the Pythagoreans.

What Luther's explanation amounts to, about the mystery of God's agency in the wicked, as given in his folly, is that, 1. They are still real existences. 2. They are still God's creatures. 3.

He works all things in them, even as he does in all his creatures. 4. He works in them according to their nature: that hence he does all their evil in them, but does no evil himself.

All this is true; but it is baldly told, and lacks opening, confirmation, and some additions. He ought to show us how man came to be what he is, consistent with God's voluntarily contracted obligations to him; he ought to show us the nature and manner of his agency in the wicked; he ought to show us how God, consistent with himself, ordained and wrought the fall, and continues wicked man in being — indeed, works wickedness by him, instead of destroying him and putting an end to the reign of evil. — I say he should have shown these things because, though he talks of 'silliness' and 'foolishness,' and 'babbling' (Libet ineptire, stultescere, et balbutiendo tentare ), it is plain that he means a serious and sober solution to the difficulty.

Then, with respect to the FIRST of these showings, man, as we have seen in a former note (Sect. 10. note z ) had a constitution imparted, and a state assigned to him, in which trial was implied, and in which he ought to have overcome temptation. There was no dereliction of the Creator's engagements, no withdrawal of any possession or privilege, no gainsaying discession or addition, with respect to God's previous announcements, either in the operation of the fall, or in the inflictions which followed it. The mutability of the creature, as simple creature — the accountability of moral creature — and the distinct source (not creation, but super-creation) of the Spirit's internal energizings — unveil a just God; that is, one who leaves nothing undone which he had freely bound himself to do, and does nothing which he should not do.

Then, with respect to the SECOND of these showings, Luther compares God's agency in the wicked to a drover driving on a lame horse (he does not mean it irreverently); this excites the idea of physical rather than moral influence: but the truth is, God acts in the wicked as in the righteous, by setting, or causing to be set, such considerations before the will, as constrain it to choose his will. This is moral necessity; such a will so addressed cannot choose differently.

Then, with respect to the THIRD of these showings, God's most gracious and everlasting design of making himself known to, and enjoyed by, certain creatures of his hands, according to what He really is, affords the ample and adequate reason for all that complex yet simple system of operation by which he has been dealing with man from the creation to this hour, and will continue to deal with him to and throughout eternity: — with man, his great manifester, not only in the blessed human person of the Lord Jesus Christ (see Part ii.

Sect. 8. note r), but also in every individual substance of the whole human race; which is made to manifest itself, so that he may manifest himself by his dealings with it.

A sight like this justifies wisdom to her children: and, although these considerations may seem to apply themselves exclusively to God's dealings with the wicked; or at farthest, with men; they will require but little extension, to comprehend all creatures. Evil has been introduced into the creation of God, and is not destroyed, but continues therein, and shall so continue, unto God's glory: because without it he could not be manifested as what he is — the union and concentration of all moral excellency — the truth, the love, the power, the wisdom — the good one. And what is this 'evil,' which has thus come into, and thus abides in God's world? A person as we are apt to account it, having scriptural authority for so speaking of it; but thinking so of it, too often to our hurt? Hear what a venerable confessor of the Church has to say about it:

'I now began to understand, that every creature of your hand is in its nature good, and that universal nature is justly called on to praise the Lord for his goodness. (Psa 148) The evil which I sought after has no positive existence; were it a substance, it would be good, because every thing individually, as well as all things collectively, is good. Evil appeared to be a lack of agreement in some parts to others. My opinion of the two independent principles, in order to account for the origin of evil, was without foundation (see above,

Sect. 9. note v ). Evil is not a thing to be created; let good things only forsake their just place, office and order, and then, though till be good in their nature, evil, which is only a privative, abounds and pro duces positive misery. I asked what was iniquity, and I found it to be no substance, but a perversity of the will, Avhich de clines from you, the supreme substance, to lower things, and casts away its internal excellencies, and swells with pride externally.' (Augustine's Confessions, in Miln. Eccl. Hist. vol. ii. p. 342)

If it is true, then, that the creature, as creature, is essentially mutable (what Augustine, and the schoolmen after him, applies to the now corrupted state of the human will being equally applicable to the will of man [see Part iii. Sect. 1 ] — to the will of every moral creature — in its essence; viz. that it is vertible); if there subsists what may be fitly compared to a chord in every moral creature, which may be so touched as to yield a jarring note, and by its vibration to produce discord throughout the whole instrument; if this chord, which is not in itself evil, may be so touched by that which is not evil neither, but good (is not self-love such a chord, and is not the sense of God's incomparable excellency, or the intimation of superiority in some other like creature of God's, or the suggestion of some flaw, blemish, or deficiency in the creature itself — each of which should only excite humility, submission, and gratitude — such a touch?). Can we have any difficulty in conceiving how Satan was with drawn from his uprightness, when as he was yet only good, and nothing but good was to be heard and seen around him? I am not ignorant that some would divert us altogether from contemplations of this kind: but why are we told so much about the devil, if we are to have no thoughts about his history and origin? We are taught that pride was his condemnation (1Tim 3.6); "that he was a murderer from the beginning, and did not abide in the truth" (Joh 8.44); "that he did not keep his first estate, but left his own habitation" (Jude 6); "that there was war in heaven." (Rev 12.7) — I am aware, that these words, in their connection, are to be understood prophetically; but there was a foundation for the allusion. Who would be ashamed to meditate and explore what God has revealed to his own justification (Rom 3.4) and to our furtherance and joy of faith? (Phi 1.25)

That is, Satan does not operate independently of God's omnipotent will. – WHG Vitiated: impaired; ruined in character.

The wheels of God's omnipotent providence (see Eze 1.15-21) carry the evil as well as the good along with them in their goings: and this is unto God's glory; but is it also unto salvation? — This is Luther's defective view.

Luther's account of 'hardening' is, 1. God actuates the wicked as well as the rest of his creatures, according to their nature. 2. Satan is unresisted and undisturbed in them. 3. They can only will evil. 4. God thwarts them by word, or deed, or both. All this is correct; but it is not the whole of the matter; neither does he put the several parts of the machinery together, cleverly; neither does he show an end. (See Sect. 11. note h ). All these things are of God, through God, and to God. (Rom 11.36) The natural man has been brought into the state in which he is, of, through, and to him. And what is that state? An earthly, sensual, devilish soul (Jas 3.16), possessed by the devil; to whom it was given up, as a prey, in the day of apostasy. Luther distinguishes the moving and driving, or seizing and moving of God, from his word and work. It is a fine image which he draws of God giving motion to 'all creatures.'

But if this idea is examined, it will be found to amount to no more than that God keeps all his creatures in a state of being which is according to their nature; and that the wicked are therefore, by the necessity of their nature, kept by him in a state of activity, and not allowed to be torpid, or as Luther facetiously expresses it, to have a holiday. Particular actings of God, then, upon this substance of the human soul, such and so related, are what he expresses by God's thwarting word and work. But this thwarting word and work extends only to the outside of the man; forìs offert — forìs objicit. All this while, Satan's is an agency with which, as it respects others, God does not interfere: he is no agent, no minister of His.

You might almost judge from his language in some places (contradicted, it is true, by others), that he accounted Satan a sort of independent chief.

Now, the root of the matter lies here, if I am not mistaken. Satan is an agent and minister of God. (See Job 1.11; 1Kng 22.19-23; 1Chr 21.1. Compare 2Sam 24.1; Zec 3.1-3.) Nor can I understand the expressions so repeatedly applied to the case of Pharaoh, "I will harden

Pharaoh's heart;" nor "Whom he will, he hardens;" nor "God has given them the spirit of slumber," nor "You have hid these things from the wise and prudent," and the like — without recurring to this agency. This obviously meets their full and express import, while nothing else, or nothing less, does. And what is the effect of this agency but such as has been already ascribed to the operation of God? (See note h , as before) Hereby 'He sets, or causes to be set, such considerations before the mind of His free-agent, as morally constrain him to choose what He has willed. It might be added that he causes such to be withheld — for Satan throws dust into men's eyes; hinders them from seeing, as well as causes them to see wrongly. What is there that can give peace under the realizing consciousness of his being and agency, but the assurance that he is in truth only this agent of God for good, and nothing but good, for his chosen?

God's hardening, therefore, I define generally to be 'that special operation of God upon the reprobate soul, by which, through the agency of Satan (whose Lord and rider he is), combined with his own outward dispensations of word and work, he shuts and seals it up in its own native blindness, aversion and enmity towards himself. There have been however, and doubtless are, certain special and splendid examples of this operation, each having its minuter peculiarities, while the same essential nature pervades all. — Pharaoh is one of these. — Indeed the whole history of the Exodus is one of the most luminous displays which the Lord God has ever made, of the design he is pursuing and accomplishing in having and dealing with creatures — second only to the marvellous and complicated history of the Lord's death: for which it was also appointed; for which it has also been recorded.

Explode: to show a theory or claim to be baseless.

"Let my people go that they may serve me," is a good demand; but it is directly contrary to Pharaoh's will, its course and propensity. (See the preceding note.) — Luther makes this act of God negative except as it respects God's general and particular operations in his providence. He does not change the will; he keeps his moral creature in being; he thwarts his inclinations. — What is Satan, meanwhile; and what does he do?

Nulla est causa, nec ratio. Cau. is the correlative of effect; 'what gives origin to this will;' rat. is 'the principle, rate, method, and design of its operations;' which supposes some extrinsic standard. There is no such source or standard for God's will: no cause which produces it; no rightness which it exemplifies.

The defects of Luther's theology are strongly manifested in this paragraph. He has no answer to give, where a satisfactory one is at hand: God continues to move the wicked, because it is for his glory that they should go on to act, just as they are. For the same cause he ordained and brought about, or as Luther speaks, permitted Adam's fall. — God does not create wicked men. (See above, Sect. 10. note z .) It is strange that he should use the word

'creare,' as applied to our generation from Adam. — 'When a thing is made up of particles which all existed before, but that very thing, so constituted of pre-existing particles, had no existence before — when it refers to a substance produced in the ordinary course of nature by an internal principle, but is set to work by and received from some external agent or cause, and it works by insensible ways which we do not perceive — this we call generation.'

Locke's Essay, vol. i. chap, xxvi. sect. 2.

God's will is cause and reason to itself. But he has a reason for all he does; and this reason, so far as respects his actings with which we have to deal, is resolvable into selfmanifestation. (See former notes.) — As to these and like questions, which Luther judges it improper to ask, the whole matter is this: Does the word of God furnish an answer to them, or not? If it does, then we are bound to entertain them and supply the true answer. How much better than to leave the caviller strong in his unanswered cavils! And what is the result? A known God instead of an unknown God; a God whom we revere, admire, and delight in, when we would otherwise only tremble and shudder before him!

Artibus petitus. Pet. 'made the subject of attack; whether by violence, stratagem, or supplication;' it probably alludes here to some magical incantations by which sorcerers pretended to darken the sun! — See Hor. Epod. v. xvii.

The word lenitas, which occurs so frequently in this passage, properly denotes 'softness,'

'gentleness,' 'kindness,' as opposed to 'roughness,' 'harshness,' 'severity;' and it seems most aptly to express that forbearance or indulgence with which the Lord God suffers long, and is kind.

"Now I tell you before it comes (Judas' treachery), so that when it has come to pass, you may believe that I am He." "And now I have told you before it came to pass (his going to the Father), so that when it has come to pass, you might believe." "But these things I have told you (their own persecutions), so that when the time comes, you may remember that I told you of them." (John 13.19; 14.29; 16.4)

Luther circumscribes the design. Doubtless, God would comfort and encourage his people by these acts and predictions: but self-manifestation was His one ultimate object; and in order for this: confounding his enemies, and rendering them yet more inexcusable, as well as emboldening his beloved ones. Was there not "also a manifestation of what human nature is, hereby made in his own people? Did they all believe, after all these signs? Where did those hankerings after Egypt come from? What about, "It would have been better for us to have served the Egyptians?" The whole is resolvable into that great first principle, 'God showing what he is, by his dealings with the human nature as exhibited both in the elect and in the reprobate — in his friends and in his enemies.' But what a maze, or rather what a mass of inconsistency this history would be, and not only this history, but the whole Bible, without that principle?

Vertible: Able to turn or to be turned; changeable.

Here, omit means "fail to do," as opposed to "leave out".

Occursu objecto. It is contrived that this word and work of God should come into contact with the edge of the will, excited into action by omnipotency, through an act like that of throwing a bone to a dog, or casting a stumbling-block in the path of a traveller

Impingere. Imp. (se scilicet subaudito) est 'ire impactum,' 'praecipitem ferri in aliquid.' — Here, as before, we have God's actuation, the man's will, and testing, provoking dispensation. But there seems a little confusion in the admission concerning the man's

(Pharaoh's) own will, as separated from the divine impulse. He now seems to make the crisis of the evil lie there. I can understand that there might be inertness in the case which he supposes: but if there is an act of will, in an essentially bad will, I cannot understand how it would be other than evil. (See above, note k ) The case is merely hypothetical, put for the sake of illustration. But like many other intended illustrations, it is confusing rather than distinguishing the object on which it would shine. And it is impossible: for God always acts, and therefore he always actuates the wicked; that is, he keeps them in their place and state as moral agents, which is a state of activity.

Ordinatam sen voluntatem signi. The distinction amounts to that of 'regulated' and 'absolute' will, limited and restrained by ordinance, or by some outward sign which has revealed it; and will of pure, uncontrolled good pleasure. The former of these, it is intimated, may be resisted; the latter cannot.

I understand ponit in a logical sense, 'takes for granted;' assumes as a datum.

Ipse dixit: An unsupported dogmatic assertion.

Luther makes some confusion in the order of the verses, putting the 18th in place of the 15th. But his argument is not dependent on the transposition. The more explicit testimony of verse 18 is implied in verse 15; but verse 18 precedes both the cavil and the reproof.

Prosopopoeia. 'The introducing of imaginary persons;' literally, 'the making of persons;' — a well-known figure of rhetoric. Paul had before been simply stating truth in plain language.

Now he brings in a supposed objection. Luther asks Erasmus whether he notices this? It was essential to his correct understanding of the passage, that he should have remarked this change in the Apostle's mode of address: that he personifies, and what sort of persons he fabricates.

Errat. fallitur. Err. a mistake in his own apprehensions. Fall. appearances beguile him. It is not disappointment as to the event, which is the subject of remark here; but an object seen far off is made to appear different from what it really is.

That is, by doing violence to the text; by forcing an unwarranted and unfounded interpretation upon it. – WHG Majestatem. A form of expression common among men, with application to earthly potentates. 'His Majesty' does so and so. It is a sort of personification of the sovereign's state, power, and excellency. So here, of God's power and will.

Fatum in-eluctabile. Even those who made the fatal sisters superior to Jupiter himself, still had an uncontrolled ordainer of events: inexorable, infallible, invincible fate.

Praetexi. Properly, 'a fine web of art spread before a substance to cover, or disguise it.' — Judicium naturale, like ratio naturalis above, opposes 'natural' to 'spiritual.' The conclusions are so obvious, that we do not need the Spirit to draw them.

Abyssum. 'Alyssus est profunditas uquarum impenetrabilis, sive speluneae aquarum latentium, de quibus fontes et flumina procedunt, vel quae occulte subtereant.' Hence applied to 'the abyss.' "They besought him that he would not command them to go out into the abyss." (Gr.) "Have you come here to torment us before the time?" Luther had felt the very hell of despair.

'And in the lowest deep, 'A lower deep still threatening to devour me Pro excusandâ bonitate Dei. Excus. 'Item, in excusationem affero.' — For regulated and absolute will see above, Sect. 19. where he distinguishes these as volunt. ordin. seu signi, and volunt. placiti. — For consequence and consequent, see Part i. Sect xi.

1Tim 6.20. antiqeseiv. 'Doctrina opposita,' 'quaestio quae ad disceptandum proponitur.' — Not what is commonly understood by opposition; but men setting out to canvass doctrines with a great display of school-learning, and maintaining theses which were opposite to the truth.

See above, Sect. 20, p. 288.

Paul's testimony can only respect the fact that a law may be written in our hearts, which is not outwardly taught and professed: for it is neither the same law of which Paul speaks; nor does he testify anything about the handling, or recognition of that law. (Rom 2.13-16.) —

Luther supposes this law of necessity to lie at the bettom of our hearts, so that, when we hear it duly and truly set out, we accord with it by the exercise of our natural powers; while it may be made illegible, and effaced, by false teaching and prejudice.

Rom 9.30. I have not marked the words as a Scripture quotation, because they are not exact.

He says in the same place, the intervening verses are all dependent upon verse 24, being so many quotations to show that it was God's avowed purpose to call a body of Gentiles into his church, and to save only a remnant of Israel.

Excisis et depravatis. Exc. words 'cut out' from the text, in which they stand connected with others. Depr. 'turned awry, 'made crooked;' their meaning, through this violent separation, is distorted and polluted.

See above, Part iii. Sect. 34.

Excutiam. instituti. Excut. 'concutere, scrutamli et explorandi causa.' Inst. 'scopus, proposition, inceptum. proairesiv.

Pro libero arbitrio dicere. Eludere Paulum.

Super aristas incedere. See above, Part iii. Sect. 6. note b . 'Certo' as opposed to 'hesitatingly;' constanter, as opposed to 'variableness of statement;' ardenter, as opposed to 'indifference;' solidè, as opposed to 'insubstantial;' dextrè, as opposed to 'clumsiness, and lack of address;' copiosè, as opposed to 'scantiness of materials.'

See above, Part iii. Sect. 37. note h .

Consistent with what has been said before (Part i. Sect. 11.), but with a minute variety in the application: Judas' treachery, they would say, was necessary, but he was not a necessary traitor: he must betray, but not therefore necessarily; that is, according to their account of the matter, compulsorily.

The 'mediae turbae' are the multitudes surrounding the judicial tribunal: 'non usitatâ. frequentiâ stipati sumus.' — Cic. 'Perduxeris' expresses the pomp and the labour with which he had dragged on the cause to issue.

Respondendi et definiendi. Resp. respects the adversary's argument, which should be invalidated or taken off: defin. is the explanatory statement of the advocate's own case. See above, Part i. Sect. 9.

Hor. Art. Poet, v. 379.

Moveret. There is a peculiar force, if I am not mistaken, in 'moveret;' he does not say 'remove,' though I have ventured, with good authority, to give it that force; rather, it is a heavy body which he cannot wag.

Luther thus ridicules his claim to skill and victory. In many sorts of competition, and for many sorts of merit, it was customary to crown the conquerors with various materials — sometimes precious, sometimes of no value — as the highest tribute of honour which could be received. Here, therefore, he represents Erasmus as crowning himself , by a feint of rhetoric abandoning his cause, and assuming to be a conquering Bacchus, and an unrivalled

Apollo, by wearing the emblems of those divinities.

Perturbatum et exasperatum. Perturb. implies lack of order and distinctness; no first, second, and third, either in reply or advancement; exasp. the heat and ruffle with which it is maintained; we speak of 'angry' debate.

Vafritia et versutia. Vaf. expresses the subtile invention which devises; versut. is the versatility and adroitness with which the crafty counsel is executed; this is opposed afterwards by simplex, 'what is inartificial;' and aperta, 'what is manifest to the view.'

Palpari. 'What you may stroke with the hand.' The gentlemen who have no eyes may still receive sense-testimony to it.

Commentum. The subtlety means Judas still has a will, which is not forced; therefore there is still Freewill. — Who says 'forced'? But can it choose otherwise? A will that can only make one choice, is in bondage. — The example of Judas is introduced by Erasmus, not Luther.

See Part iv. Sect. 1. — The course of this long, elaborate, and invincible argument may be traced by the side notes attached to each section; but the reader will forgive me if I endeavour to assist him by the following short summary. Erasmus endeavours to evade this plain text by a trope. 1. Tropical interpretations are generally inadmissible. 2. Absurdity of the proposed one. 3. It does not remove the difficulty. 4. Certain illustrations are objected to. 5. The causes assigned for introducing it are examined. 6. How God hardens is explained.

7. Diatribe is exposed, and Luther's view maintained by an appeal to the context. Also, by an appeal to Paul's comment; which introduces Erasmus' evasion and that of the Sophists. In the course of these considerations several topics are admitted by the way: such as the state of man, limits of inquiry, carnal reason's objections, etc...

Pugnant. Said with reference to some particular doctrine not named — the doctrine of Freewill doubtless, as maintained by Jerome and those who teach like him.

That is, be judicious in discerning what may not be doctrinally correct in Jerome's writings.

What is, in fact, gained by this distinction? The principle is the same; God differentiates by his sovereign will. Just so it is, with respect to national and personal election. Yet some seem to think that they have hooked a great fish in discovering that Great Britain may have been elected to hear the Gospel without any of her children having been elected to receive it!

Originally Sarah. Clearly, it should be Rebekah. Sarah was dead when this prophecy was delivered, which is expressly said to have been delivered to Rebekah. "And she (Rebekah) said, If it be so, etc. And the Lord said to her." Gen 25.22-23. The preceding mention of Sarah in Romans 9 accounts for the mistake.

Pravis. Nearly allied in meaning to the torquendae Scriptura which follows: 'what is crooked and awry.' —It is obvious that no objection can be drawn from the statement in this paragraph, and from St. Paul's argument, to what has been advanced in a former note on the subject of original sin (see above, Sect. 10. note z .). The question is about the difference

.between Jacob and Esau. Both alike are fallen and self-destroyed in Adam; the question is how either of these receives distinguishing benefits, whether of a temporal or eternal nature.

With respect to manifest existence and distinct personal agency, it is plain that neither of them had done good or evil when the words were spoken to Rebekah. There had not as yet been any opportunity to display that which alone could constitute any difference on a ground of Freewill or merit.

See the last section. The question of Freewill is not affected. Erasmus follows Jerome, whom Luther has pronounced sacrilegious.

Oraculum. It is said of Rebekah, that "she went to ininire of the Lord." Oraculum is therefore, 'an answer, counsel, or sentence from the gods;' it is the fit term by which to characterise what was said to her.

Isaac's descendants in the line of Jacob were not only to be the typical family — the community which shadowed the Lord's elect church — but also the visible church for a season, and to contain within them the true seed. So that, all the spiritual blessings of God were comprehended in this superiority which is announced as the portion of Jacob.

Sacrilegam. 'Qui sacra legit,' i.e., furatur. Thus, sacrilege is beautifully defined by [Samuel] Johnson to be 'the crime of robbing heaven.' Jerome and those who followed him were guilty of this.

Qui sacris scripturis seriò non affiduntur. Luther has a peculiar use of the word afficio, or rather afficior, which I recognise here — 'affected to' — denoting a mind interested in, or having its affections excited towards an object.

Triplici industriâ torquet. A peculiar use of the word industriâ — which commonly denotes 'a state, or act, of mind' — to express 'the result of that act;' and this in an unfavourable sense: a laboured excogitation, in which there is neither genius, nor the Spirit. (See above,

Si literam urgeas. By way of forcing a tropical interpretation of the text, she intimates that the literal cannot possibly stand. 'If you drive the letter;' that is, force us to take it whether we will or not.

Citra et praeter. More literally, 'on this side and beyond,' implying therefore that they are altogether of him and through him and to him.

Erasmus says it is not love and hate, but the effect of these. Luther replies, if it is an effect, it is God's will that effects, and the effect is what he approves: he approves one sort of event to Jacob, therefore, and another to Esau. How much further on are you by that?

Excogitation: the creation of something in the mind; a fancy or imagination.

To make this text consistent with Freewill, there must be ground of love and of hate in the personal mind and conduct of the two persons. — What follows is a master's view of Malachi's prophecy, and decisive as to the question. Judah's reproach is that he has been freely, distinguishingly loved, and has been so treacherous. The essence of the reproach is the freeness of the love: and what is this temporality, which extends from generation to generation, and which comprehends as its cen tral portion 'the eternal God had,' in opposition to 'not had,' but had for an enemy?

Pertinacity: persistent determination.

Textus ipsè apertus Prophetae. Ipse, without any additions of mine; apertus, what requires no opening to make its meaning clear. Mal 1.4.

Hie odit, illic amat. More literally, 'hates in the one quarter, and loves in the other.'

I insert the word 'afterwards' to give clearness. It is evidently the eleventh chapter to which he refers. — There cannot be a more pernicious practice in the interpretation of Scripture

(while there is scarcely any more common), than that of dragging in words which are somewhere thereabouts, but really stand in quite a different connection, and have a completely different scope; to ascertain the meaning of a proposed text. An argument, or rather an illustrative exhortation of the eleventh chapter, separated from the preceding by many intervening subjects of discussion, is adduced by Erasmus to determine the meaning of an express affirmation in the early part of the ninth.

According to Paul's distinction of offices in Rom 12.6-8. "Having then gifts, etc.; or he that teaches, on teaching; or he that exhorts, on exhortation."

Erasmus says the Prophets speak only of temporal afflictions. What of it? You do not disprove bond-will by this distinction, if it is just. Rather, you adduce an instance of bondwill. These afflictions come, lie, remain against our will. How much does this show about freedom? — Voluntariè. We are taught indeed to make God's pleasure ours; but, whether we are enabled to do so or not, his pleasure alone is done. [Job 2.10; Luk 22.42]

Velut similes coaptare. I have given the idea rather than the exact word: it is 'pairing, like horses joined together in a chariot.'

Coram Deo. Referring to a distinction which I have already objected to (See Part i. Sect. 25. note i); as though there were some objects and considerations with regard to which it is not nothing. Erasmus argues against the conclusion drawn from the simile of the potter, chiefly by appealing to 2Tim 2.20-21. Luther says, 1. You mistake the words "from these." 2. If the simile is inefficacious here, this does not prove it so in Rom. 9. You must prove the similitude which you assume. 3. This passage, rightly interpreted, does mean the same thing, and it does prove the very thing in dispute.

The account which Luther gives of this text in its connection and construction, is perfectly correct. Ruin abounds: "the solid foundation of God nevertheless stands;" evil does not contradict His will and plan, but fulfils it. In a great house, there are vessels of two sorts.

God's eternal separation of his people is manifested, realized, and consummated by their own God-enabled voluntary separation in time, through his Spirit working in due season.

Qemeliov (themelios) expresses the whole elect church of God laid by him as a sort of huge foundation-stone with inscriptions. See Zec 3.9.

See pp. 162-165, Part iii, sect. 20.

On the contrary supposition to that assumed and reasoned by Paul, the vessel is not the potter's workmanship, as having been made by him just as he is; but his own. Why defend the potter then?

Luther personifies the heart, or rather the wickedness of the heart, which I have therefore ventured to make feminine.

R.C. Sproul once said that what's surprising is not that anyone is damned, but that anyone is saved. WHG Luther blunders a good deal here, while he says many excellent things. In dealing with this cavil, the fault then is in the potter, he first sets forth its audacity, next repels Erasmus' gloss by it, then maintains that it is an interested judgment, not a judgment of equity, by which God is condemned. — Much of the difficulty is, no doubt, resolvable into the sovereignty of God; that sovereignty which is so bitterly offensive to the carnal mind, while without the light of it we cannot stir a step in God. Whence came creation in all and every part of its wide range; whence come blessing and cursing, either as foreordained or as fulfilled; whence come heaven and hell, and inhabitants for each; whence comes the devil, whence comes the fall of man; whence comes sealed ruin on the one hand, and whence comes free restoration and glorification on the other; but from Him who makes no appeal to the creature for his vindication, but says 'I have lifted up my hand that it shall be so?' — But there is a worthy end for all this; which Luther did not see, and therefore did not assign: the sight of which, however, makes the difference between a cruel God and a wise one. (See Part t v x iii. Sect. 28. notes .) —It is not true that God condemns the undeserving, or that he crowns the unworthy. Luther did not discern the mystery of the creation and fall of every l individual man in Adam (see Part iii. Sect. 38. note , Part iv. Sect. 10. note z). Nor did he understand the mystery of the predestinative counsel. Every individual of the human race became a hell-deserving sinner in Adam; every individual of the saved, is saved by virtue of new relations assumed by God, and given to him in Christ — as one previously self-ruined, whom Christ has rendered worthy to be taken up from his ruin, by having shared it with him. Predestination is fulfilment forearranged; as is the execution, such was the covenanted design. It is self-destroyed ones, therefore, who are predestined to hell; even as it is Christmade worthy ones who are predestined to life. Luther knew nothing about God's assuming relations, much less about his assuming distinct relations. And this shows once more how impossible it is to give any consistent account of the salvation of the righteous, on the basis of universal redemption: such a redemption must leave either partiality in God, or merit in man. Luther would have it indignos to avoid merit, and therefore he leaves God 'a respecter of persons.' — He does not say a word too much about sovereignty, but he puts it in its wrong place, and omits what ought to be added to it — the end for which it is exercised. The place is, 'God determining to make creatures with opposite destinies some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt — vessels of wrath and vessels of mercy.' And that we may not even in heart murmur here, we must have an adequate end shown to us. It is shown to as many as have an eye to see it: he determines to make them, and he does make them, to His own glory — the manifesting of himself, according to what he really is. "What if God, willing," etc. (Rom 9.22-24.) In the fulfilment of this design, sovereignty is not the hinge; there is nothing from first to last, in the varieties of the way or of the end, except what approves itself to right reason. — Luther seems to think that the salvation of the righteous escapes animadversion [harsh criticism or disapproval]. The fact that there is such a state may. But if the true nature of that state, and the true way to it, are faithfully opened, they are scarcely less offensive to the carnal mind than the damnation of the lost.

Interpretatione sanâ. I do not venture to render this by 'qualified interpretation,' though this appears to be nearly the meaning: a 'sound' as opposed to extravagant sense is to be assigned to the words, in contradistinction to their simple literal meaning; this, it is implied, would be extravagant and contradictory. A peculiar use of interpretatio, which both Cicero and Quintilian recognise; from whom Erasmus no doubt borrowed it, is 'a giving of the sense, instead of rendering the words' — much as the Levites did when they read the law to the people after the captivity. Neh 8.7-8. See Part iii. Sect. 30. note f .

Simpliciter, dupliciter, centuplic. Luther makes a pun on the word simpliciter, which is properly opposed to figurative, or tropical.

All this alleged inconsistency in Scripture is the fruit of your additions; by the aid of which you create inconsistencies, but you also contradict your own positions.

Affectavimus, extende. See above, Sect. 4. text and notes; particularly note u .

Nodos in scirpo quaerunt. See above, Part i. Sect.26. note l.

Corrupta. The figure is that of a man drowned; and the last term expresses the state of his substance, when now it has been long underwater. It is like Virgil's 'cererem corruptam indis.'

Land caprind. See above, Part ii. Sect. 3. note l.

I am disposed to give rather a different turn to the declaration, though in no way affecting Luther's argument. All he wants to show is that they are words of anger, not of pity and palliation. But since the word which we render "strive "and which Luther renders "judge" properly signifies debate or judgment given after discussion; why might not the sentiment be, "My Spirit shall not always be proving that man is flesh;" or "shall not always be reproving him for being flesh?" The great reason for continuing man in existence after the original and damning transgression was that he might show himself what he is, as he has made himself — so different from what God made him. The Lord here says that he will carry on this work of manifestation — this controversy, as it may be called — for no longer than one hundred and twenty years. There seems to be no great importance in the annunciation that he would not strive because he is flesh. He was so from the first moment of transgression; and not more so now, than from that moment. But the manifestation having been carried far enough, there was now a reason why it should cease. This trial, or controversy, or judgment, or proof, or reproof, was effected by the divine Spirit both mediately and immediately acting upon their spirit. Luther confines it to the effect of their intercourse with others — such as Noah, and those of the Lord's people who had lived and were living with those generations of men in whom was the Spirit of God. But did not that Spirit also act upon these disobedient ones, without their intervention? that Spirit which, according to Luther, moves and drives all God's creatures. — י֤רחִוּ (ruach), appendere — litem vel causam agere — quomodo 'disceptare' signift; et 'judicare;' fut ruach disceptabit;

Gen 6.3. (Sim. Lex. Hebr. in loc.) ruach Contendit. prop, appendit. 2. Judicavit, i.e., appendit bilance judicii. 3. In judicio contendit. 'To judge, to strive, to litigate' (Robertson's

Clavis Pentateuch in loco.) ם֖ גַּשַׁבּ(gamְ basar) 'Inasmuch as,' 'for that.' Robertson. Simon derives it rather differently, and explains by 'en tw' seducere eos; i.e., dum seducit eos ipsa caro.

Luther seems to lose the particular point of the preceding verses, when he speaks of the 'sons of men' marrying wives; it is the sons of God seeing the daughters of men, etc. meaning surely those who practised and made profession of his worship, in opposition to those who had thrown it off. The great offence and provocation seems to have been given by that hypocritical remnant, to and concerning which Enoch had previously prophesied (as it appears from Jude 1.15).

Virgilicentonas. More literally, Virgilian centos.

Simplicitati scripturarum studeretur. i.e., taking care to maintain a plain sense where it is practicable, in opposition to a figurative one.

Officio verbi inter eos agere. Implying more than mere preaching; he has before said 'per verbum praedicationis et vitam piorum:' it is word administered by mouth, and life.

It is impossible to understand this text in such a way that it will not be a decisive testimony against Freewill. Whether it is that 'God would cease to prove man, what he is,' or 'cease to judge him, because he is such a one;' what he is, remains the same; and that is something so vile that God cannot any longer tolerate it.

I confess that I greatly prefer understanding the flesh in Romans 7 and 8 as the bodily part of the saint, which is unrenewed while he remains in this world. But what difference does this make as to the question of Freewill? Every individual man is by natural constitution

"enmity against God;" so far as that natural constitution remains in the saint, he also is enmity. The passage under consideration either says, or implies, being that he is flesh, he is contrary to the Spirit and offensive to Gocl. What is the state of his will then?

I would understand the word flesh here, of his whole substance or constitution, rather than 'an affection' of it, as Luther and most other divines do. Indeed, I consider that much jargon has been introduced into theology by this distinction. It has led to what is called the doctrine of two principles (the term 'principle' being a very indefinite one, and a shelter for almost everything that is unknown or wishes to be obscure). Whereas, I believe there are few if any places in Scripture, in which it may not be understood of the human substance, either in its complexity as soul and body, or in its dividuality, as body only.

I by no means subscribe to the interpretation which Luther assigns to some of the texts he adduces. "The flesh profits nothing "is not 'evil affection,' but the natural substance of man as contrasted with the Spirit. "The word was made flesh," does not declare body in opposition to soul, but it declares that whole human person which the second Person of the ever-blessed Trinity truly and actually assumed into union with himself when the fulness of the time had come. So "my flesh is food indeed" does not exclude his soul as made an offering for sin. Neither does the "one flesh" which the church is made to be with Christ, exclude someone who is joined to the Lord, from being one Spirit. If Luther's interpretation and distinction with respect to the term 'flesh' is admitted, a third must at least be added — viz. this sense which comprehends the whole human substance, and so constitutes a title which distinguishes man from all other creatures. As a hint to show this, I would mention

Psalm 145.21; Luk 3.6; Isa 40.5,6; Joh 17.2; 1Cor 1.29; to which countless others might be added. Luther speaks with sufficient exactness about the presence and withdrawal of the Spirit to make it clear that he did not understand Him to have dwelt in the ungodly — while he omits a very important part of the Spirit's agency. (See above, note m .)

Erigere. See Part iii. Sect. 38. note n .

See above Part iii. Sect. 22. etc.

See Part ii. Sect. 1.

There is a vengeance connected with the preaching of Christ; yes, and a necessary part of that preaching. "To preach the acceptable year of the Lord, and the day of vengeance of our

God." The kingdom of God has enemies who would not be reigned over by the King, to be trodden under foot, as well as princes to be seated on thrones. There are souls to be cut off among the people by not hearing that Prophet, as well as souls to be gathered by hearing him. "We are to God a sweet savour of Christ in those who are saved and in those who perish. To the one we are a aavour of life unto life; and to the other a savour of death unto death." 2Cor 2.15-16 The Lord Jesus said of his Jewish opposers, "If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin." Joh 15.22 The manifestation of what is in man — of the Satanic enmity of the human heart — is peculiarly effected by the preaching of Christ.

But it is not the form of that dispensation to condemn ("God did not send his Son into the world to condemn the world" Joh 3.17), though aggravated guilt and increased condemnation are the actual result of his coming. Nor is Luther's argument invalidated by this result: the people to be comforted are not objects of vengeance, but of favour.

Grammatistis. Not grammaticus, but grammatista, a name of reproach, which he applies here to the Jewish Rabbins who were sciolists in literature [self-proclaimed experts], though vast pretenders, and took great liberties with the sacred text. See above, Sect. 4. note t .

2Tim 2.3; 1Tim 6.12; 1Cor 9.24-27; 2Tim 2.5; Eph 6; 1Th 5; 2Tim 4.7.

Exod. 38.8. Compare 1Sam 2.22.

Legem exprimere. Properly, 'to press, wring, strain, or squeeze out;' hence, it is applied figuratively to models in wax, marble, or canvass.

Militantem. The word 'milito,' which occurs in diverse forms throughout this passage, expresses 'the whole state of a soldier' as to doing and suffering, in preparation, conflict, and endurance. — Luther goes far afield for his solution and defence of this text. 1. Warfare is her legal service. 2. She only sinned in that service. 3. She was rewarded for sin, not merit. —

The truth, if I am not mistaken, lies nearer home. Why not understand "double for all her sins" as a phrase to denote that, 'great and manifold as her sins had been, she was receiving double in divine favour.' Double is a finite put for an infinite. (So in Isa. 61.7; Jer 16.18;

17.18; Zec 9.12; Rev 18.6 .) Her warfare is the whole interval of her toil and labour. — I cannot help but think that the prophecy in its consummation is still future; though it has already received a partial fulfilment. Jerusalem's warfare is not yet accomplished: but the whole space from the Lord's first coming in the flesh to his coming in glory hereafter, is comprehended in this prophecy in which it will at length be seen that the Jerusalem which then was, had an interest. The visible church received this double at the coming, or rather at the ascension, of the Lord Jesus; when her covenant of condemnation was exchanged for a covenant of righteousness. But the prophecy looks farther; even to the end of that new dispensation which John Baptist began, when the true church "the church of the first-born, which are written in heaven" shall receive its consummation and bliss; and the national

Israel, which has been running parallel with it throughout the whole of its history, shall receive and enjoy what it has never yet truly possessed: its Canaan and its Temple. Thus, I neither understand the 'warfare,' nor the 'double,' with Luther's strictness. I might rather say, farfetched-ness. Nor do I place this text where he would place it, as a testimony against Freewill. It is only by implication a testimony against Freewill; it is a broad, palpable testimony to "reigning grace." Sin is requited with superabounding, free favour; and it is implied that there has been, and could be, nothing but sin going before. The hypothetical and therefore questionable nature of Luther's interpretation, is manifested by his own testimonies: all rest upon 'militia,' which he makes law-service. But does he not cite the Gospel, which is also called a warfare? To whom are these sayings in Timothy, the Corinthians, Ephesians, etc. addressed?

A bouquet or corsage. Libro suo inseruerit. I have ventured to maintain Luther's figure of We receive the Spirit at conversion. Till then, all our righteousness is as filthy rags (Isa

64.6). Only at conversion does the blood of Christ cleanse our sins, and the grace of God in Christ cover us. Thus, the Spirit's presence is evidence of that faith which makes us wholly acceptable to God (Rom 8.9), and which turns our sinful works into "good works." For without faith, it is impossible to please God (Heb 11.6). To say that our works prior to conversion "prepare us for grace," is to say they make us worthy of receiving grace. It is to proclaim salvation by works, not of grace. God's grace, His favor, is a gift that cannot be earned, or else it is not a gift — it is only wages due the worker (Rom 4.4). – WHG

He was declared clean by God (Act 10.15, 28), through faith (10.30-31), not by works.

However, he did not yet have an object for his faith (as with those in the Old Testament). He was an elect of God, drawn to Christ by God, for salvation (Joh 6.44). God sent Peter to him with the only means of salvation, which is the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Cornelius believed the Gospel (10.43). The union with Christ was then consummated with the gift of the Holy Spirit

(10.44). See Vaughan's next note concerning regeneration ("quickening"). – WHG Cornelius, if I distinguish rightly, was a quickened man, but not a converted man: one begotten again from death by the Holy Ghost, but not yet turned to the Lord — for how could he be turned to whom he did not know? And how could he know of whom he had not heard? But he had already been brought by the Spirit of Christ into a state to receive Him when he was manifested by preaching; and the Lord had reserved, and still reserves, this honour for his outward word, and for his accredited ambassadors.

Etiam Philippum sugillabas. Philip Melancthon maintained a good deal of friendly intercourse with Erasmus, and was much more to his mind than Luther and the rest of the reformers: this explains the use of etiam here.

To hgemonikon, hegemonikon.

Referring to his challenge above; 'provided he but show,' etc.

1Joh 5.1; Joh 10.35; 2Cor 5.17.

Luther's argument is, Freewill is called 'flesh' here; for it is part of 'the people' — which, with all that is in it, gets the name of 'flesh' here: for 'people,' 'flesh,' 'grass,' are declared by Isaiah himself to be the same thing. — You should submit according to your own previous confession, therefore; and with respect to the real nature of flesh, we have it from our Lord's own mouth in John 3. — I do not fall in with his reasoning: if flesh means what he says it does in John, then must it also mean the same here? But why must it mean what he says, in John? Why not there as well as here mean 'the whole substance and constitution of man,' not 'body only,' nor 'ungodly affection.' (See above, Sect. 37. note i.) 'All flesh,' is 'all human beings;' 'the people' generally distinguishes the Jews from the rest of the world; and so gives emphasis here. It is man's mortality, moreover, rather than his sin, which is brought into view here; as set in contrast with the immutability of God. (See the whole context from ver.

3 to ver. 8, and compare with 1Pet 1.24-25.) The great subject of the prophecy is, the glory Jehovah shall be revealed. God — who is not, like man, grass and a liar — has spoken it. In the word 'grass,' I follow our English version, which has the authority of the original text —

חָצִירherba virens a חָצִירviruit. But Luther has faenum; grass in the state of 'cut and withered.' Thus, again we have a testimony against Freewill by implication only. And though we need not wonder, as Erasmus does, how this should be dragged into the dispute (for if man is grass, what is his will?), I cannot help remarking what I will have occasion to do hereafter more freely: that Luther would have done wisely in keeping back some of his witnesses.

Referring to the Council at Nicea in 325, when it was concluded that the Father and Son are of the same substance, Gr. homoousios.

Luther speaks as the oracles of God, when he says, 'all things' — meaning all persons —all human beings — are flesh. I have hinted already (see the last note) that I do not agree with Luther in his interpretation of this most authoritative text (Joh 3.6) on which he bottoms his whole argument here, as he did before. He says "That which is born of the flesh is flesh," means that which is born of the flesh is sinful or ungodly affection; in short, it is wicked, or wickedness. I say flesh means the same in the subject and in the predicate; 'that which is born of man is man.' What this is, as to its nature, properties, and qualities, must be sought elsewhere. But the next clause gives us a pretty good hint at these, by implying that it is of a nature directly contrary to that of the Holy Ghost; "That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit." The Scripture is, moreover, abundantly explicit in its testimony to what this nature is, by giving us a full and complete history of its creation and depravation, and by asserting in the clearest and strongest terms, its total, universal, complicated, and pervasive villainy. Take but these four passages, to which scores might be added, and let them teach us what that flesh is which flesh begets, and brings forth. "What is man, that he should be clean? and he which is born of a woman, that he should be righteous? Behold, he puts no trust in his saints, and the heavens are not clean in his sight.

How much more abominable and filthy is man, who drinks iniquity like water?" (Job 15.1416) "Behold I was shaped in iniquity, and in sin my mother conceived me." (Psa 51.5) "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked; who can know it:" (Jer 17.9) "For from within, out of the heart of man, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, fornications, murders, thefts, covetousness, wickedness, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride, foolishness: all these evil things come from within, and defile the man." (Mar 7.2123.) It is not, therefore, that I draw a different testimony from Joh 3.6; but I make it a step to explicit proof, rather than explicit proof itself; and by so doing, cut the sinews of objection here, while I also preserve simplicity and uniformity in the interpretation of Scripture terms.

For a fuller consideration of the terms flesh and spirit, I venture to refer the reader to 'Vaughan's Clergyman's Appeal,' chap. iii. sect. iii. and chap. v. sect. ii. iv., where some account is given of the nature state of man, and of the sanctification of the Lord's people, which I deem satisfactory.

Omnis affectus. Not merely what we commonly denote 'affection,' meaning appetite and passion,' but all that is liable to be moved and affected in man: his whole constitution as a moral being.

Quo nitimur ad honesta. Honestum is properly opposed to turpe: 'placui tibi, qui turpi secernis honestum. — Hor. It is the 'honore et laude dignum,' as opposed to what is dishonourable: the kalon (kalon) of the Greeks; something more exalted than the prepon,

(prepon) even as that was also more exalted than the dikaion (dikaion) See above, Part ii. Sect. 20. note x .

That Scaevola who risked his life to rid his country of Porsenna; that Regulus who dissuaded from peace with Carthage though he went back to die for it.

Ut impium justificet. Luther evidently means by 'justify' here, 'making righteous;' and that is as to personal character. I do not know where he gets his quotation from; "believes on him that justifies the ungodly." (Rom 4.5), is said with quite another meaning: the nearest I can find is 1Cor 6.11: "And such were some of you; but you are... justified in the name of the Lord

Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God."

Cùm verò. I venture to give it this turn, because it is clearly a new and distinct argument which he introduces here: to call 'flesh' is to call 'wicked;' for it is to say, 1. that he does not have the Spirit (which alone makes us godly); 2. that he is a member of the devil's kingdom.

See Part i. Sect xxii. Part iii. Sect. 32. Part. iv. Sect. 20, 32.

Luther's order in the last two sections is, 1. Your praise of the heathens is false. 2. Man is 'flesh,' 'man is wickedness.' 3. What would follow if your cavil 'not all' were true. — There is a good deal of subtlety in this part of his argument; and we are ready to say, 'not content with knocking down his adversary, he kicks him when he is down;' but his objections are solid and unanswerable.

There is an ambiguity in the expression 'renatus per fidem.' Faith is the fruit and effect of regeneration strictly and properly so called; that is, 'of that act of God by his Spirit, whereby he begets the soul anew, and so makes it capable of spiritual perceptions, actings, and sufferings.' But in the more enlarged sense of regeneration, which includes state as well as character (what is more properly called new birth, born again) regeneration may be said to be the fruit of faith: "you are all the children of God in Christ Jesus by faith;" that is, manifested to be such visibly and acknowledgedly adopted into his family. The child as begotten differs from the child as born into the world. Regeneration, strictly speaking, is the begetting of the child; speaking more widely, it is the birth of it; and Baptism is the sign and seal of this regenerate state — the sign of, and the seal that we are in it. In its most correct view, it is the sacrament of the Resurrection; of our having died and risen again with Christ

— into whom we have been baptized — in a figure, the reality of which is our being in the number of those for whom and with whom he has died, in order that they might be raised up again from the dead with him, and for his sake — at an appointed time. By baptism, therefore, the Lord's people are sealed to be in the state of those who have risen from the dead; who already have that which is to be had in this life of the resurrection from the dead, in possessing, acting, and enjoying a risen Spirit — and who have the pledge of God, which cannot lie, that they shall have the superabundant residue both in their person (a raised body) and in their state (partakers of the glory which shall be revealed.) In whatever form the ordinance is administered, whether by immersion, affusion, or aspersion, it is in effect the same teaching sign: the laver of regeneration being the Lord's blood, and its application to our person denoting our union with him in his death and resurrection. It is this signing, sealing ordinance, I say, to God's elect, and to none else. When they have been called by the Spirit (which may be before or after — if one part of the sign must be future, why may not both be?), they are led and enabled either to wait upon the Lord in receiving it, or to look back to it as a benefit already received. — Hosts of objections will rise up, no doubt, against this testimony. Why then are infants baptized? Why is baptism administered to the nonelect? — I am not hesitant to answer these questions about the natural man. Infant baptism

I remark, however, must stand on its own grounds of vindication; and for my own part, I am content with God's having commanded every male Israelite to be circumcised on the eighth day— administered to non-elect! Why it has been the mystery of God from the beginning to bring out and draw to himself his elect, amidst a multitude of professing hypocrites, Enoch lived among such: Judas was one of the twelve. The meaning of the ordinance is not impaired by these mysterious arrangements; and it is just so much of shame, grief, and weakness to the spiritual man, if he does not use and enjoy the pregnant sign. — I have mixed this reference to baptism with the subject of regeneration, not only because it is so mixed by the Fathers and by the Apostles, but because I cannot doubt that the Lord had a reference to it in Joh 3.5. (Unless a man is begotten by the Spirit out of water — i.e., begotten by the Spirit in and through that water which is the sacramental emblem of my blood — he can have no part or lot in the kingdom of God); and because I consider it as so illustrative of the real nature of regeneration, which I cannot grant to be either character or state only, but I must regard it in its more enlarged sense, as comprehending both. How simple and how sweet is the view thus opened to us, of the Lord's sacraments! Baptism, the sacramental introduction of the Lord's people into the resurrection state; and the communion of the body and blood, the sacrament of their continual life in it. — The phrase

'renatus per fidem,' then, which both Erasmus and Luther adopt, is allowable as expressive of that state into which the eternally foreknown of God are brought when, having already been regenerated in Spirit, by faith and calling upon God, they are regenerated in state. In this state, they live and walk by and in the Spirit. — Then, what has this state of theirs to do with the question of Freewill; or rather, with all that has just been argued about man's being

'flesh'? —whatever is meant by that word. He that has been begotten, or born, of the Spirit is Spirit, and he has the Spirit dwelling and walking in him, and he serves God therein.

Secundum reliquias. Luther speaks of this remainder, as many other divines do, in a manner which implies that the work of the Spirit on the substance of the soul in regeneration is incomplete: whereas it will receive no increase or alteration forever. Only the body is unrenewcd, and will remain so till the resurrection. The variety is in the energizings of the within-dwelling Spirit, which, to God's glory in our real good, are neither uniform nor perpetual; and to give occasion to the unrenewed part of our frame, and to our enemies without, to gain many a transient victory over us. — What I have already said and referred to about 'flesh' and 'spirit,' will serve to show that my account of this remainder would differ a little from Luther's. — See above, Sect. 42. notes i and k. See also Part ii. Sect i. note f .

Luther defends his interpretation of Isa 40.6-7, by 1. Making Jerome and Erasmus ridiculous. 2. Maintaining Isaiah. 3. Appealing to Erasmus' vain show of candour and exposing it. 4. Entertaining the cavil 'not all.' 5. Repelling false charges, and charging inconsistencies.

Plenipotentiary: having full power to represent a government; or here, to represent God's word.

O LORD, I know the way of man is not in himself; It is not in man who walks, to direct his own steps. O LORD, correct me, but with justice; Not in Your anger, lest You bring me to nothing. (Jer 10:23 NKJ)

For objections to this distinction, see above, Part i. Sect. 15. note i .

Pertinet igitur. More literally, 'It most of all pertains to events, that a man strive,' etc.

Creatis eventibus. divinis eventibus. Luther has said (see note x), that a dominion has been given to man over the inferior creatures, in the exercise of which he would not object to its being said that he has Freewill. There are creature-events therefore, and God-events; that is, events which are conversant with creatures only, and events which are conversant with God also. Those in which he has to deal with creatures, are of small moment with respect to those in which he has to deal with the Creator. Temporal prosperity is of the former; salvation is of the latter. I deny the justness of the distinction, and I must allow that we have rather too much of the gladiator in this paragraph. Luther's defence of his text is correct; but to give his adversary another thrust when he is fallen, he goes into refinements which will not stand. Doubtless, spiritual things are higher than temporal things, but each is under the sole dominion of God.

See Part iii. Sect. 44. note m .

Luther's order is, 1. To repel Diatribe's gloss. 2. To show the folly and inconsistency of it, if admitted. 3. To confound Diatribes' confusion. The proof which the text fields is broad and palpable, and only loses force by allowing that it may allow a cavil.

See Part iv. Sect. 10. note z .

See above, Sect. 11. note h .

Quia. I should have liked quâ instead of quia, if there had been any authority for it. — For the principle maintained, see above, Sect. 11. and note h .

Coram Deo. Referring, I suppose, to the former distinction about divine and created events; as if there were some acts in which God left us at liberty. See above, Sect. 31. note a .

Sui juris. 'Jus (a jubeo, ut quidam volunt) est universim id quod legibus constitutum est, sive naturalibus, sive divinis, vel gentium, vel civilibus.' 'The law or rule, which he prescribes to himself for the regulation of his conduct.' Hence the expression 'sui juris esse, i.e., liberum esse, suique arbitrii.' 'Ut esset sui juris ae mancipii respublica.' — Cic.

Luther defends his quotations from Proverbs, and withdraws the chorus from Erasmus' old song thus: 1. Necessity does not preclude human agency, but quickens it. 2. They are imperative and conjunctive verbs. 3. The nature of God's making and operating in the wicked. 4. The king's heart furnishes an a fortiori, but any man's heart will do.

Magniloquous (or grandiloquent): Speaking pompously; puffed up; bombastic; lofty in style.

Thersites: In Homer's Iliad, he was a common soldier of the Greek army during the Trojan Uti. abuti. Ut. 'To use according to its real nature.' Abut.' To use contrary to the nature, or first intention of a thing, whether for the better or worse.' The Scripture is authority; she will not use it. The Fathers are not authority; she will use them as though they were.

Corruptis. fallacibus. Cor. expresses the state of the receiver; fal. the wilfulness of the false prophets: we have the tinder ready, and they strike the spark.

Uno verbulo. Alluding to this little word 'nothing,' I suppose. All Luther's force, he would say, is in this Achillean lance; which we break by our interpretation of the word 'nothing.'

See above, Sect. 3. Trope and Consequence, p. 239.

Longè potentiss. et callidiss. mundi. There is a little ambiguity in the expression; but he clearly means to compare the devil with other earthly Princes.

Luther speaks as others do, leaving it to be imagined that sin is a substance, and has a real and positive existence. (See above, Sect. 11. note h .) The more correct statement is that the human soul is itself a substance that is sinful and devilish, and it would remain so — willing according to its nature — even if Satan and his agency were withdrawn from it.

Fortiter contemnit. The taunt is obscure; but I understand it to insinuate that Diatribe has a good deal of that 'better part of valour, which is discretion.'

Luther refers to John 15.5, from which Diatribe argues that nothing does not mean nothing:

"I am the vine, you are the branches. He who abides in Me, and I in him, bears much fruit; for without Me you can do nothing."

I would rather rest the conclusion on the scope and train of the parable, than upon the interpretation of the figures in any one verse; this is a good general rule for the interpretation of parables. We may overstrain parts; but we cannot be wrong in seizing the general outline, and maintaining the broad principle which is illustrated, where that can be distinctly ascertained. Perhaps I should not interpret this parable just as Luther does. I consider it as a representation of the visible church, exhibiting two sorts of members: fruitful and unfruitful. Only the fruitful are Christ's true ones; and their fruitfulness is altogether dependent n a real, continued, and unobstructed union with himself. It is with reference to their continuance in him, that this nothingness is spoken of. If they should be cut off from him — suppose them to have been ever so fruitful — (thus the parable speaks), their fruitfulness would cease — entirely cease. Both the end and the way require that the nothing be an absolute nothing. Luther cannot state the result of non-union, or dis-union, more awfully than I would do; but I would question whether the parable sets this out with the minuteness which he assigns to it; and I do not see it necessary to the conclusion he is sustaining. It is quite enough that the disunited branch is a cast-away, waiting for the burning.

Per omnia et omnibus modis. Per omn. the several parts of her argument. Omn. mod. the materials of each. Her arguments would not prove her point if they were sound; but they are not so.

Verba, ut vocant. Ut voc. i.e., 'quatenus vocabula sunt, sive dictiones quibus res singulae vocantur, aut voce efferuntur.'

Coram Deo. Erasmus says, nothing means a little; and so men speak of their performances.

Luther replies, this is said of the effect, not of the act: but if it is said of the act, this proves for me: doing, he does not — for in the sight of God, his work is nothing. Coram Deo, in a former instance (see Sect. 31. note a), referred to God's presence as an agent; here he refers to it as a spectator.

Merâm nihil. Erasmus applies this text to the act of ministering the word; whereas it belongs to the effect of that ministry. But if it illustrates the agency of the free will under the ministry, without grace, then this agency is nothing in the sight of God, though not an absolute nothing in itself. — This conclusion, however, is drawn from a double misapplication of the text: it is act, instead of effect; and it is an act of the hearer, not of the speaker.

Quo loco pugnemus. The same as 'status causa;' or the question at issue.

We are reasoning about existence of grace, or 'existence before God,' and her argument is about mere natural existence, which is absolute — when even she has avowed the distinction which makes the difference.

De hoc enim. We shall see hereafter that Luther is mistaken in his view of this text; but the conclusion remains: the nothing is distinct from natural endowments. — Plato's chaos is that 'rudis indigestaque moles,' out of which, 'being itself eternal,' he taught that the eternal

God, according to an eternal draught or model in his own mind, had, in his own appointed time, created the world. — Leucippus of Abdera, b.c. 428, was the first who invented the famous system of atoms and a void, which was afterwards more fully explained by Democritus and Epicurus. The void was nothing, till the infinity of eternal atoms rushed into it by a blind and rapid novement, and thus settled into a world — Aristotle's 'infinite' is his 'first moveable,' eternally put into motion by his first Mover, and made to be what it is, at its one first projection, by Him. There is not much of essential difference, therefore, between Plato's chaos, Leucippus' vacuum, and Aristotle's infinite: they are each a name for some supposed state in which the world that now is subsisted antecedently to its present one. —

For some account of Plato, see the Preface; see also Part ii. Sect. 5. note u , where I followed Seneca's account of his term 'idea.' — For some account of Aristotle, see Part iv. Sect. 8. note r .

Detriverunt. A figure taken from threshing, or more properly, from treading out the pure grain with the feet: "You shall not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treads out the corn."

Possibly he may have a squift [swipe] at the name of Diatribe in his use of this term; 'even the Sophists have trodden the floor of their schools' to better purpose than she. See the Introduction, p. 3, note a .

Luther maintains his Achillean lance by 1. Exposing the staleness, unaptness, and unauthorizedness of the evasion which Diatribe proposes. 2. The dangerous conclusions which may be extorted from her concessions. 3. The impossibility of realizing what is thus ascribed to Freewill. 4. 'Nothing' cannot mean a little in this text. 5. And it does not in any of the texts which she adduces.

Enumerat implies 'the number in full tale' — an ostentatious display of numbers.

There is a double failure in the comparion: the works are two, and the agent in each, is one.

Hor. Art. Poet. v. 22. — I do not find any classical allusion for the gourd.

Omnia etiam impia. 'All wicked substances': men and devils Renovata creatura. Sometimes called 'the new creation;' but with less propriety. This new is all made out of the old, which 'new' does not imply, but 'renewed' does. "Of His own will He brought us forth by the word of truth, that we might be a kind of firstfruits of His creatures."

Cooperaremur. The cooperation in both cases consists in our acting concurrently with God, according to our nature. God, by his own agency, calls out our faculties, such as they are, whether natural or renewed, into act and exercise: it is by, and not without, our faculties that He moves, drives and hurries us along.

Publicè traducere. A peculiar use of traduc., 'to expose to ridicule or dishonour, to disgrace.'

So 'traducit avos.' — Juv. viii. 17. 'Rideris, multòque magis traduceris.' —Martial. 'Miseram traducere calvam.' — Id.

Stocks and stones: an Old Testament idiom for making idols out of stone, in the image of stocks (animals).

Encomion. A Greek derivative from which we get our English word 'encomium'. It is applied peculiarly to the laudatory songs which were sung to the praise of the conqueror amidst the tumultuous revels of his Triumph. See Introd. p. 4.

Explode: to show a theory or claim to be baseless.

Feasts in honour of Bacchus; which were not only drunken bouts, but scenes of proud display, to the praise of the glory of man. They imitated the poetical fictions concerning

Bacchus; putting on fawn skins, crowning themselves with garlands and personating men distracted.

Originally, "tricked out with grace."

Jer 48.10. Negligenter. Our version says 'deceitfully,' but it has 'negligently' in the margin.

Re ipsâ. The material which he worked up, as distinguished not only from his name, but from the dress of language which he put upon it.

Asperity: harshness of manner; hard to endure.

Nihil humani alienum. 'Homo sum, nihil a me humani alienum puto,' has furnished Luther with a sentiment which requires a little correction. As a called child of God he had surely something in him more than human. — He only means to make a full confession of his humanity — and that is another name for sin of all kinds.

Luther's argument is, 'Paul declares that wrath is revealed upon "all men." If so, then it is revealed upon Free will. His labour, therefore, is to show that this text means as much. That it does mean as much is shown, 1. From the very words. 2. From the preceding context.

Ebraicatur. I would not say 'hebraizes' here; for it is Greek as well as Hebrew — perhaps nearly all languages — to speak thus, grammarians call it Hyperbaton. To "hebraize" is also to bring a Jewish understanding to it.

An epithet which implies the reason for the Lord's conduct, and which I should venture to render by, 'for that they detain,' etc. In Latin, 'utpote qui;' 'seeing that they are those who,' etc. I do not agree with Luther in the distinction which he understands the Apostle to make here. I consider him to be speaking strictly of all men; even as he is proceeding to show that all men without exception in their nature state, are chargeable with holding the truth in unrighteousness. It is the nature state of man, the state of man without the Gospel, which the Apostle treats, till he comes to the twenty-first verse of the third chapter. The true connection is, 'I shall be glad to come to Rome, for I am not ashamed of the Gospel; for that Gospel is the power of God unto salvation' — that salvation which all men want; which all men want because the wrath of God is revealed upon all men for their ungodliness; for their ungodliness and unrighteousness, because they hold the truth in unrighteousness; and they hold the truth in unrighteousness, because God has made himself manifest to them, but they have not dealt with him according to that manifestation. His great charge therefore, which he goes on to maintain against man universally, both Jew and Gentile, considered as yet without the preached Gospel, is that they hold the truth in unrighteousness. This account of the context does not at all invalidate Luther's application of the text. All he lacks is "all men;" and this he clearly has.

Istis duabus. I would rather understand the Greeks in this connection to be the representatives of the Gentile world, selected as the most favourable or enlightened specimen of it; Jew and Greek, like Jew and Gentile, comprehending the whole human race.

Luther understands Paul to express that nation in its individuality, and argues by induction from there to the rest of the nations. The frequent use of this antithesis, Jew and Greek, favours my view: but Luther's argument is not affected by the distinction. His refined Greek is included among my promiscuous Gentiles.

Qui ad honesta niterentur. Referring to Erasmus' noble defence of the heathens and their philosophers, as such great sticklers and strivers for the 'honestum.' See Part iv. Sect. 43. note m . See also Part ii. Sect. 8.

The allusion is to Rom 1.14. I do not find any text in which he speaks of himself as debtor to Jews and Greeks. Luther seems to have confounded the fourteenth verse with the sixteenth, and with some expressions in Rom 2, 1Cor 1, Gal 3, and Col 3.

Luther's account of this text is, 1. The words are a testimony. 2. This testimony is confirmed by (1.) the preceding context (2.) fact and experience. — I deem him mistaken in his view, both of the text and context. (See above, note c .) The text does not refer to the truth as preached by the Gospel, nor does it make any division or exception. It is the nature state of 'all men' that is described here, and it is described as a reason for Paul's willingness to preach the Gospel at Rome, or anywhere. Luther was misled, possibly, by the word 'truth;'

"who hold the truth in unrighteousness;" as if it must necessarily mean the Gospel. What, is there no teacher of truth but the Gospel? and is the truth identical with the Gospel? "The truth" is either 'the substance of God,' or 'the doctrine of that substance what states it,' and consequently, what states or displays any part of this — so far as it does state this —may in this inferior sense (I call doctrine of or about the reality inferior to the reality itself) be called 'the truth.'

I do not forget that the Lord Jesus Christ is both personally and mystically called the truth; but if this title is examined, it will be found that He has it in both these regards, subordinately — as the grand Displayer, Declarer, Word, and Glory of God the Father, the created image of the Uncreated Reality.

Now some of the invisible things of God were thus shown, or stated out, in creation; and are shown by what we call the works of nature (that is, works of God in creation as distinguished from those of super-creation or redemption). So that, those who did not have the Gospel might still be charged with holding the truth in unrighteousness: they had it, and did not act on it. — That this is Paul's reference and meaning here, appears from what follows. He goes on to say, "Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God has shown it to them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead: so that they are without excuse." He then sets out the conduct of the Gentiles under this knowledge, having thus previously shown that if they sinned, it was without excuse. Luther is guilty here of the very error which he charges against Erasmus in Part. iv. Sect. 30, that of assuming parallelisms without proof. Because Jew and Greek are opposed in 1Cor 1, and also here, he assumes that it must be with just the same reference and scope in each. Whereas there it is the rejecting infidel, and here the un-evangelized neglecter and contenmer of God, that is the subject of remark. Still, the testimony against Freewill is entire. Even the conclusion from the sixteenth verse, and from the seventeenth verse, is not abated: "The Gospel is the power of God unto salvation for everyone who believes; to the Jew first, and also to the Greek." Therefore, both Jew and Greek need salvation; therefore, they neither have, nor know it, by Freewill. "Therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith;" therefore, righteousness is not known without it — it is not known by Freewill; it is by faith

— and that faith is not of Freewill, but opposed to it. But what does the text itself say in its grammatical sense, as led to and supported by a just view of the context? 'The wrath of God is revealed against all men in their nature state, for they hold the truth in unrighteousness: they manifest themselves to be what they are — children of wrath and curse, through original sin and guilt — by blinding themselves to that display of God which is made by the visible, and otherwise sensible, things of his hand.

Luther does not quote the words in the order in which we I have them in our version, and in which they stand in the original text. "Because, when they knew God, they did not glorify him as God, neither were they thankful. But they became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God," etc. — I doubt the propriety of Luther's distinction here between the wiser of them, and the rest of the nation. He appears to have understood the words 'faskontev einai sofoi,' (phaskontes einai sophoi) as expressing those who said they were wise among them. But there is nothing partitive in the form here. It is a description applied to the persons: of whom he had spoken in the preceding verse, and of whom he continues to speak in the following verses. The whole nation, which was a refined and philosophical nation, boasted of its wisdom. The philosophers led the way in much of the idolatry and sin, but the people followed them; and it is of the whole, inclusively but not exclusively of the philosophers, that the Apostle delivers his testimony. Luther's argument, however, is not affected by this distinction; he only wants to have it secured that the greatest and best of their community are comprehended in the censure.

Sequentia monstra, quae. The form is ambiguous; it might express that their horrific abominations were the natural consequence of their idolatries: which is true, though I do not consider him as affirming it. The form as I have rendered it, though not grammatical, is common.

Quod sine querelâ vivant. Ambiguous — it might mean without a murmur — but it seems clearly to refer to such passages as Phi 3.6; Luk 1.6. — Luther's representation of these Jews requires chastening: they yielded only an outward observance to the law, either in its ceremonial, or in its moral requirements. They did not really fulfil the commandment any more than they entered into the spirit of the ritual. The real Jew, the spiritual Israelite, was enlightened by the Holy Ghost to see, understand, receive, use, and enjoy Christ in both, by faith; having faith bestowed upon him, by an exercise of grace which was distinct from and beyond his covenant.; (See above, Part iii. Sect. 28. note v .) But the others were transgressors of the law, not because they did not have faith: "For the law is not of faith; but the man who does them shall live in them." (Gal 3.12.) One of the objects proposed by the law was to make them superabounding transgressors (Rom 5.20); and they were constituted such, not by lack of faith in Christ, but by lack of spiritual obedience to its spiritual requirements. Luther confounds Law and Gospel here: the spirit-faith of Abraham with the letter-morality of Moses! It suits his view of the Apostle's argument; but that view is incorrect. (See above, Sect. 2. note c .) The Apostle is showing that the law-having Jew is no better than the uncovenanted Gentile: "but if you are a breaker of the law, your circumcision is made uncircumcision." (Rom 2.25.)

Velut epilogum faciens. Epil. 'Postrema pars orationis qua congregantur et repetuntur ea, quae dicta sunt; Latinè peroratio, cumulus, conclusio: ab epilegw, insuper dico, dictis addo, repeto.'

Causati sumus. prohtiasameqa (protiasametha). We say, proved; but Luther is more correct, as appears both from the etymology of the word and from the discourse which follows: proait. ante causam affero; ante arguo. Most commentators however, and Sleusner among the rest, assign a sense to it like ours; although this is the only place in the New Testament where the word occurs (Rom 3.9). Paul enters quickly into proof; which looks as if he considered what had preceded as little more than laying a charge. — Some MSS. read the simple verb htias (hetias) which Luther seems to have followed.

Velut fructibus impietatis convicti. Their abandonment of God, under which they did such vile things, proved what they were with respect to God, who had been provoked to give them up.

That I deny: here he speaks of Jews only; there, by the combination of the two names, he comprehended all men. The very force of the argument consists in its exclusiveness. The Jews would say, those Scriptures do not belong to us, but to the heathens. No, he says, they are addressed to you: "Whatever the law says, it says to those who are under the law, that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God." Do not excuse yourselves; it is meant for you chiefly. Why should that be spoken to you, which belongs to others, but not to you? Your excuse therefore cannot be admitted. — It is a common and current mistake that the law was given to everybody: given to Adam in creation, and through him to the whole race. But this is apocryphal, and not canonical

Scripture. It was never given except to the Jews, that is, to the church; the elect and covenanted nation of Israel: which was for its hour (a space of fifteen hundred years) the visible church (even as the whole community of professed Christians is that church now); which was the type of the church of the first-born — the true church — and in which the several and individual members of that same church — the people of God during that period existent in the flesh — were chiefly, if not exclusively, gathered into realized union with Christ. — Here at least, it is plain that the Apostle distinguishes between the two parts of mankind — Jews and heathens — by means of this badge. If the rest of mankind is supposed to be dealt with according to this law, and as though they were under it; this must be by a tacit reference to it in the divine mind, not on the ground of any positive and express enactment which had given it to them, and in which they are plainly differenced from the Jews, who are the subjects of remark here.

My objection with respect to the law does not affect the universality of the charge. Paul is dealing with a Jewish objector; no question is entertained with respect to the guilt of the heathens. The Scriptures which he quotes have established the guilt of the Jews also. He has therefore made good his charge, that 'all men' hold the truth in unrighteousness.

See above, Part iv. Sect. 11.

I object, as before, to Luther's interpretation of this text: it is the Jews of whom he is speaking:, not of the best and most excellent of men generally. These testimonies are borne to, and concerning Jews, that they also may have their mouths stopped. There could be no question of the Gentile mouths being stopped, and there was none with the Jews; though they shifted off their own charges from themselves to others. But the argument, again, is not affected by this distinction: the whole world is declared guilty, which is all he wants.

Deo obnoxius sen reus. upodikov tw qew. Obnox. in this distinction it expresses 'liable to charge,' Reus, 'one actually arraigned.' Upoo t q comprehends the two, 'one charged with crime at the suit of God.'

Qaâ interp. reata obstrictus. Interp. See above, Part iv. Sect. 34. note e . Re. 'the state of the reus or accused;' obst. 'one tied and bound with the chain of crime solemnly charged, or imputed.'

Luther should not say 'fulfil;' it is a mere accommodation of Malachi's words, which have no reference to this subject. — Luther refines here too much, and is again guilty of arguing per sequelam [by sequel – this follows that, therefore]. The whole world is guilty. Why then, if there is any good thing in them; any good part in their substance, or any good affection of their substance, it ought to be excepted: or else this part, etc. has an answer for God. But why may they not have abused this good part? The testimony is against their spirit and conduct. By inference, their whole substance and all its affections must be bad; but this is not asserted. Just so, in the last section; 'Man does not seek after God' is the same as saying,

'Man cannot seek after God,' which he proves by argument and inference.

Luther misapprehends the condemnation here pronounced by the Apostle. It is not that the works of the law are evil; or that the works of men, so far as they are a fulfilment of it, are evil; but that they do not really perform these works. If they really performed these works, such testimonies as those above would not have been borne against them. The fact that such testimonies have been borne (which he has shown to be designed especially for them) proves that they are not keepers of the law but the breakers of it; and as breakers, not as keepers, they are condemned by it. — Luther is again in error about the word 'flesh.' It is not sinful affection here, any more than in the former instances: it is a name for the human species; 'no flesh' is 'no human being.' The argument, however, is not shaken. If the deeds of the law are ever so good, but man and Freewill, instead of attaining to them, are condemned by them; what is man, and what is Freewill?

I say, to the Jews only; (see above, Sect. 2. note c , and Sect. 7. note p) though Luther would have it apply to both. Clearly, however, both did not have it in the same form; and the Jew had the ceremonial, which the Gentile confessedly did not. It was necessary to Luther's argument, therefore that he should mark the distinction. He goes on, "Nor had this been abrogated."

Regnant: having power and authority.

The cavil is this: Paul speaks of ceremonial works exclusively. Luther's answer is, 1. Paul's argument would be defective. 2. Grace would be a mere trifle. 3. These works have not become deathly. 4. They were a part of the law requirements meaning as much as the decalogue, and have never been abrogated. 5 "When treating the same subject in Galatians

3, he expressly says, 'All things which are written in the book of the law.'

The true and short answer to this cavil is that the whole law, ceremonial and moral, is one institution, and Paul makes no exceptions or distinctions. Luther goes wide and says many exceptionable things. What he says about 'not abrogated,' is ambiguous, inconclusive, and unnecessary. Does he mean that the law in both its parts is still standing, just as it was? Was it the Apostle's place here to say 'not abrogated,' if he considered it so — as he does explicitly in Romans 6, 7; 2Cor 3; Eph 2; Col 2; Gal 4; and 1Tim 1? Is it true that what has been the law is not to be spoken of under the name of the law, unless it be still in force and reigning?

Did the Jews, to whom this argument is addressed — I say 'only,' he says 'firstly' (see last note) — require any assertion of its authority? What he says to reconcile the apparent discrepancy between Paul and Moses, which forms the basis of his interpretation and position here, he says under a misapprehension of both Paul's and Moses' meaning, and says unwisely and untruly. (Compare Deut 27.1-26, with Gal 3.10.) Paul does not have it for his object, to condemn as many as are doers of the law, but "as many as are of the works of the law;" that is, all those who are looking for justification, in whole or in part, from their obedience to the law. What inconsistency is there between this interdict of Paul's, and Moses' curse, pronounced upon everyone who does not continue in all things? etc. — Paul neither takes away this curse, nor condemns the fulfiller. He condemns the attempt to fulfil, not because it succeeds, but because it fails, and must ever fail. — 'They both require the Spirit in their performer: Moses' cursed does not continue, because he does not have the Spirit; Paul's cursed is not justified, because he does the works without the Spirit.' Now, there is no consideration about either power or motive, in either. Moses in effect says, fulfil; without inquiring or teaching how. And Paul says, 'aiming to be justified by the law, curses, because man cannot fulfil it, and there is a curse upon him who does not do it.' But the Spirit is so far from being the law fulfiller (legis consummator), as Luther entitles him, that he who has the Spirit, after justification, does not "continue in all things," and would be condemned still, if that were required of him; nor is it in any way his aim to do so. His aim is to do the whole will of God, in that relation into which he has now manifestly and consciously been brought by Him in Christ, as God is pleased to make known that will to him, and to enable him, by his Spirit which dwells and walks in him: a rule, if it can be called a rule, far more extensive and copious than the law, and of a totally different character; the law of an eternally saved and glorified sinner, walking in Christ with God — his Father, his

Friend, his Portion, his exceeding Joy. — What he says here, and in other places, about the justification of the Spirit, is fallacious. His language implies that, if the obedience of those who are "of the works of the law" were yielded in the Spirit, it would justify; and that it was for lack of this gift, that Moses' worshippers did not escape their curse by "continuing in all things." Now, though it is true that the Spirit justifies the Lord's called people (1Cor 6.11), as it "manifested God in the flesh" (1Tim 3.16), by proving whose, and who, and what they are

— this is perfectly distinct from any act of obedience which removes the curse, or earns acceptance. However, all he wants from Galatians he has: 'Paul, treating the same subject there, expressly comprehends the whole law.'

I object to Luther's interpretations and conclusions in this section. He infers a division of law workers from the words no flesh; by which Paul does not express division, but universality. No flesh (see above, Part iv. Sect. 37. note k) is no human being. The argument drawn from this supposed division therefore — that it is the deeds of the law done without the Spirit, which fail to justify, and do absolutely condemn — falls to the ground. In the several passages which he quotes, the opposition is not between the Spirit and the deeds of the law, but between the Law and the Gospel. (Gal 3; Rom 3) Nor do I allow the parallel between this text and John 3.6, any further than that the word 'flesh' is used in the same sense in both; but that is not Luther's sense. I must object to the assertion that it is the absence of the Spirit which makes the deeds of the law damnable, which would not be damnable, if He were present in them — as if any works of man in the flesh, performed with or without the Spirit, could endure the severity of God's judgment! All I can allow to Luther in this section, therefore, is that 'By the deeds of the law no flesh shall be justified in his sight.' Therefore, Freewill, even with the help of the law, is still condemned; for even with that help she cannot justify. Then what is she without it? — And is this not enough?

Luther misapprehends the scope of the Apostle's argument. He is not reasoning and declaring about man as with, and as without, the Spirit: but having shown what man is, both Jew and Gentile, from Scripture, he is arguing how impossible it is that he should be justified by the law. The argument is against justification by the law, as preparatory to his opening of justification by the Gospel; not against man's natural impotency and imbecility, while without the Spirit. — Luther makes 'not justified' to mean the same as 'damned.' It implies damnation, certainly; but Luther's expressions and argument intimate that damnation is brought and incurred by doing these deeds without the Spirit; whereas, in fact, that damnation had already been incurred before the law came; and it was only continued and manifested by it, instead of being removed.

How clearly these latter words of Paul confirm the view given in the former note as to his meaning and design! The law cannot justify, for it exposes this state of man which I have been charging upon him; it just manifests what he is. He does not say makes sin, or makes him a sinner; but is, or leads to, knowledge and acknowledgment of sin. What connection would this clause have with the preceding sentence, if the object were to show that man's law-deeds done without the Spirit do not justify, implying that with the Spirit they do? But how strong is the argument, when correctly opened, against Freewill! She does not even know, what is sinful and what is not; nor how vile she is, through her propensity to it. —

Luther reads the word "justified" in the present tense, for which I do not find any authority: the future defines the sense both of disti (disti) and of epignwsiv (epignosis); that it is therefore, not because, and 'increased or perfected knowledge,' not 'acknowledgment.' The law not only shows what is sin to a greater extent, but also its power over us, and its malignity, or "exceeding sinfulness:" it exacerbates and excites by forbidding and requiring

(see Rom 7.7-12.); and what must that soul, or Freewill be, which is provoked to evil by such a cause?

Luther does not see quite the whole of this great text, though he sees much of it. To understand it, we must connect what has gone before with it; beginning with verse 12.

"Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin: even so death passed upon all men through him in whom all sinned. For until the law, sin was in the world; but sin is not imputed when there is no law." Man — the whole race — sinned in and with the first man; each individual, distinctly and personally, having been created with, and being inseparable from him, when he personally committed the one transgression. Though sins were committed afterwards by the several individuals of the race, as brought out, one after another, into manifest existence, these were not imputed, but they were dealt with on the ground of the first transgression, in which they were distinctly, individually, and personally, parties by means of their union and unity with Adam. The law afterwards "stole in," that the offence might be multiplied; or as in Galatians, because of offences;* that is, that there might be more than one offence; that many offences might be added to the first.

With whatever little variety this text maybe read and understood — whether added because of, or put into the hand of a Mediator because of — it must imply, if it does not express, the same broad truth that the law had no other effect and design than to multiply transgressions. Again, the application of Rom. 7.7 is equally just when that text is understood in its fulness — the provocation which the law gives to sin — as in its inferior and more common interpretation, of mere teaching.

It is not, therefore, merely the communication of the knowledge of sin, that was sought and conveyed by that institution, but multiplication of transgression; that, with regard to the Lord's people, who are the displayers of God, specially as that God which is love — love to the uttermost — love in the way of grace and mercy — the God of all grace might be shown as what He is, in the much more abounding of grace, where sin has abounded. Sin has never been imputed by God to man, any more than by man to himself, without express and absolute enactment. The command, or prohibition, in the garden was of this sort; and there has been none given since, save the law which was confined to one family, the seed of Abraham, for a while the visible church — and a second, declaredly a universal one, "Repent and believe the Gospel." On the former of these universal commands, death was suspended; on the latter, life was suspended. He that believes (which implies repentance) shall be saved; he that does not believe — which implies impenitence — shall perish.

The whole force of the argument from this clause, "By the law," etc., is this: if the law, which does so little, is necessary, what is Freewill by itself? Luther, however, did not thoroughly apprehend the nature and design of that interposed covenant and dispensation; its twofold relation to Israel as the elect nation, and as the visible church — its universal typicality — its strict temporariness — and its precise adaptedness to teach sin; that is, to teach those who have made themselves sinners before they are born into the world, and as such are under the wrath of God, how just that wrath is.

The believer alone is righteous before God. It is not pretended by those, with whom Luther reasons, that Freewill makes any man a believer: it is a power and exercise distinct from, and prior to faith. If, then, the faithful man alone is just, what is the Freewill man — and of what character is his act? — It is scarcely necessary to notice here, that Luther speaks of God's manifested righteous ones. Those who have been justified from everlasting, in the covenant transactions between the divine persons, referred to the Father and to the Lord

Jesus Christ (the Father's will appointing to receive them as just, through the merits of the most precious death and passion of his dear Son) are manifested to be such, by the blessed

Spirit's acting upon and within them in due season, and thereby enabling, indeed, constraining them to believe. Now, therefore, they have conformed with that edict of God described above (Sect. 13. note c), which says, "Repent and believe the Gospel:" nor is it until this manifestation has thus been made, that any of their personal actings become the acts of the righteous — or can it in any way consequently be accounted as righteous acts. The acts of Freewill, therefore, being performed before the man has entered into this state, are acts of sin.

Latin: per fidem Iesu Christi (Rom 3:22 VUL) 'by the faith of Jesus Christ.' Also Greek: διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (Rom 3:22 SCR) "through the faith of Jesus Christ." (genitive case)

It will be seen presently, that I consider Luther wrong in the account which he gives here of "the glory of God;" but he is excessive and erroneous, even upon his own representation of his thunderbolt. Freewill, he says, is evil because it is destitute of 'the glory of God;' by which he understands 'assurance that we please God.' She is in fact guilty of unbelief, in not having it. This is outrageous, because faith is not, 'I believe God has a favour toward me,' but 'I believe in God.' Neither is it true that God has favour toward everybody. What are Luther's reprobates, then? If everybody is to believe this, many are to believe a lie.

Luther's bolts are five; 1. The righteousness of God is here declared to be perfectly distinct from the righteousness pf the law. 2. Whatever is not of faith is sin. 3. All have sinned. 4. All have come short of the glory of God. 5. The justified are all justified freely. — I would rather consider this magnificent and comprehensive passage as one vast bolt; the very emission of which lays Freewill prostrate, because it declares what her state was, to give occasion to such an emission. This vast bolt, however, may be considered as expanding itself into several smaller bolts, each of which contuses Freewill.

Luther breaks the shock of this bolt, in some measure, by not exactly discerning the order of the Apostle's argument. He considers Paul as speaking of the preached Gospel in its reception and effects, from Rom 1.16; whereas from 1.18 to 3.20 he is setting out the condemnation of all men, first of the Greek, and secondly of the Jew, as being without the Gospel. And then, having previously shown that there is nothing but condemnation without it, both without and with the law, he proceeds to open the Gospel as the revelation of the counsel and performances of God's free favour, with which Freewill neither has, nor can have, any thing to do, and which her necessities have rendered necessary, if every individual of mankind — already shown to be in a damned state — were not to be continued in that damned state forever and ever. — I also consider Luther as interpreting some of his bolts erroneously; while each, truly interpreted, is a bolt indeed!

"But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the Prophets." The righteousness of God is that righteousness which God freely bestows — which, on many accounts, might specially be called His; but which is specially socalled in opposition to man's own righteousness — a law righteousness — the result of a man's own personal obedience. "Not having my own righteousness which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith." (Phi

3.9) Luther speaks much of distinctness and opposition, but he did not discern the extent of this, and he was for bringing the law in again, after having cast it out. But the words cwriv nome banish all connection with the law forever; just as cwriv criste (Eph 2.12) and cwriv eme

(Joh 15.5) declare entire severance from Christ. Indeed, what is severance, unless it is perfect? — "Even the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all those who believe."

I say, by the faith of Jesus Christ, meaning the Gospel, as strictly opposed to the Law, and so preserving a distinctness from that which follows, "those who believe" — the distinguishing character of those to whom the Gospel is made the power of God unto salvation. It is unto these — preached especially for their benefit — they are, as it were, its point of rest; and upon these — they are efficaciously, consciously, and manifestatively invested with it, even as they have possessed it from all eternity, covenantly, secretly, and to the eye of God and his Christ. "Inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world;"

"According to his own purpose and grace which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." (Mat 25.34; 2Tim 1.9) "For there is no difference: for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God." The Jew and the Greek are invested with this righteousness alike, through the instrumentality of this preached Gospel. He is hereby shown and declared to be the God of the Gentile as well as of the Jew, and to be no respecter of persons; even as all — that is, both Jew and Gentile alike — have manifested themselves to be sinners, and nothing but sinners (for those who had the law, transgressed it, as well as those who did not have it), so proving that there was no possibility of acceptance with God — that is, of being made righteous in any other way.

I consider the sin spoken of here, to be the sin committed by every individual man while living and acting in this world, which rendered it impossible for him to obtain the glory of God on a law ground, even if his original sin and guilt were remitted. It was the special design of the law covenant and dispensation to make this manifest. The word hmarton denotes a time prior to this manifestation of God's righteousness: it is not are sinning, or have sinned, but have in time past been sinning —as the Apostle has shown distinctly of both these parties, which together constitute the whole human race — and are now, therefore, "left behind in the race" by the glory of God. This is the proper import of the word usterentai, which applies specially to the Jews who had the covenant of eternal life — that is,

"of the glory of God" — proposed to them on the ground of their own personal obedience.

This could not be so properly said of the Gentiles, while their conduct had been such as to make it manifest that they could have no claim under such a covenant, if they had been allowed to be candidates and competitors for its prize.

I do not accord with Luther in his idea of this glory. It is the same thing which is spoken of in Rom 5.2 ("rejoice in hope of the glory of God"), and in 1Pet 5.1 ("a partaker of the glory which shall be revealed.") It is that manifested excellency which God has provided for his people; and which is with the greatest fitness called His glory — the glory of God — because the state into which He will in due time introduce his human people will be one of His most glorious manifesters. They will in their measure, both individually and collectively, when thus brought into and displayed in the completeness of their union with the Image of the Invisible One, show Him forth as He is. By this glory — which, if it is to be received upon a law ground, requires spotless perfection in him who wins it — they had all been outstripped and overcome, so as to have no part in it. "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus." These words open the nature of God's righteousness, as well as the origin and ground of its bestowal.

Justified is from the same root as righteousness, and it expresses properly making the unjust, just. It is God's method of absolving a sinner from his offences by taking them clean away. The origin of this removal is free favour, and the way of it is Christ's blood-shedding.

It is a cleansing which we receive without money and without price, from, and unto the display of, that portion of God which we distinguish by the name of grace. But it is a cleansing which he has rendered himself just, in freely bestowing — that is, which he freely bestows in perfect consistency with his justice — through the price which Christ paid, by joining himself to them in their damned state, living with them as The Righteous One in and under their curse, and at length dying with them, and for them, a death of shame, agony, and complicated torments. The expression is peculiar, "The redemption which is in Christ

Jesus," marking the peculiar and elect objects of this redemption. It is a deliverance through the payment of a valuable consideration, had and received by means of union with Christ

Jesus — sought and obtained therefore, for those only, to whom the Father (as both Covenant and Scripture speak) has granted this most precious of all gifts. This implies and conveys all the rest — union with, being in, Christ. "According as he has chosen us in Him"

— that is, to be in Him; that we should be in Him — "before the foundation of the world."

Hereby, as it is afterwards declared, God is shown to be righteous, though the justifier of sinners; who are manifested to have had this covenant union, of His free gift, from everlasting, and therefore to have been of the number of those, for the sake of whom He did so come, live, and die —by having faith given to them in due season, through the regeneration and within agency of the Holy Ghost, and so differencing themselves from others to whom, according to the will of God, the free grace proclamation is made, and the second universal commandment (which the more private and peculiar one of the law, had established to be the only practicable method of salvation and glory) — Repent and believe the Gospel — has been delivered in common with them, while it is exclusively obeyed by them.

Thus this ordinance text of Luther's, fires a sort of volley against Freewill, of which every shot is death. 'Righteousness of God' — 'without the law' — 'the faith of Jesus Christ' — 'all those who believe' — 'no difference' — 'all have sinned' — 'all come short of glory' —

'justified freely' — 'by His grace' — 'through the redemption' — 'a propitiation by blood' — 'that the might be just' — 'the justifier of him that believes.' Here are no less than thirteen bolts, thirteen death-blows for Freewill, while the very existence of the Gospel declares the Freewill state of those to whom it is sent.

Condignity: punishment that is deserved.

Nostri verò. Friends, inasmuch as they profess to be antagonists of the Pelagians together with us. — What follows — 'si hypocrisin spectes' — 'hâe hypocrisi' — by a figure, this is taken from the histrionic art; that peculiar species of simulation of which the stage-player is guilty, when he puts on his mask, and personates a character in the drama.

Fulminates: criticizes severely; explodes against.

Per contentionem. Referring to Paul's continual and repeated opposition of grace to works, in this and the following chapter, as also in chapters 10 and 11. Contention, or comparison, is a figure which Paul abounds in; letter and spirit; law and faith; God's righteousness and their own righteousness; life and death; flesh and Spirit, etc. are set out by him in the most forcible manner, through this sort of competition.

Solam gratiam. gratuitam justificationem. Sol. gr. as opposed to grace mixed with works: gr. just, justification without any personal worth.

Gloriam apud homines. Vacat gloriâ Dei. Here again, Luther has the mistake already noticed (see notes g h), respecting the glory of God. It is in quite another sense that all are said to come short, and Abraham is not to boast. He had no cause for boasting before God, because he was not justified to God by his works; otherwise he would have had cause, as he might boast before men, because he was showing himself to be one justified to God by his works done after justification.

Reputatione gratiae. The account which grace takes of character; — rep. is most correctly englished by reckon; but Luther uses it throughout the whole of this passage interchangeably with 'imputo.'

Renovata creatura per fidem. As if the Lord's people were renewed by faith! where does their faith come from then? So he had said above, acquiescing in Erasmus' term, 'renatus per fidem;' which I called ambiguous there, but we now see to have been meant wrongly. —

See above, Part iv. Sect. 45. note l .

No Freewill follows from God's "purpose and grace:" "Whom he foreknew, he predestined; whom he predestined, he also called." The calling is of predestination therefore, not of Freewill; "according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord." —

'No Freewill' follows from God's promise, which was antecedent to the law, and therefore cannot be dependent upon our works, which are by the law. Indeed, in its very nature, as Paul argues, promise is opposed to work. — 'No Freewill' follows from faith ("the just shall live by faith;" "those who are of faith are blessed with faithful Abraham"); of which the law

— that is, works — is not. (Gal 3.11-12.) 'No Freewill' follows from the law: for even the law works wrath — and yet she is a help; Freewill does not even know what sin is, without her.

Luther has his eye, all the way, upon Rom 5.12-19. His account is this: Adam's sin is ours 'nascendo' — by our being born of him, as we are; born of him who did it; making us voluntary agents in being born, and making God the propagator of sin in causing us to be born from Adam, or as he has described it, making us out of him. (See above, Part iv. Sect.

10; and for objections to his statement, note z .) However, Luther's conclusion is right, though he arrives less correctly at it. The truth is, we are born having previously sinned; we are guilty, and "children of wrath;" how then can we do anything good? How near Luther is to the truth, and yet he does not reach it! Observe, he would not have it 'sin after birth;' and he would have it 'our own sin, and not Adam's only.' But he does not have that distinct individuality of subsistence given to us in the creation of the Man, which makes us truly one with him in his deed; nor does he have the power and order given before; nor does he have

God's veracity shown in inflicting the curse. (See above.) He is somewhat clearer, however, than our ninth Article, which lacks distinctness as well as fulness. [The Thirty-nine Articles of Religion. The ninth article is, "Of Original or Birth Sin." ]

The words above cited are a sufficient illustration of Luther's meaning in the several terms — 'words,' 'sentence,' 'contrast,' 'division,' 'context,' 'scope,' 'discussion at large,' 'mind of the writer.' — Extra fidem Christi, I translate according to Luther's meaning, not according to my own view of the Apostle's argument. Both here and in Galatians, it is common to represent Paul as speaking of 'faith in Christ,' as opposed to 'works.' But in both places, it is

'the Law' as opposed to 'the Gospel,' of which he is speaking. In both places he is showing, in opposition to Judaizers, 'that the Law cannot save; only the Gospel can.' — But then, that this Gospel may save, it must be believed with the heart; 'Christ must be believed in and into.' Under the right interpretation of these passages, then, two steps are lacking in Luther's conclusion that 'Paul condemns Freewill.' Paul says only, 'Without the faith of Christ there is nothing but sin and damnation.' But that faith must be received, or obeyed, before it can save; and that reception or obedience is not of the nature power of Freewill, but of the super-nature power of God's Spirit. — There are more than enough texts to prove both these points. I would rather say, Scripture is explicit enough in her witness to both these points — ("Taking vengeance on those who do not know God, and those who do not obey the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ." — "No man can come to me, unless the Father, who has sent me, draws him."). So that, there can be no question of what is truth in this matter; though Luther does not come at his conclusion legitimately, through misuse of his premises.

Ubi genus. Referring to the preceding verses, "Those who are in Christ Jesus; who do not walk after the flesh, but after the Spirit." As to what follows, it has been seen already (Part iv. Sect. 42. notes i k) that I do not admit the parallel. Paul clearly divides men into two classes; but the Lord in John 3 is showing the necessity of a new and spiritual birth. The opposition is not between those who have, and those who do not have this birth; but between the nature-power of procreation, and the Spirit-power of procreation. Adam produces his like, and the Holy Ghost produces His like.

Sensus carnis. non est subjectus. Sensus, 'the mind in action;' or rather the result of that action; 'what it thinks or desires.' It is not so properly the mind, or desire, that is not and cannot be subject (as is commonly understood); but the flesh, that is, the unrenewed body itself: fronhma (phronema) according to the analogy of language, should be 'the desire formed,' not the faculty forming it. And therefore, it is not this fronhma, but the substance that forms it (the flesh — sarx, sarx), which ought to be subject; but it is not.

Legi impossibile. Luther does not explain, as we might have wished him to do, this most difficult text: but the considerations which we have already entertained respecting the flesh and the Spirit will assist us to unravel it. In the preceding chapter, Paul had been describing a very remarkable temptation, with which, for his own good and that of the church, he had been visited since his conversion. He had been tempted to think that he must still obey the law; and having been put upon trying to do this, had acquired a deep knowledge of his own state: which is also that of every called child of God. He discovered that he had a law in his members (his body) which warred against the law of his mind, and brought him into captivity to the law of sin which was in his members. He sighed for deliverance from that body — fitly called a dead body — whose law made him so wretched. He was assured that he would one day possess it through the gift of God in Christ Jesus. At present, however, his state was that of a person serving two laws, in the two distinct parts of his frame. But still, even now, he was not condemned. Why? because he was a man in Christ. (I perfectly approve Griesbach's improved reading, which puts "Who do not walk after the flesh, but after the Spirit," as read in Rom 8.1, into the interior margin. It breaks the connection of the argument; and it may very naturally be supposed to have been interpolated from Rom 8.4.

[Johann Griesbach (1745-1812) was a famed biblical interpreter]) Why, as a man in Christ, did he have no condemnation? Because the Holy Ghost, had by him in Christ, had delivered him from the thraldom and bondage of that law which still reigned in his members. Why did he have the Holy Ghost in Christ Jesus? Because God, by sending his own Son in flesh of sin, had condemned sin in the flesh — that is, Christ had executed the sentence of death upon this sinful flesh, and could now, in consideration of that sentence so borne, raise up both Himself and that people for whom and with whom he had borne that sentence, into a new state of being, in which they would be the subjects of spiritual influences in both parts of their frame; in whom, even here, while tabernacling in their flesh of sin, the foretaste and firstfruits of this grace is shown in their being renewed, and dwelt in, by the Holy Ghost.

Here I have stated the reality, which is more commonly set forth by the Holy Ghost in figure — the dying, quickening, rising, and now sitting of the Lord's elect in and with Him.

(See Rom 6; Eph 1 and 2; Col 2 and 3.) God's eternal, covenanted design of raising them up, in Christ, from that death into which they were contemplated as having brought themselves by their fall in and with Adam, is the basis and element of this reality.

Thus, they have that done for them, which the law could not do, because it was weak through our flesh's being what it is. They are enabled to fulfil the righteousness of the law — or rather to yield to God a service which is far more righteous, because it is more adapted to that full manifestation which He has now made of himself, than law obedience would or could be. — Hereafter, he proceeds to show most triumphantly in the progress of this chapter, that the other part of their frame will also have its triumph: the body which has death in it, and has yet assuredly to die, shall be quickened by the same Spirit which has already quickened and dwelt in their souls, and shall live.

This, which had been glanced at in Rom 8.25, and is so distinctly affirmed in verses 11, 21, and 23 of this chapter, receives its seal and crown in 1Cor 15, where the paean [a formal expression of praise] is sung, and the victory ascribed to its giver and communicator. "But thanks be to God who gives us the victory, through our Lord Jesus Christ." — I have found it impossible to render a consistent account of these two chapters (to which the precedent sixth may be added), verse by verse, and clause by clause, on any other principle than this, which makes 'flesh' the substance of the body, and 'spirit' the renewed mind. (See Part iv.

Sect. 37. 41. 42. and much that has elsewhere gone before.) There is much emphasis in verse 1. Therefore (that is, although with the flesh, they serve the law of sin) there is now (as opposed to 'I thank God,' Rom 7.25, for what shall be) no condemnation (all these outbreakings and manifestations of evil are forgiven, and not allowed to abidingly mar the peace of their souls — for "Who shall lay anything," etc. Rom 8.33-39.) to those who are in Christ Jesus, Rom 8.1.

The people of God are said to be in Christ Jesus, with reference to two distinct states: in Him by covenant and predestinative union from before the worlds ("According as he has chosen us in Him," etc., Eph 1.4; "Grace which was given to us in Him," etc., Rom 12.6); in Him by realized, conscious, and efficacious union, through the calling of the Holy Ghost.

("Andronicus and Junia...who also were in Christ before me," Rom 16.7; "I knew a man in A third state may be distinguished as that of sacramental union (see Part iv. Sect. 45. note l), which is distinct and separable from the other two: bring an analogy to that entrance which the Lord had into his kingdom, by baptism. — The blessedness here described belongs to his called, but it is the ordained, earned, and waiting portion of all his elect; who, as they are one by one brought by the Holy Ghost into the knowledge of this grace, toward themselves as those who have virtually died in and with Christ, and who therefore are dead, and have their life hid with Christ in God. Hence they live and walk after that part of their frame which lives — into which it has already been introduced — and not according to that which is virtually dead.

It is of the Lord's called that he here bears this testimony, as it appears from the context. It is a testimony which, in the Lord's time, is realized for all his elect, and for the same reason

— God has condemned their sin which is in their flesh — "Who is he that condemns? It is Christ that died." Rom 8.34. He has made me free (Rom 8.2): a habitual deliverance is not incompatible with an occasional ravished subjection — such as he described in chap. 7. The law of sin and death is clearly the law of evil, which is in the members, or flesh, or body. The impossibility of the law — the law gave no power, and therefore it could not possibly get itself to be obeyed by a creature whose substance is such as fallen man's. Likeness of flesh of sin does not deny reality any more than in Phi 2.7. Condemned, etc. not only passed the sentence but inflicted the judgment.

Compare 1Pet 4.1-6, also 3.18-22. 'Christ's flesh condemned and made to suffer or die,' is not only the burden of Scripture, but the essence of the reality of the foundation of God's new creation-transactions in Him: even as the knowledge of this body of ours — what it was in its formation; what it was in and became by the Fall; what it is to the unregenerate; and especially what it is to the regenerated sons and daughters of Adam — is one of the great keys to the mystery of man, and to Christian experience.

Righteousness of the law is not what is commonly meant by it: 'the act, or ground, of justification;' but 'the enactment' — 'the matter of the statute' — dikaiwma, dikaiooma, not dikaiosunh, dikaiosune. Who walk — denoting habitual conduct, aim, and principle. Their conformity with the law is circuitous, not direct; incidental, not deliberate and designed.

They 'walk in the Spirit" (Gal 5.16); that is, 'in or after their renewed mind,' just as it is said here, Who do not walk after the flesh, but after the Spirit. I cannot forbear remarking what a close parallel that whole chapter (Gal 5) is to the seventh and eighth chapters of Romans, and how truly the whole rule or law of the Lord's called ones ("you have been called to liberty") is set out in the four words which I recited above. For what is not only the whole law, but even the whole volume of Scripture to us (to the extent it is apprehended and received by our renewed mind), through the inspiration of the Holy Ghost?

I cannot agree with Luther here. Origen is more nearly right than he, if by soul may be imderstood 'the will with its affections;' and the distinction is surely recognised in Scripture, when Paul prays for the Thessalonians "that their whole spirit and soul and body may be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." (1Th 5.23) According to Luther, 'those who are after the flesh,' and 'the flesh,' are the same substance; whereas, in truth, the distinction of character is made by these constituent parts of their frame according to which they walk (that is, habitually act) severally. The natural man Yucikov, psuchikos) lives after his flesh, and is carnal. The spiritual man (pneumatikov, pneumatikos)

— he who has a pneuma, pneuma — that is, a Holy-Ghost-renewed spirit, lives after his renewed spirit, and is spiritual. Thus the spirit and the man, and the flesh and the man, are distinct substances severally; though the one includes the other. — Still, Luther's conclusion is not affected. He who does not live after the spirit, but after the flesh, does only evil; because that flesh, after which he lives, is only evil; 'defecated' evil: and unless and until a man is renewed in the spirit of his mind, and thus is made spiritual, he neither does, nor can do anything good. Indeed, further, if he is thus renewed, and when he has been thus renewed, it is only so far as his renewed spirit is impelled and sustained by the Holy Ghost, that he either resists evil, or works good. There are seasons when, for the fuller manifestation of God to his real good, the Holy Ghost, who never leaves his temple, but is like the friend who sits by, neither speaking, nor putting out a finger to help. So far as he is left to the endeavour and power of Freewill, therefore, all that is said here by Paul, about not pleasing God, etc. belongs to him.

Luther adduces these expressions in Romans 8 as the crown of Paul's testimony against Freewill. The flesh — meaning, as I maintain, the natural, unrenewed substance of man, with all that is in it (and the unrenewed man has nothing else) — is enmity against God. He confirms this saying, by two of Christ's, which say that we can do nothing else; not merely that we do evil, but that we can do nothing else, from our very composition; being like corrupt trees; "being evil." And in another place: you "being evil," do evil, even while you are giving good gifts (Luk 11.13). Then, by insinuation and implication, Luther proves the same from Paul's twin sayings. If the just man lives by faith, he that does not have faith is not just; and, if he is not just, then he is a sinner. — If whatever is not of faith is sin, then whatever is done by mere Freewill is sin, because Freewill has nothing to do with faith, but is by the supposition perfectly distinct from it. Neither does faith have anything to do with Freewill, but it has another origin. Whatever it does, therefore, not being of faith, is sin. So that Freewill is only sin.

I object to the application of these two texts in this connection. It is the eternal state of the already justified person, which is proclaimed by "shall live." (See Hab 2.4; Gal 3.11; Heb

10.38.) Faith, then, is the acceptable principle, without which (it is implied) there will be no acceptance for any man. Freewill has no faith; therefore it does nothing acceptable. — But still, the fair application is, shall not live; not does only sin. "Whatever is not of faith," etc., if Luther interprets it rightly, proves his point; because Freewill, not acting in and by faith, can do nothing, therefore, except what is sin. But that text means 'if a man is not satisfied as to the rectitude of his own act, but doubts it,' it is sin. This text, therefore, does not fairly apply because Freewill may have no doubts, and yet still be damned, whether she doubts or not. On the other hand, a person may sin in some particular act, by acting without faith, and yet not be a condemned person: it is of such that Paul speaks. Thus, although the principles which Luther would establish from these two texts are true, these texts, rightly understood, do not prove them.

Sublapsum referri. 'Omnia nirsus 'In pejus ruere, ac retro sublapsa referri.' — Virg. G. I, v. 200. 201.

For some considerations which seem desirable, to mitigate the harshness of this statement, see above, Part iv. Sect. 34. note d; also Part iv. Sect. 10; Part iii. Sect. 38. note l .

Peculiaris. Luther means peculiar to this Apostle, as contrasted with the other sacred writers: but it is not confined to John. Paul has it also, Eph 2.12; Col 1.6. It may be doubted, too, whether he ever speaks of the world universally; that is, of a strict 'all men,' 'all mankind;' though his contrast is varied. Sometimes it is the world at large, as opposed to the Jews; sometimes the multitude of the unregenerate, as opposed to the called people of God, as Luther afterwards distinguishes ("Nam et ipse Johannes," etc.). This is a more correct distinction than Christ's people, and the seed of the wicked one. For, until called by the effectual working of the Holy Ghost, the children of the kingdom are often found to be as fierce opponents of the truth, and of its children, as the devil's seed. What was Paul? —

Luther does not notice the former of these oppositions, but it is a necessary one to mark.

Clearly, it obtains in the words under consideration. "He was in the world (that is, in the material world — on the earth) and the world knew him not: he came to his own," etc. The contrast here is between the world at large, and his peculiarly connected ones, the Jews.

And so, in John 3.16, "God so loved the world," etc. It is all kindreds and tongues, and languages, etc., contrasted with the natural seed of Abraham. The clear sense here assists in establishing this use of the term, and it serves to confirm the ascription of it to Joh 3.16, etc.

Translatum in spiritum. We might render it 'made spiritual;' but this would efface the distinction which he means to mark. He opposes Christ to the world; making Christ the Spirit, in contrast with Adam, the flesh. So, by realized union with Christ, we are transferred from the world into the Spirit.

'The will of the flesh' and 'the will of man' separated and distinguished, and both named, must, upon every conceivable interpretation of those terms, exclude everything belonging to the human will from this generative power; and therefore, they decide the question as to the power of Freewill, in bringing us to the inheritance of God's children. But I would rather understand 'bloods' to express natural birth generally (we do not have it by descent from our parents); 'will of the flesh' for our own personal and individual will, which we have by nature; and 'will of man' for the ordinance and appointment of man generally: it is not a human device. It is what men have chosen and procured for themselves, or what can, in any individual instance, be conferred by man, one or many, willing it to another. A man may leave his estate at death, or confer a liberal gift in his lifetime, but he cannot will or bestow new birth. Luther speaks as if we were begotten by believing ('nascendo ex Deo, quod fit credendo in nomine ejus'); like Erasmus' 'renatus per fidem,' which, as we saw, he does not object to. But the truth is, we must be begotten again before we can believe; and then, believing, we take our place among God's adopted children. So that there is a sense in which we are regenerated by faith, inasmuch as it is by faith we are manifested to be of the Lord's children. But the birth, or generation more properly, spoken of in verse 13. is prior to faith; so that it cannot in this view be said, 'nascor ex Deo, credendo in nomine Jesu Christi.' (See above, Part iv. Sect. 45. note t , also Part v. Sect. 19. note n .)

Pro gratid scilicet Christi. Luther seems to understand him as saying grace in return for, or on account of, his grace;' that is, the grace which Christ has himself shown. So he clearly explains himself afterwards, when he says 'gratiam eis impetrat per suum sanguinem.' In this view, it is parallel with the passage which he cites from Romans 5. It is more commonly interpreted 'grace for grace;' that is, one degree or measure of grace for another. But Luther is more correct: although the grace which we have from Christ is in reality grace given to us by the Father in the same instant in which the grace is given to Christ, by means of which he has done and endured everything personally; it still comes to us, and is actually conferred upon us, in the way of fruit and consequence of his actings — grace bestowed on us, for the sake of grace acted previously by himself.

Condignity is the quality of deserving something; inherent worthiness. Congruity is the quality of being suitable.

Meritum condignum. 'Worthy merit,' i.e., 'merit worthy of the reward which is proposed to be given to it,' 'merit of worth to the uttermost.' See above, Sect. 16.

It is most true, that the Gospel mystery is strictly a matter of revelation, and not within the discovery of natural reason. But it is also true that it has been the will of God that there should be intimations of this mystery, hereafter to be revealed, and traces of such intimations amidst all nations, from the beginning. The kingdom of God was announced immediately after the fall, in the denunciation upon the serpent. And it has been part of the counsel and work of God, that it should be spoken of, and looked for, and that the eternal separation between the two parts of the human race into hell and into heaven, should be made on the ground of it. Still, it is not that Freewill has found this out, but that God has shown it.

Pro nobis exaltatum. Exalt. is a word of doubtful meaning, which might refer to his seat at the Father's right hand; but I understand it with allusion to the Lord's words, "And I if am lifted up" (uywqw, John 12.32), as explained by the comment, "this he said, signifying what death he should die."

Nec sic tamen tacere. A sort of oxumwron, exumooron, like 'stremna inertia,' 'concordia discors;' but there is no real inconsistency: Freewill should be silent for herself, and give glory to God.

The word extra is used throughout the whole of this passage, to denote distinctness: there are but two sorts of substances; to be without the one, is to be within the other.

Luther's argument is that Scripture speaks by way of comparison (See above, Sect. 18. note); therefore Freewill, which confessedly is out of Christ, must be sin, death, Satan, error, etc. If you deny that Scripture speaks by comparison, 1. You make Scripture void. 2. You deny

Christ. 3. You make God unjust. His reasoning is subtle, but conclusive. See the same sort of argument pursued, and remarked upon, Part iv. Sect. 44. note s .

Jam judicatus est. Already as opposed to the judgment day. He need not wait for that; the preaching of Christ tries him, of what sort he is, whether he is a doer of evil, or a doer of the truth — as it appears from vv. 20, 21. The secret is, a regenerated soul, when Christ is preached, knows, owns, and receives him. He who rejects Christ, thereby proves that he is not regenerated, but is in his nature state; devilish, and possessed by the devil. — It is supposed that the state described here is the abiding, unchanged, indeed dying state of the man. Every deliberate rejection of Christ, when preached, gives ground for an awful apprehension; but it is final rejection which stamps this judgment. Such being his mind towards Christ, he does not need the process of the last judgment to declare whether he is

Luther refers only to 1Joh 1. But the testimony is equally strong in 1Joh 5.10. "He that does not believe God has made him a liar; because he does not believe the record that God gave of his Son."

Per synecdochen. Syn. 'A figure of speech by which a part is taken for the whole, or the whole for a part.' Here, Diatribe makes it the whole of man, put for his grosser part.

Hic dicit. That is, according to Luther (who assumes that the things spoken of here are things of God, not of the creature), determines this question; it is God's will that is done, not man's. — I have already objected many times to the distinction which Luther here again resorts to (see above, Part iv. Sect. 46. note x); nor can I allow this text to be a direct testimony against Freewill. — John is accounting for the superior honour paid to Jesus above himself. He had just been informed concerning Jesus, "All men come to Him." The principle of the remark therefore is, 'I can have no more of honour than it is the will of God to bestow upon me.' And he goes on to say that he never claimed to be Christ, and consequently never claimed to receive the honour which it had been the Father's good pleasure to appropriate to Him. It is honour and distinction, therefore, not spiritual power and capacity, of which John speaks here. — But it is honour in and of the kingdom of God, which is preceded by a gift of super-creation power exciting and leading to it. As the honour is, so is the precedent power of God, and according to the measure in which he has ordained to bestow it, and produce it. However, non tali auxilio. If Luther understands it as, 'we must have power given to enable us to receive power,' then it is a testimony. But its meaning is far simpler than this. What we have, we have received; if another has more, it is because God has given it.

This is a testimony borne to Jesus by John, in contrast with himself: though filled with the Holy Ghost even from his mother's womb, and having the hand of the Lord with him (Luk

1.15, 66.), he had not been born 'by the Holy Ghost's coming upon a virgin mother, and the power of the Highest overshadowing her;' 'he had not come down from heaven ,' he had not 'come from above,' 'come from heaven,' (and, as compared with Him, was earthly in his words (see Luk 1.31; Joh 3.13, 31; 6.38, 41, 42), as well as in his frame and formation.)

I do not refer to 1Cor 15.47, because I consider it as belonging to another subject — Christ the risen head of his risen people, come down the second time from heaven to raise his dead ones. — It is of Christ walking upon this earth that the Baptist testifies here: he comes or (what is the same in import here] he has come from heaven; and so too in the other passages to which I have referred.

Luther misunderstands the text — he does not see its glory, and he does not elicit its testimony against Freewill correctly. It is, however, a testimony: if John, only so far as he had a gift from heaven, was other than earthly, and had so comparatively little of this gift as to fitly call himself earthly — what is 'Freewill,' 'nature man,' 'that which is nothing but earth,' instead of being such a one as John had been made, by the grace of God. It is not 'Christ's people,' and 'the world,' which are opposed to each other here by the names

'earthly' and 'heavenly,' but Christ and John singly. John was a man in no way different from other men as to his natural frame; he was truly and solely a son of Adam. But Christ's human person, as to its spiritual part, was from heaven.

Surely the Lord means more by 'from beneath' here, than the Baptist did, who spoke of himself or, according to Luther, 'of himself and all who are Christ's.' The Lord speaks of these Jews as the devil's seed, whose throne and habitation are beneath the earth — while his own origin, as well as his throne, was and is heaven. (See that whole discourse in John 8, especially from v. 21 to the end of the chapter.) Luther's conclusion, however, is correct. He bore this testimony to their best and finer part, not to the grosser pat. An objection may indeed be taken to, 'These were expressly and emphatically children of the wicked one; and therefore their case is somewhat different from that of the children of the kingdom.' The answer is, not as it respects nature — Freewill and all natural powers.

Venit ad me. The original text is stronger; "is able to come to me."

Illuminationem Spiritûs. Not 'the enlightening of the man's own soul,' but 'the throwing of light upon Christ.' The blessed Spirit casts his bright beams upon the face, or person, of the Lord Jesus Christ and so wins to him. — This is a most beautiful and accurate description of that Holy Ghost violence with which the soul is converted. One can hardly help saying to Luther, O si sic omnia! A single testimony, like this broad and irresistible one, opened as he opens it, is worth a hundred abstruse and obscure ones. It is a question in the first place, of whether they bear at all upon the subject — secondly, how they exactly bear upon it — and thirdly, with what degree of effect. I do not mean to disparage Luther's testimonies which, with a few exceptions, are clear, and strong to the point. But I think the question might be safely rested upon this single text — considered in its connection — and that, on such a subject, to bring those which would allow for a doubt, or a possible misconstruction — in short, to use any other implement than a sledge-hammer is unwise. Even Luther might have made his proofs clearer and stronger; and they would have lost nothing by being fewer. The impression is weakened by being extended; and many small blows, of which one or two beat the air, render the victory doubtful in the sight of the by-standers. (See above, Part iv. Sect.

42. note i.) But what do we have here? It is not only that the words are so express that it is impossible to evade them, and that to cite them is even more impressive than to enlarge upon them; but they must mean what they say — 'There is no power whatsoever in the natural man to come to Christ' — because otherwise, they have no meaning at all in this context. — The Lord is accounting for their murmurs, in which they muttered a rejection of him. 'You reject me! What wonder? It cannot be otherwise, seeing that you are not drawn to me by God.' — And when he repeats the same sentiment at the 65th verse, it is to account for the same fact, and it is followed by a consequence which would naturally result from such a declaration, and which no other sentiment would account for. "From that time many of his disciples turned back and walked with him no more. Then Jesus said to the twelve, "Will you also go away?" The testimony, therefore, is so unequivocal, as well as so decisive, that Freewill does not even have a heel to lift up against it.

Omnibus modis vicero. Omn. mod. like panti tropw (panti tropoo), or kata tanta tropon (kata tanta propon) of the Greeks, expresses the manner in which any act is done, or event accomplished: 'By whatever arts and means, or with whatever spirit and turn of mind, the contest is carried on, I will have so conquered as not to leave a single jot or tittle for Freewill.' — The argument is this: Scripture preaches Christ by antithesis; therefore, whatever preaches Christ, excludes Freewill. Christ is preached everywhere: therefore,

Freewill is opposed everywhere.

How strange that this enlightened and enlightening view of the two kingdoms should be so little realized, substantiated and applied! This needs only to be carried back to the period of the fall, and from there continued downwards to the end of the world, with an understanding that this is not the creation-state of man, and the things of man, but the counsel and scheme of God, as made way for by the creation and the fall, to render all

Scripture, history, observation and experience, simple and intelligible! Luther evidently did not comprehend them in the fulness of their origination, design, operations, and results. But the substance is here, and we can scarcely help breathing out the vain wish that he had, for his own comfort, and that of others whom the Lord has not disdained to edify by his writings, been enabled to put the elements, with which he here furnishes us, together, in their beginning and endings, and in the connection of the intermediate parts, in a workmanlike manner. He has the materials; but he neither models, nor lays the foundation, nor builds on it. Still, what grace in his day to have seen so much!

I have already shown that I do not coincide with Luther in his representation of the flesh and the spirit. I consider the flesh and the spirit to be the unrenewed body and the renewed mind, severally, of the Lord's called people. But this difference does not affect the argument here. If the renewed man, who has the Spirit, has this conflict to maintain, then what is the wholly unrenewed man before God, and what is his endeavour after good?

Laborare. The allusion is evidently to 1Cor 9.26; but he does not use the word currere. Paul says trecw (trechoo – run).

Justitiariorum. I do not find the word, except as bad Latin for 'a justice!' But the connection determines it to mean here, persons who are going about to establish their own righteousness, in opposition to those who have learned that there is a God-righteousness, and have been led to submit to it. — 'Justicers,' or 'righteousness-mongers.'

Oudeiv (Oudeis) implies more than no man: no person, whether man or devil.

The defects of Luther's theology are apparent in this paragraph. He gives quietness, but not triumph; quietness too, we know not why, when a reason might be assigned. We are to live, assuredly to live; yet we do not live: we are to work too, that we may live; and our workings must be forgiven and amended. He did not see Christ's peculiar and peculiarizing headship.

He did not see that the efficacy of Christ, is enabling God — by his own dying — to raise up the cursed from their curse after suffering a part of it; that they live, even now, in a risen

Christ as though they had risen with him; and that it is eternal life already received and acted, in just such a measure as He is pleased to bestow it, which constitutes the acceptable service that they are now rendering. This service He will reward, as he has appointed, and in just such a measure and manner as he appointed. But all this is upon the basis of Christ's super-creation headship, and their relations to God in Him. The merit of their acceptance has been wrought already, to the uttermost, by Him alone; and they have only to enter into and enjoy their portion — which is a mixed one here, but an unmixed one hereafter. See Part iii. Sect. 38. note l. Joh 3.36; 5.24; 10.28; 17.3; 1Joh 5.10.

Ad illius omnia. I do not venture to render it, 'as compared with its like of His;' but Luther means so, presuming that our image-ship extends to every divine property.

Hale: cause through pressure or necessity, by physical, moral, or intellectual means.

Justitiam et judicium. Just. The principle of justice; the faculty of judgment.

Arrogate: to demand as being one's due or property; to assert one's right or title to something.

Ad consolandum. An odd expression in this connection; but he means, to console the spirit which is tempted to see with evil eye: 'an evil eye is one which is either unsound generally, or is infected with the particular disease of envy, malice and blasphemy.' See Mat 6.23;

Job 12.6; Psa 73.12. Our version says, "The tabernacles of robbers prosper." "Behold, these are the ungodly who prosper in the world; they increase in riches."

Luther feels a difficulty in reconciling the condemnation of the reprobate with God's justice.

In fact, he acknowledges that he cannot; begs off, and then makes unwarrantable concessions. This difficulty arises from his imperfect conception of the creation and fall of man. If every individual of the human race had a distinct personal subsistence given to him in the creation of Adam; and consequently, had a distinct personal subsistence in him when he broke his commandment; and as this distinct substance was one with him who by his sole personal agency broke that commandment (the union of these many distinct substances in and with his one substance in now way contradicting the sole and distinct agency of the one first man, Adam) — then where is the injustice of God's bringing out each of these distinct individuals, one after another, into manifest existence and distinct personal agency, and — having given to them individually, for the most part, the opportunity of showing what they are, according to their own making of themselves, not according to his making of them

— inflicting upon them the judgment which he had distinctly fore-announced, which by their disobedience as one with Adam they had wilfully incurred, and which for the most part they have by their own subsequent actings in this world, proved to be their due, suitable, and self-made portion? God has been pleased to make provision for the mitigation, removal, and reversal of this sentence, in some of those who have justly incurred it, clearly, those who suffer have justly incurred it; and therefore, God is only just in inflicting it.

Through not discerning the mystery of the creation, Luther accounted God the creator of these wicked ones, as we have several times seen; and in consequence, through not discerning their participation in the fall, he accounted God their debtor, to give them an equivalent for that Freewill, or rather that knowledge of only good, which Adam had possessed, and which Luther did not see how they had forfeited. I say knowledge of only good, because Adam had no more of Freewill, properly so-called, than we have, as has been shown. With respect to the justice of God in this transaction, then, there can be no question

— though Luther makes one. Justice is the fulfilment of relations; God had fulfilled all His when man incurred his fore-announced curse.

What does justice then require, but that it be exacted? Again, with respect to God's right of instituting such relations as He did between himself and the human race in Adam, there can be no question. God has a right to form any creature that he is pleased and has power to form. To be consistent with himself, he will give them due relations, and will fulfil his own part in those relations. Now, what was lacking in the relations that he gave to Adam? Did He not give him reason and knowledge, by which he ought to have resisted the temptation? And if Adam had enough, what could the distinct substances which were in him complain, if God put their safety upon the issue of his obedience? What difference would there have been, or could they pretend there would have been, in the result, if each of them distinctly and personally had undergone the same trial?

But I do not deem this consideration at all necessary: it is the union and unity of each individual of the human race with Adam, while still retaining his individuality, which constitutes his original sin and his original guilt, and from which the loss of his creation state and of his creation character was derived. The only question that can be asked in all this mystery, respects the goodness — that is, the lovingkindness of God. It is here that Paul puts the difficulty; it is here that he calls for submission; and it is here that he assigns the principle of the procedure. "Is there not unrighteousness?" For it will come to this: no man has done otherwise than God designed. The answer is, God has exercised his right of the potter, and has exercised it for a great and wise reason. "What if," etc. The man whose eyes the Lord has opened will see and search into these things, and will justify God at his heart.

Nor will Paul, with his Isaiah, condemn him. He is using what God has done and has revealed, to the very end for which He has done and revealed it. See Part iii. Sect. 38. note .

Part iv. Sect. 10. note z , Sect. 11. note h , and Sect. 34. note d .

Luther's mention makes it doubtful which of the two Plinies he refers to; whether to the great naturalist or his nephew. Neither of them, however, saw in the works of nature, anything more than matter. Both were amiable, as natural men, and the former was a monument of philosophy and industry, called by some the martyr of nature, but more fitly called the martyr of curiosity and self-will. The latter was a well-bred, lettered persecutor of Christians; but he was too proud to inquire into their doctrines, and was not afraid, though reluctant, to shed their blood. For some excellent remarks on his character, see Miln. Eccl.

Hist. vol. i. pp. 166-172. For a hint at the Epicureans, who were like their master — 'Epicuri de grege porcus' — See above, Part i. Sect. 5. note l. For a confirmation of what is said here about Aristotle, see above, Part iv. Sect. 8. note r .

Demosthenes, abandoned in fact by his countrymen after having fled to the temple of Neptune in Calauria, sucked his poisoned quill. Cicero was delivered up to his philippicized

If the observations of the preceding note are correct, we do not want Luther's illustration, with its distinctions. We need not wait for the decision and discoveries of the great day, to see God just. Nor are his assumptions admissible. God has never left the eternity of man and the future judgment without witness. If these things have been obscured, it is not by God's having put them into the dark, but because men have wilfully shut their eyes to them. The new creation kingdom was announced at the fall — and it has been variously preached ever since, to the whole earth. The kingdom of grace does not leave God under the suspicion of injustice. Man has made himself that damned thing which he is. The elect are not crowned sinners. The union of the elect with Christ, and the lack of this union in the reprobate, with its consequent self-left state, explains both dooms, in perfect consistency with divine equity.

The illustration, therefore, is both unneeded and untrue. It is unneeded, inasmuch as the spiritual man even now sees the inflexible justice of God to be without spot — what it assuredly is; and it is untrue, inasmuch as Luther's insolvable questions are resolved under those lights which he declares to be severally inadequate.

Pertinacity: persistent determination; that is, if the listener does not doggedly refuse to hear the truth.

A still inferior view to what he has given us before of original sin, but a very common one: here he takes it for that vitiation of nature, which is the consequence of it — instead of that first sin, which gave origin to the vitiation. But the argument against Freewill is not affected; the consequent vitiation is in no way less than he represents it to be.

He briefly recites certain additional considerations which must, each of them, be conclusive upon this subject. 1. God's foreknowledge and predestination. 2. Satan's lordship over the world. 3. Original sin. 4. The case of the apostate and rejected Jews, as contrasted with the conversion of the Gentiles. 5. Christ the Redeemer as unnecessary, or his benefit vilified.

Ita per Satanam. Very true as to instrumentality. But from where, then, does this ingratitude come? Could not God cure it? Could not he drive out the Canaanite altogether from the land? Regenerate man, and a revived church, is still Adam; and it is the glory of God to save and glorify an Adam. He must be shown therefore, or rather he must show himself, what he is. His Canaan is not yet the Lord's world, nor is he yet the risen God-man.

The time of ingratitude is yet; and it is yet, because the Lord's real and designed glory requires that it should be so. There is something satisfying, and cheering, and enlightening, in this view of the Lord's present dealings with his church and people, which reconciles us to what must otherwise be a constant burden and distress, and which leaves no more questions to be asked. Luther did not have distinct perceptions of the origin, nature, and design of evil; and while he talked much about Satan, he did not understand him well enough to put him in his place.

That is, Erasmus was merely "talking about" these things, rather than asserting they are categorically true.